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Abstract
Concept development in relation to the biology of reproduction in secondary
science: 
a Vygotskyan perspective.
Doctor of Education (EdD)
J McAnulty
The study of concept development in biology comes from a professional 
concern that arose in my classroom teaching -  an inability, after many years 
practice of the techniques of ‘discovery science’, to accept the theoretical 
base of the individual secondary school pupil constructing science concepts 
mainly through experiment.
From this concern arose my research question -  the extent to which a 
developmental space could be defined in which the development of science 
concepts could take place. The instance for examining such a space would 
be science concepts of reproduction.
To develop a model for such a space I looked at the work of Jean Piaget, 
Lev Vygotsky and a number of other theorists concerned with the issue of 
innate learning mechanisms and of constructivism and social 
constructivism. I adopted Vygotsky’s dialectical materialist approach in 
assessing the concepts involved.
To test the emerging model I decided on a case study approach, defined in 
terms of both the case as instance and the case as issue -  instance in that the 
focus would be a year 8 (Britain year 7) science class, with interviews
P agel
across the year group The study would involve the case as issue in that I 
intended to walk through the process of concept formation in plant and 
human reproduction with the pupils. I applied a mixture of semi-structured 
interview and classroom observation, linked through the development of 
‘structured situations’ in which models and materials were made available 
in specific social settings in the expectation that the pupils would construct 
meaning.
The outcome of the investigation did not support the initial model, but it did 
suggest in outline a new model of a developmental space. This suggested 
that the different goals of teacher and pupils expressed themselves as 
implicit and explicit elements of the situation, often resolved by the pupils 
completing tasks without thought. This indicated that a common outcome 
of schooling was ‘encapsulation’, formal mental constructs lacking 
meaning. Elements of a new model would be the role of emotion and of the 
goal of activity.
Page 11
Grateful thanks to the 
staff and pupil’s at St. 
Fergus and to my mentor, 
Gordon Bloomer, for his 
great patience and 
boundless optimism
Page 111
Table of contents
Abstract page I
Acknowledgements page iii
Chapter 1: Introduction: A Professional crisis page 1
The foundations of pedagogy , page 2
Piaget and Vygotsky page 3
Research Question page 4
A model of concept foimation page 5
Chapter 2: Literature Review: A paradigm shift page 7
Introduction page 7
Theory and practice page 8
The crisis of Psychology page 9
An overview of Piaget's learning theory page 12
Critics of Piaget page 14
A computational model page 16
An outline of Vygotsky’s theory page 19
A Dialectical Materialist Perspective page 27
A Vygotskyan Paradigm page 32
Overcoming the crisis in psychology page 36
Conclusion page 38
Page IV
Chapter 3: Modelling a developmental space page 40
A Piagetian model page 41
Initial perception page 43
Mediation page 44
The word page 46
Children’s conceptions page 50
Cognitive domains page 52
A Vygotskyan model page 55
Reproduction in secondary science page 57
Conclusion page 60
Chapter 4: Developing Methodology page 61
Introduction page 61
Vygotsky’s approach to methodology page 61
Theory and methodology page 63
Methodology and meaning page 64
Structured situations page 66
The case study approach page 68
Outline of the research page 70
Approach to data analysis page 71
The question of ethics page 72
Conclusion page 73
Chapter 5: The study as case study page 74
Introduction page 74
The case study as situation page 75
The not quite typical page 76
The research relationship page 77
Obstacles to the investigation page 80
Conclusion page 83
Page V
Chapter 6 : ‘Structured situations’ part I page 84
Interviews and interpretation page 84
Introduction page 84
Structured situations page 84
The interview setup page 86
Overview of the initial interviews page 87
The comparative element
of the initial interviews page 89
Contrasting plant and human page 89
Interpretation page 94
Conclusion page 97
Chapter 7 : ‘Structured situations’ part II page 98
Classroom observation page 98
Structured situations page 99
Intersubjectivity page 99
The classroom setup page 101
Group A ’s conceptual journey page 105
Lesson A1 page 105
Lesson A2 -  build a flower page 108
Lesson A3 -  Flower dissection page 110
Lesson A4 -  Beetrip page 111
Group B’s conceptual journey page 113
Lesson B 1 -  build a flower page 113
Lesson B2 -  flower dissection page 115
Lesson B3 -  Beetrip page 116
Lesson B4 -Human life cycle page 117
Overview of the classroom observations page 118
Conclusion page 121
Page VI
Chapter 8: ‘Structured situations’ part IQ 
Final interviews 
Introduction
The final interview set-up 
Interview details 
Interpretation
Contrasting element of findings 
Conclusion
page 122 
page 122 
page 122 
page 122 
page 123 
page 129 
pagel29 
page 132
Chapter 9: Deconstructing Texts 
Syllabus
Deconstructing the syllabus 
The text
The assessment material 
Groups A and B 
Overall Interpretation of texts 
Conclusion
page 133 
page 134 
page 135 
page 137 
page 126 
page 140 
page 141 
page 143
Chapter 10: Revisiting the literature, reviewing the model 
Introduction
To what extent did the research 
support the initial model?
Is there an automatic aboutness 
to social situations?
Can social situations be seen as composed 
of implicit and explicit levels?
page 144 
page 144
page 145
page 152
page 154
Page V ll
To what extent does language share this 
automaticity of social situations? 
Encapsulation
Models for learning meaning 
A new model of a developmental space 
The significance of emotion 
Conclusion
page 154 
page 156 
page 157 
page 158 
page 159 
page 162
Chapter 11: Overview
The research question 
A model of developmental space 
The value of research 
Following the research
page 163 
page 164 
page 165 
page 169 
page 171
References
References page viii
Appendices
Appendices
Appendix A .l 
Appendix A. 1.1 
Appendix A.2 
Appendix A. 3
Parental permission 
Administrative permission 
Code of Conduct 
Interview setup
page 182 
page 183 
page 184 
page 185 
page 186
Appendix B.l 
Appendix B.2
Human concept board 
Human concept cards
page 187 
pagel 88
Page V lll
Appendix B.3 Plant concept board page 189
Appendix B.4 Plant concept cards page 190
Appendix B.5 Sample interview record cards page 191
Appendix B.5 Sample interview record cards page 192
Appendix B.7 Sample interview transcripts page 193
Appendix B.8 First interviews 
Raw data summary page 196
Appendix B.9 Raw data summary (continued) page 197
Appendix C.l Classroom observation setup page 198
Appendix C.2 Model flower kit page 199
Appendix C.3 Flower kit ‘mutation’ page 201
Appendix C.4 ‘Beetrip’ page 202
Appendix C.5 Classroom observation
Bart and Andy page 203
Appendix C.6 Classroom observation
Brian and Martin page 204
Appendix C .l Fertilisation page 206
Appendix D .l Final interview schedule page 207
Appendix D.2 Final interview aids page 208
Appendix B Final interviews: raw data summary page 211
Appendix F.l School knowledge
KS3 curriculum content page 212
Appendix F.2 KS3 sample questions page 213
Page IX
Figures and tables
Figure 3 .1 -concept dimensions page 42
Figure 3.2 -A  developmental space page 57
Figure 3.3 A developmental space for reproduction page 59
Figure 10.1 -  A new model of a developmental space page 159
Figure 10.2A developmental space for reproduction page 161
Table 6.1 page 93
Graphs
Graph 6.1
comparing plant and human responses page 89
Graph 6.2
failed to identify embryo as new life page 91
Graph 6.3
failed to identify seed as new life page 91
Graph 6.4
Life cycle completion times for both
plant and human concept boards page 91
PageX
Graph 6.5
Life cycle completion time
(human cycle attempted 1®^) page 92
Graph 6.6
Life cycle completion time (Plant cycle attempted 1st) Page 92
Graph 6.7
Trend in completion times for human life cycle page 93
Graph 6.8
Trend in life cycle completion times (Plants) page 94
Graph 8.1 Final interview group B page 127
Graph 8.2 Final interview group A page 128
Graph 8.3 Final interview group C page 128
Graph 8.4. Completion time for
frog life cycle (frog first) page 130
Graph 8.5. Completion time for
frog life cycle (frog last) page 130
Page XI
Chapter 1
Introduction: A Professional crisis
This research paper is unusual in having a unique historical moment -  a 
‘critical incident’. That moment was in a school science laboratory on a 
sunny afternoon in the spring of 1995. I was standing in the middle of a 
group of year 8 pupils (In Britain, year 7) carrying on a running 
commentary as I applied a rough-and ready dissection to a typical school 
daffodil. My notes, recorded immediately after the lesson, record a period 
of ‘Teacher hesitation -  teacher confusion’.
The focus of the lesson was plant reproduction. At the time I was heavily 
committed to ‘discovery learning’. This approach covered a range of 
pedagogies, but typically involved open-ended investigations organised by 
the pupils and following what were presumed to be the authentic 
investigative methods of science. The pupils were encouraged to interact 
directly with phenomena, to use informal measuring units and terms and 
only later link up with a formal science vocabulary. Thus I would encourage 
children to adopt terms like ‘stringy bit’ or ‘centre bit’ in relation to flower 
structure before introducing teims like stamen and carpel, Stephen Rowland 
gives an example of this approach when, in The enquiring Classroom, he 
records a series of experiments by ‘David’, a pupil, to investigate burning 
(Rowland 1984: 86-92). My demonstration dissection was to be followed by 
pupil dissections of other daffodils. They were to observe and separate out 
the main parts of the flower and give the parts informal names made up by
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themselves. The lesson would be followed by the teacher introducing the 
foimal vocabulary and then linking the structure of each element to its 
function as part of a plant reproductive system.
The foundations of pedagogy i
Without thinking, I found myself ‘hinting’ broadly to the pupils about what 
they might discover. "'You should find four bits - 1 mean five different bits -  
no you could find  more - n o  lets say five...'". As I spoke I was aware of a 
number of discoveries. Firstly I saw that there were a lot of parts, many 
identical. Then that there were still more than five different parts, then that 
in fact the flower was a unitary whole that did not naturally split into parts. 
Finally I realised that what I was asking the pupils to do was impossible. I 
was asking them to ‘discover’ elements that were in fact cultural constructs. 
The divisions and categories were not ‘out there’ in nature and in the flower 
but within the individual, their culture and society.
This represented something of a professional crisis. An implicit ontology 
which had been the foundation for my teaching perspectives had proved 
false. At the same time that I had been thrown into confusion by this 
question I had also had to confront the new common curriculum and it 
seemed to me that the new curriculum also challenged a perspective of 
active learning from a very different direction, with the elements of science 
process overbalanced by a heavy factual content. I also felt a more general 
political concern. It seemed to me that there was a widespread dismissal of 
active learning and also of the concerns often associated with it of tailoring 
education to individual development and that what was being offered in its 
place was quite regressive -  both in its espousal of transmission teaching 
and in an implicit view of the puipose of education as primarily serving the 
economy and the needs of employers.
Of course these reflections and concerns of mine had not arisen from 
nowhere. They were part of my development as an extended professional, 
defined by Lawrence Stenhouse as a teacher able to undertake autonomous
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self-development through self-study, study of the work of other teachers and 
the testing of ideas through classroom research (Stenhouse, 1975: 146) and 
in fact the specific study had arisen in the course of work for an MA in 
Curriculum and Assessment with the Open University. I was therefore able 
to use the resources of the course to examine the theoretical foundations of 
my pedagogy and to seek for alternatives.
Piaget and Vygotsky
It quickly became clear to me that the theories of Jean Piaget were a major 
element in the conception of active science in the active science curriculum. 
As explained by Wood, Piaget laid great stress on the individual, often lone, 
learner, and their interaction with nature (Wood, 1989: 21). Valerie 
Walkerdine had shown that Piaget did not have a theory of pedagogy but 
that his theories had been co-opted to dominate the processes, records, 
training and even the physical structure of primaty education (Walkerdine, 
1989: 195). Piagetian theory had less influence in the secondary schools, 
but Piaget was clearly the inspiration for active learning, with its focus on a 
developmental process, the learner as individual interacting with nature and 
the teacher acting as a facilitator. I will have much more to say about 
Piaget’s theories later, as they act as a starting point for my own reflections 
on teaching and learning.
I began to look for alternatives to the Piagetian approach and eventually 
came upon the work of Lev Vygotsky.
Vygotsky’s suggestion that what was manipulated was signs and that 
thought and language had a common origin seemed to coincide with my 
own intuition. James Britton explains that, in contrast to Piaget, Vygotsky 
stressed the learner in a social setting, interacting with others as she learnt 
(Britton, 1989: 212). Again, I saw this idea as being fundamental to building 
a new model of teaching and learning and I will return to this concept of the 
social learner in more detail later in the thesis. Problems arose because of 
the unfinished nature of the theory. One of the most well-known and
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developed aspects of his work, the zone of proximal development (ZPD) 
seemed limited in use in the classroom. It clearly had great power in the 
tutor-pupil relationship, where it could be used to assess the educability of 
an individual and devise appropriate teaching strategies, but seemed to be 
more difficult to apply in the classroom to a broad range of pupils with 
different abilities. One of the ideas to arise from it -  of strategies or aids 
that could act as scaffolding -  seemed to me to suffer from a vagueness of 
definition. On the one hand almost any teaching strategy or aid could be 
described as scaffolding. On the other hand a specific element of the 
teaching-learning situation could only be legitimately defined as scaffolding 
if it fell within the ZPD of specific pupils.
From these starting points arose my research question, which will gain in 
detail and in meaning when I link it to the methodology that I later decided 
to employ.
Research Question
To what extent is it possible to define a developmental space 
based on Vygotsky's theory that charts the learner's movement, 
during classroom instruction, from initial perception and 
introduction of technical vocabulary as empty concepts to the 
internal development of fully formed concepts?
In the main body of the thesis I intend to chart a path through the existing 
literature, examining the strengths and weaknesses of Piaget’s theory, the 
extent to which Vygotsky’s work can be seen as an alternative paradigm or 
as a complementary perspective, the importance of other aspects of 
cognition such as language acquisition and computational theories of mind 
and the direction taken by theories of social cognition since Vygotsky.
A consideration of these general theories of cognition will lead me to a 
consideration of the process of concept formation in science and the 
construction of a model of a developmental zone for this process.
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A developmental zone seemed to offer the potential for a more specific yet 
more broadly based model of learning. We would expect to see broad 
generalities in the way most people learn and from that model develop 
teaching aids that would be of use to a broad range of pupils. It was quite 
clear that I did not have the resources nor even as yet the theoretical 
foundation with which to investigate the whole area of cognitive theory. A 
useful approach seemed to be to simplify the issues into a relatively trivial 
case. I use the word trivial here in the mathematical or scientific sense -  a 
situation in which all the elements possible have been removed in order to 
leave, as far as possible, only the central elements and their relationships. I 
decided to look specifically at the mechanism of concept formation in the 
area of plant reproduction. I had the advantage of an earlier investigation 
and the topic itself allowed for directmanipulation and perception as well as 
an extensive technical vocabulary and hidden scientific concepts that would 
have to be made explicit.
A model of concept formation
The starting point for the investigation was the initial model of the process 
of concept formation. The early stages of perception and manipulation were 
seen as largely automatic. The sign -  in this case the technical vocabulary -  
is seen as initially being an “empty concept” serving a denotative role in 
pointing to various elements of the flower. The final stage is when the 
connotative aspects of the concept predominate and it links up to models, 
theories and philosophies in the process of formation or already held in a 
process of assimilation and retention.
The narrowing in of the theoretical aspects of the study will be mirrored by 
a naiTowing in of the methodology. A case study approach seems to allow 
for the intensity of focus on the individual and on the individual in the small 
group that will reveal what a Vygotskyan approach would expect to be 
initially a private, internal and ideosyncratic affair. A model of 
developmental space forces consideration of movement from ‘outside’ to
pages
‘inside’, from word and action to thought and from the individual to the 
social. This brings into sharp focus the crisis of psychology -  that is the 
dichotomy between the study of behaviour and the discovery of meaning.
“Opportunity sampling” suggested a focus on classroom activity, with a 
case study methodology that allowed movement back and forth from 
behaviour to meaning by structuring the classroom activities, providing 
work materials and moving from individual interview to the classroom and 
back again.
In reflecting on the literature and the findings of the study I hope to 
establish the extent to which a theory of developmental space aids 
understanding of concept formation and also the extent to which the 
perspective I am suggesting would aid classroom practice and the 
development of teaching aids that would act as scaffolding in the teaching 
and learning of science.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: A paradigm shift
Introduction
In chapter two I intend to organise my initial review of the literature around 
an initial assessment of the linkage between theory and practice. I will argue 
that such a linkage is possible, but that psychology is unable to act as a 
foundationist theory for pedagogy because of the ‘crisis of psychology’ -  
the inability of the subject to resolve the contradiction between a science of 
behaviour and one of agency and meaning. I will initially approach this 
problem by treating the broad schools within psychology as paradigms, as in 
the theories of Thomas Kuhn, each new school produced by the 
accumulation of contradiction in what went before. In somewhat more 
depth I will examine the theories of Piaget, of computational models of 
consciousness linked to language structure and finally the work of L S 
Vygotsky. The issue put forward will be the extent to which Vygotsky’s 
work serves as the basis of a new paradigm or, alternatively becomes one 
element in a broader, social constructivist, paradigm. I will suggest that an 
understanding of dialectical materialism would lead to a broader acceptance 
of Vygotsky’s work and narrow down my own study to the process of 
concept fomiation in the classroom.
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Theory and practice
A great deal of my thesis rests on the assumption of the connection between 
a theory of psychology, educational theory and educational practice, so it is 
worthwhile examining the basis of such a connection. P.H. Hirst argues, 
with some justification, that the basis of educational theory is educational 
practice. For Hirst, too much of the actual activity of education is contextual 
and local to a given situation. It draws too heavily on implicit 
understandings of the practitioners to be subject to the determinist 
rationalism of the scientific method. At best we can draw upon the sciences, 
alongside our own experience, to reflect upon and modify our professional 
understanding and practice (Hirst, 1993:151).
This view seems to me to contain insights about the way in which much 
professional discourse takes place, but to be too conservative and inward 
looking a view to explain changes in educational perspectives. We seem to 
need the insight of other disciplines, above all the insight provided by a 
theory of mind, to shape our view of the educational process.
A good example of the influence of a theory of mind on practice is given by 
Valerie Walkerdine. Her account of a primary school teacher coping with a 
child’s mathematical development shows how powerfully Piaget’s theory of 
development structures inteipretation of the situation. The teacher being 
observed appeared unable to view the situation outside of the schema 
deri ved from Piaget and definitions of pupil development and the role of the 
teacher arising from that. Walkerdine observes that the influence of ‘child- 
centred’ pedagogy even deteimined the layout of classrooms and the 
structure of records. (Walkerdine, 1989: 203).
Martin Hammersley argues that the direct application of educational theory 
to practice is problematic because the fact that something is seen as a
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research problem is no indication that a solution will be found. However 
research is justified because, although there are difficulties in linking the 
peculiarities of the individual teacher’s situation to research, teachers are not 
the only audience for research findings (Hammersley, 1993: 216). 
Elsewhere Hammersley and Scarth suggest that the role of research is often 
seen as being to inform policy-makers, although not always to good or 
progressive effect (Hammersley and Scarth, 1993: 216).
I would accept Walkerdine’s view that there is a complex political process 
that links theory to practice and that the amount of structure that a theory 
can offer, the procedures that it engenders, can aid its absorption into 
educational practice (Walkerdine 1989: 200).
My own view is that there is a dialectical process at work between theory 
and educational practice, mediated by politics. At one pole new insights can 
help change political and educational directions. At the other pole politics 
and educational practice can largely determine the direction of research and 
to some extent what is regarded as an acceptable outcome. The major role 
of research can be best seen as holistic, setting and amending the discourse 
through which educational change occurs.
The crisis of Psychology
There is however one major stumbling block to the adoption of a 
“foundationist” theory on which to base educational discourse. That is the 
ability of psychology as a science to offer a coherent account of human 
action -  the crisis of psychology referred to by Vygotsky that still exists 
today. The crisis in psychology is ably described by John Shotter. Is the 
human an object and the subject of psychology behaviour? If this is so then 
a reductionist materialism boiTowed from the natural sciences will in 
principle provide a complete description of human activity (Shotter, 1975: 
15-20). If the human is actor and the subject of psychology is meaning then 
psychology becomes a moral science concerned in part with what we should 
do rather than what we do and the methods of natural science lend a false
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authority but little insight (ibid). A1 hough Shotter plumps for a moral 
science concerned with meaning, the crisis in psychology today, as in 
Vygotsky’s time, consists of the inability of either approach to provide a 
complete description of human activity.
I found it a useful heuristic device to look at the development of psychology 
from the viewpoint of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn saw science as developing 
through a series of “paradigm shifts”. Within a paradigm a dominant model 
was used to explain phenomena and anomalous results were ignored or 
explained away. Eventually the accumulation of anomalous results led to a 
paradigm crisis, the collapse of the dominant model and a “scientific 
revolution” leading to the adoption of a new paradigm (Kuhn, 1970: 10-18).
Vygotsky commented on a dominant school of Gestalt psychology that 
relied on introspection to observe processes of thinking. He saw this as a 
form of idealism (Vygotsky, 1971: 2). Eventually evidence accumulated 
that there was little in the way of a common description to be found in the 
introspective studies of the Gestalt school and the paradigm shifted to a 
foim of logical positivism called behaviourism developed by Hull and then 
by BE Skinner (summarised in Wood, 1989: 3).
The Gestalt psychologists understood perception of the outside world to be a 
holistic process. They relied heavily on subjective introspection as a method 
for understanding consciousness. (Eysenk and Keane, 2000: 28) They made 
several important observations about the nature of visual perception, most 
based on or derived from what Koffa called “The law of Pragnanz” -  that of 
several possible geometric shapes the one actually perceived would be the 
best, simplest and most stable (Koffa quoted in Eysenk and Keane, 2000: 
24). A constant problem was that it was difficult within the subjective view 
to define what best and simplest was and the danger of a circular argument 
was always present. The Gestalts made the idealist assumption that 
perceived objects were minored in the brain by electrical fields in the brain.
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but the existence of such fields was fairly conclusively disproved by 
Lashley et al in 1951 when gold foil implanted in the brains of chimpanzees 
failed to disrupt perception (quoted in Eysenk and Keane, 2000: 26).
The introspective paradigm was largely succeeded by the logical positivism 
of the behaviourists Hull and Skinner. Hull refused to speculate about 
mental process, arguing that any theory ought to begin with behaviour in 
which a stimulus led to a response (quoted in Shotter, 1975: 41). B F 
Skinner's behaviourism is an example of the effects of theory on educational 
practice (Wood, 1989:4). It denied a theory of meaning, focusing more on 
observable inputs and outputs, but it was highly structured and that structure 
lives on in concepts such as positive and negative reinforcement and in the 
structured learning programmers, once common in book form and now 
found in some educational software.
From a Kuhnian perspective the progressive aspect of a behaviourist 
approach can be seen in the fact that it allowed counter-intuitive findings -  
for example that partial reinforcement of a stimulus was more effective than 
continuous reinforcement. Like other theories of psychology it generates an 
educational literature centring around positive and negative reinforcement 
and behavioural aspects of teaching and learning such as time on task. At 
the centre of the behaviourist approach was the idea of an “empty organism” 
-  that we should ignore cognitive processes in favour of a pure stimulus -  
response model. The paradigm crisis for the behaviourists came when it 
was demonstrated that test subjects ignored the reward/reinforcement in 
favour of the problem-solving aspects of the activity. The evidence for an 
internal cognitive mechanism directing goals, learning and behaviour for the 
organism was overwhelming, (ibid: 4) A paradigm crisis for behaviourism 
was followed by a new paradigm of constructivism in which the organism 
was seen as actively constructing knowledge.
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An overview of Piaget's learning theory
Piaget's work retained a link to behaviourism in that the stimulus-response 
chain was replaced by the scheme, innate stinctures arising from simple 
reflexes and responses that evolved into flexible patterns of action. His work 
is usually presented as a series of stages of qualitative changes in the 
development of the child.
The stages are:
Sensorimotor
Motor reflexes develop, generalise and become purposeful. The foundations 
of intelligence are built on action on the environment. (Piaget and Inhelder, 
1973: 4). External data undergoes a process of assimilation as it is filtered 
through existing action schemes. In turn the schemes themselves are 
modified by a process of accommodation. These processes, which are 
holistic processes of the organism, evolve from reflex to habit and from 
habit to purposeful behaviour (ibid: 2-6). An example is suckling. The reflex 
is innate, but rapidly evolves into a more complex and adapted habit 
structure. Later the child shows purpose in systematic thumb- 
sucking (ibid: 7). Action enables the construction of reality, involving the 
formation of schemes of the permanent object, space, time and causality 
(ibid: 13-19).
Concrete operational
Initially the child is preoperational. Children acquire representational skills 
in mental imagery and language but are unable to view the world from 
perspectives other than their own. As they mature they can take into 
account more than one perspective simultaneously and can represent 
transformations as well as static situations (ibid: 96). [In the US pre­
operational and concrete operational are taken as separate stages]. Just as 
the sensorimotor stage involved a decentering at the level of action so the
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preoperational stage involves decentering at the level of representation in 
the social universe of other people (ibid: 95). A long maturation process 
involves the schemes of space, time etc and development of perception, 
memory and the semiotic function. The co-ordination of these in action 
constitutes the stage of concrete operations. Concrete operations involve 
joining and ordering and central to these is the concept of conservation 
(ibid: 97). The child is able to carry out operations involving listing and 
arrays and tasks of class inclusion (ibid: 102-103). The beginnings of 
causality are present (ibid: 110)
Formal operational
The child develops adult reasoning patterns. A final decentering takes place 
from the concrete to propositional logic, involving the nonpresent and the 
future. She can think logically and abstractly and can reason theoretically 
(ibid: 131). A combinatorial system develops which allows combination 
and permutation. The child can carry out operations upon operations. 
Inversion and reciprocation become more abstract and allow the 
development of the "4-group" of identity, inversion, reciprocation and 
correlation (ibid: 131). It is from this basis, rather than the concrete, that 
concepts of proportion and probability develop and allow for formal logic 
and the experimental approach (ibid: 140).
The pattern of stages is what is usually available to the classroom teacher, 
but it rests on another series of assumptions that are not always clearly 
presented. Piaget saw intellectual development as a process of biological 
maturation which took place through a system of adaptation. Adaptation 
was accomplished by a mechanism of assimilation [absorbing new 
information into existing schemes] balanced by accommodation [changing 
existing schemes to incorporate new observations] (ibid: 5-6). Finally the 
bedrock of Piaget's investigation was genetic epistemology - the evolution
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of knowledge structures. He saw knowledge as arising from action on the 
world and having an end or goal in the operations of formal logic (ibid:
155). . ,
Critics of Piaget
The Piagetian perspective, with its focus on meaning, seemed to offer a 
solution to the difficulties faced by the behaviourists. However 
contradictions accumulated. A theory of biological development did not 
seem to allow much space for an active pedagogy. There were difficulties 
in showing the existence of the stages predicted. The preferred 
methodology of the Geneva school, the experiment/structured interview, 
was shown by Donaldson not to be an effective tool. The child subject’s 
view of the meaning of the situation was often quite different from that of 
the experimenter. (Donaldson, 1993: 163-171)
In Kuhnian terms the Piagetian paradigm had supplanted the earlier SR 
theories. From the Kuhnian perspective we would expect the accumulation 
of problems and the development of crisis to be the prelude to a new 
paradigm. In fact aspects of the Piagetian theory have been attacked by 
researchers supporting a constructivist stance. Initially many of the 
researchers would have supported Paiget’s model of the individual learner 
interacting with nature and constructing meaning, but contradictions in the 
theory and in its interaction with nature tended to move them in the 
direction of a social constructivism where the learner is part of a group and 
a culture. Donaldson found that context and familiarity influenced the 
outcome -specifically that small changes in the experimental setup and 
small changes in verbal cues together produced a large change in the 
success rate in class inclusion tasks, (ibid: 171). Bruner offers an overall 
critique of a private, egocentric, unmediated learner and offers an alternative 
of a culturally situated learner, negotiating with others. He points out how 
the acquisition of language involves a "diectic shifter" that involves taking
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the place of the other and denies the assumption of egocentricism (Bruner, 
1989: 38). Bishop indicates that even the domain of Mathematics can only 
be understood as a cultural construct (Bishop, 1989: 85).
Lunzer's critique is more fundamental. The ideas of logic as the goal of 
thinking processes or of those processes exhibiting discontinuity are both 
flawed he suggests (Lunzer, 1989: 27). Strong support for the fonner 
critique is offered by Carey, who shows that cognitive conflict does not lead 
to the abandonment of traditional concepts in favour of scientific ideas 
(Carey, 1989: 106). Walkerdine points out a contradiction between the 
constructionist, agentive picture of the learner and the normative, biological 
constraints of the theory (Walkerdine 1989: 196). She suggests that 
implementation of Paigetian ideas in an educational setting tends to assume 
an active construction which is directed by the individual learner, yet the 
model is based on a biological determinism of maturation and adaptation.
Wood sums up many of these criticisms, but, in an echo of the Kuhnian 
perspective, points out the difficulty of these ever adding up to a refutation 
because Piagetian theory per se is based on an internal understanding not 
visible to the observer and it is impossible to decide if misunderstanding is 
at the end of the day based on the tyro status of the learner or their ability to 
carry out class inclusion or decentering (Wood 1989: 83).
The fundamental contradiction of the Piagetian school was the view that the 
developmental process had a goal and that goal was a system of logic. The 
assumption here was that meaning was already inherent in the world and 
that the maturing human discovered the inherent logic. Evidence 
accumulated that logical thinking was a specialist form of thinking and 
usually not the routine form and that many adults did not arrive at a use of 
formal logic as a way of thinking about the world (Lunzer, 1989: 27).
page 15
A computational model
As the Piagetian model of cognition faced a paradigm crisis, researchers 
moved from the difficulties of meaning back towards behaviour. The 
promise of linking meaning and. behaviour was a possibility offered by 
theories of computation.
In computational theories information about the outside world is converted 
to data by sense organs. The brain is a modular structure which moves, 
stores and processes the data to produce an appropriate output. Key 
elements of the theory dealt with perception, memory and planning 
(Eysenck and Keane, 2000: 2). As with other new directions in psychology, 
there was a surge of progress with many elements of new research. Lines 
and edges were seen as the starting point in computational processes which 
built perception. The magic number five, plus or minus two, seemed to 
show the limits of a central processor (Miller, 1956: 91). There were 
however problems. The area split early on into cognitive science, concerned 
with artificial intelligence and designing computers that could model 
processes such as speech recognition, translation and visual perception, and 
cognitive psychology, concerned with identifying computational structures 
and processes in the brain.
This division did lead to many useful insights, but it also led to paradigm 
crisis. Success achieved with computers tended to stress the difference 
between them and minds. Massive problems were posed by the digital and 
sequential nature of computer processing. Attempts were made to build 
parallel processors but fundamental differences with mind remained.
Neurones are not digital, nor are they linked in a linear sequence. Each 
neurone has multiple connections and the signals are chemical and analogue 
in nature. The neural structures and substructures are not linked by any 
logical structure and structures of the brain are adaptationist at a number of 
levels (Dennett, 1991: 112). Each population of neurones undergoes a 
process of developmental adaptation and also an adaptive process during
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processes of perception and memory (ibid: 184-186). There is evidence for a 
process of evolutionary adaptation during which brain structure was formed 
(Mithin, 1996: 205-211). A body of evidence also exists for limited 
compensatory adaptation when some brain structures fail during stroke and 
other brain structures adapt to restore function (Sacks, 1986: 12-18). In any 
case, even if one could trace a direct sequence from the individual neurones 
to concept formation, it would be difficult to argue that one caused the 
other. A strict biological reductionism seems unable to find a ghost in the 
machine.
Daniel Dennett makes explicit the basis of many commonsense ideas of 
mind -  the ‘Cartesian theatre’ where an observer sits inside the brain and 
directs it. This does not explain consciousness, but merely defers such an 
explanation indefinitely at the cost of a dualist welding of matter and spirit 
to make mind. Dennett’s solution is to propose ‘multiple drafts’ of external 
reality that compete with one another (Dennett, 1991: 111-113). Stephen 
Mithin draws upon evidence from anthropology to argue that the 
environment may have acted over evolutionary time scales to select various 
internal mental structures to act as ‘modular intelligences’ such as social 
intelligence, technical intelligence and a natural history intelligence. These 
intelligences are presumed to be present to some extent in other species in 
an isolated, unselfconscious form, but are linked and transformed in humans 
by language, which links the modules into a unity (Mithin, 1996: 64-71).
Bredo argues that mental processes are fundamentally different from both 
computers and from the logical and academic world of researchers. Mental 
processes occur within a holistic world of thought and action and even in 
principle we cannot expect computational processes to explain thought 
(Bredo, 1999: 28).
Stephen Pinker has made an ambitious attempt to unite the computational 
model of the mind with theories of biological determinism and evolutionary 
determinism, using a theory of language as the cement joining the elements 
together. He argues that a computational model of the brain is fundamental
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and basic - akin to the cell theory in general biology (Pinker, 1998: 83). He 
also asserts that much of our behaviour is deteimined by evolution and 
genetics, having been selected for by environmental pressure in paelolithic 
times (ibid). Stephen Rose attacks this sort of determinism as just so stories. 
He compares them to Kipling's story of how the elephant got its trunk - 
essentially as fiction and speculation involving a form of circular reasoning 
(Rose, 1997: 234).
Pinker draws heavily on the recursive and combinatorial aspects of language 
that make it capable of literally infinite modes of expression. He accepts 
Chomsky's argument that the speed with which children acquire language is 
evidence for a LAD -  language acquisition device -  which is hard wired 
into the brain. He also draws upon the evidence of grammar. There are only 
a relatively limited number of grammatical rules and, while these differ 
between languages they are consistent within each language. This is seen as 
evidence for pre-existing brain structures for producing and interpreting 
language. The fact that children often make consistent giammatical 
mistakes, such as applying the regular past tense by, for example, saying 
losted rather than lost is seen as further evidence for this thesis. Pinker 
supports Chomsky's assertion of a deep structure to language. Sentences 
seem to structure together as if the brain expects noun or verb phrases and 
can only assemble them in certain ways. Certain random collections of 
words seem accepted by subjects as appearing to be grammatical while 
others are not (Pinker, 1998: 118).
It appears to me that a general weakness of theories of evolutionary 
determinism is that they assume a logic to evolution that is not inherent to 
the process. Stephen Jay Gould points out that evolution allows for survival 
of the fit and not, as many assume, survival of the fittest. He also points out 
that adaptive structures have a dual and contingent nature, allowed to 
change to carry out more than one function (Gould, 1993: 118).
If the brain were in essence a computer then we could consider the crisis of 
psychology to have been essentially solved, and we could look to a deeper
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and deeper understanding of computation and of the structure of language. 
Unfortunately computational theory seems to assume the identity that it later 
proves. Evidence that computers can appear to mimic some of the processes 
of perception or can produce outcomes similar to a human operator (the 
Turing test) do not show the identity claimed. A closer examination of 
mental processes does show the processing of data, but it is in a holistic, 
adaptationist and dialectical way very different from that of computers. Key 
to understanding here seems to be the process of movement, both upwards 
and downwards, outwards and inwards (Eysenck and Keane, 2000: 54)..
The paradigm offered by Piaget was beset by contradiction. Computational 
theory had appeared to offer a solution to these contradictions but, although 
it offered many fresh insights, it did not offer a fully convincing overview of 
cognitive development. A theory of cognition should allow both for culture 
as well as for computation, and this is what LS Vygotsky set out to do.
An outline of Vygotsky’s theory
An alternative paradigm that asserts a constructivist perspective while 
avoiding the accumulating difficulties of the Piagetian theory has been 
outlined by L. S. Vygotsky. Vygotsky [and Marx and Engels before him] 
would refute Pinker’s reductionism in principle. Culture cannot be 
explained by biology. Theorists trying to understand human thought 
frequently look to childhood development and also to the evolution of the 
human species and its links to other primates. For Piaget the main theme of 
such perspectives was their continuity. Human problem-solving involved 
the innate intelligence shown by other animals in a quantitatively amplified 
form, amplified further and released from the restrictions of the immediate 
situation by the semiotic functions, including language.
For Vygotsky the shift from animal to human and from child to adult 
involved discontinuities and qualitative change. In Thought and Language 
he outlines the distinction between animal and human as follows:
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1. Thought and speech have different genetic roots.
2. The two functions develop along different lines and 
independently of each other.
3. There is no clear-cut and constant correlation between them.
The apes display an intellect somewhat like humans in 
certain respects (the embryonic use of tools) and a language 
which develops differently.
4. The close correlation between thought and speech 
characteristic of man is totally absent in the apes.
5. In the phytogeny of thought and speech a prelinguistic phase 
in the development of thought and a preintellectual phase in 
the development of speech are clearly discernible.
Applied to early childhood his conclusions became:
1. In their development, thought and speech have different 
roots.
2. In the speech development of the child, we can with certainty 
establish a  preintellectual stage, and in his thought 
development, a prelinguistic phase.
3. Up to a certain point in time, the two follow different lines, 
independently of each other.
4. At a certain point these lines meet, whereupon thought 
becomes verbal and speech rational. (Vygotsky, 1971, p 44)
So Vygotsky agrees with Piaget in seeing early intelligence in the child as 
not qualitatively different from the intelligence of animals and primates. 
However he sees the development of speech as marking not a quantitative 
amplification but a qualitative difference. This is not hnmediately apparent 
because much early speech is pre-intellectual - many words such as 
“because”, “i f ’, “when” are clearly used without understanding. Thought 
and speech intersect because speech immediately begins to serve a
page 20
mediational role. The child is operating with culturally acquired signs and 
therefore at a level of abstraction from reality not available to other 
primates.
This mediational role of language allows Vygotsky to define the unit of 
verbal thought as word meaning. (Ibid: 120). Word meaning is a dynamic 
rather than a static process.
“Thought is not merely expressed in words, it comes into
existence through them“ (Jbid: 125).
Vygotsky does not mean that all thought is verbal. Rather verbal thought is 
a uniquely human activity. Verbal thought acts as a mediator. The level of 
symbolic abstraction involved in the use of words creates mental structures 
that no longer intersect directly with perception of reality but with symbols 
that, by their very existence, involve a grouping and classification of the 
world. “Bow-wow” can be applied to a whole range of objects by the young 
child, but it eventually comes to mean dog in a complex interaction with 
others that enables the selection of salient features, classification and 
grouping so that a distinct group of dogs becomes defined and denoted by 
one symbol. This enables children to move mentally in space and time and 
thus plan activities and collaborate with others.
The vocal and semantic aspects of speech move in opposite directions - 
outwards from the whole to the particular and inward from the particular to 
the whole (ibid: 126).
Both Vygotsky and Piaget observed solitary speech in the child. Paiget 
labelled it egocentric and saw it as linked to the child’s inability to take the 
viewpoint of others. Vygotsky observed it as having a number of functions 
in problem solving, beginning as descriptive and going on to serve a more 
advanced mediational function in planning and directing activity. When this 
speech was disrupted problem solving did not take place. He argued that the 
external development of speech towards a more formal communication
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instrument was mirrored by a hidden development of idiosyncratic internal 
thought. Egocentric speech in the child moves outwards and becomes more 
formal to become social speech. It moves inward, becoming more informal 
and idiosyncratic, to become verbal thought. This process was generalised 
to outline a spiral of development of higher mental functions where each 
stage was first apparent externally and controlled and mediated by external 
signs and then developed internally to become mental processes and 
structures (Vygotsky, 1978: 36).
School occupies a special place because the knowledge there is “scientific”-  
formal and non-spontaneous. (ibid: 89) The child can more easily carry out 
logical reasoning because she knows that she knows the information. She 
knows many other things from everyday life as spontaneous concepts, but 
the fact that she knows about them may not be available to her. School can 
offer a ‘scaffolding’ -  the teacher lending consciousness to the child of 
concepts not yet fully developed.
Within school knowledge writing and literacy have a special place, (ibid: 
109) They allow a further abstraction on which rests a greater appreciation 
of social others and a greater formalisation and structuring of ideas. The 
child has greater freedom to move in time, away from the immediacy of the 
spoken word. Writing develops from the fusion of speech and gesture 
through drawing. It is initially a second order of symbolisation - 
representing speech -  but a complex internal development leads to it 
directly representing concepts (ibid: 115). One of the many concepts 
thrown up by Vygotsky was that of the ‘Zone of Proximal development’. It 
can be understood as the difference between the assisted and unassisted 
performance of the learner and is arrived at by testing a child’s 
understanding when they were working alone and then testing again with 
adult help. The amount of help that would benefit the child was called the 
Zone of Proximal development. For example a child that was awarded an 
age score of eight alone and an age score of eleven when helped was said to
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have a ZPD of 3. The ZPD indicated the developing ‘buds’ of new skills, 
while normal testing simply recorded what the child could already achieve. 
Put simply, the ZPD indicated the educability of the child at that point in 
time (ibid: 85-87).
Vygotsky put great stress on science teaching in schools. He appears to have 
meant two things by this ■ Partly the formal discipline of science itself and 
more generally all teaching and learning in schools in the sense that it is 
formal and abstract in contrast to spontaneous everyday knowledge.
Like Piaget’s hypothesis, Vygotsky’s theory can be dealt with at a number 
of levels,
1. As an account of cognitive development
2. As an outline of the mechanisms of such development
3. As an ontological and epistemological statement - in this case of 
dialectical materialism.
Chalmers explains dialectical materialism by quoting Marx:
“It is not the consciousness o f men that determines 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that 
determines consciousness. ” (Chalmers, 1980: 136).
In fact by itself this Would simply be a  statement of materialism. Marx 
specifically adopted the idea of a dialectical process in which consciousness 
could reflect back on being because of his opposition to any mechanical and 
reductionist materialism.
In the Kuhnian view of scientific revolution a new paradigm does not so 
much replace an existing paradigm as subsume it. It explains phenomena 
also explained by the preceding paradigm, incorporates aspects of the
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preceding worldview and explains new phenomena. An example would be 
the fact that Piaget's theory did not invalidate ideas on reinforcement 
introduced by Skinner.
From this viewpoint it cannot be said that a Vygotsky an paradigm has been 
developed which supplants and incorporates earlier paradigms. There are a 
number of reasons why this is so: ; '
• Vygotsky's theory is incomplete.
• It is unclear if  the theory should be developed in a strong form, as an 
overarching theory of psychology, or in a weak form as part of a 
more general paradigm of social constructivism.
• The theory could be developed separately from Vygotsky's more 
general views, especially his support for dialectical materialism or it 
could be seen as closely bound to a more general Marxist viewpoint.
More recent research, such as work by Lave and Wenger, appears to raise 
questions that arise from a Vygotsky an perspective but have not been 
closely bound to it. This includes work that appears to move consciousness 
"further out" away from the individual and into the group and cultural and 
other work that questions the formalism and abstraction of school both as a 
method and as a goal of learning (Lave and Wenger, 1999: 22).
The most pressing difficulties lie in relation to Piaget's theory. Does a 
Vygotsky an perspective supplant Piaget? Do they exist separately, 
explaining different things? Do they complement each other, exploring 
different facets of the same reality?
The issue here is the extent to which critiques of Piaget would lead simply 
to a broadening of the context of development to make it more social or if 
they indicate a collapse of the paradigm. The first conclusion would lead to
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a “weak” social constructivism in which Vygotsky’s perspective is simply 
one of many competing tendencies and it would be mistaken to speak of a 
distinct ‘Vygotskian’ cognitive theory. The second would be strong 
justification for the investigation of Vygotskian theory to establish its 
overall plausibility as a general theory of cognitive development.
Is Vygotsky’s theory a global alternative to Piaget’s learning theory and to a 
broad church of social constructivism or is it a contribution to that broad 
church, one perspective amongst many? Precisely this division occurs 
between Jerome Bruner, inti'oducing ‘Thought and Language ’ and Michael 
Cole and Sylvia Scribner, introducing ‘Mind in Society’.
Bruner explicitly detaches Vygotsky’s research from his Marxist 
background: He argues that there is little point in tracing the ideological 
course of Vygotsky’s work (Vygotsky, 1971 intro: V) and that Vygotsky 
was an original, not to be understood in terms of Soviet concepts (ibid: VI).
“He transcends, as a theorist o f  the nature o f man, the 
ideological rifts that divide our world“. (ibid: X)
So Bruner’s critique of Piaget and endorsement of Vygotsky lead, not to a 
general Vygoskyan theory, but to a social constuctivism that incorporates 
both and links them to a range of other theories. This work involved an 
information-processing approach which would have been at odds with 
Vygotsky -  specifically breaking with his idea that the verbal thought was 
the basis for analysis. Bruner now says that information-processing models, 
while informative, are "incommensurable" with a cultural cognitive 
approach (Bruner, 1997: 6).
Bruner tends to focus on the contextual aspect of teaching and learning.
This is a valuable approach, but falls into the strong empirical tradition in 
the US and militates against any over-arching theory. Thus in chapter 1 of 
The Culture o f Education he lists 9 broad areas that impinge on learning 
from perspectival (ibid: 13) to narrative effect (ibid: 39). He lists 4 ‘folk
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pedagogies’, one of which -  pupils as thinkers -  again subdivides into 
another 4 groups (ibid: 50).
These broad areas are:
“parts o f a broad continent, their significance to be 
understood in the light o f their partialness” (ibid: 65).
Bruner clarifies his position by taking each area and indicating a mechanism 
through which they operate in the culture of education and how they may be 
studied or become the subject of policy. So the perspectival element is 
explained as the tension between individual and culture and the area of 
study is education as both agent of change and force for conservation. Later 
interaction is said to have as its mechanism intersubjectivity and 
understanding the mind of others, its focus scaffolding and mutual learning. 
Finally narrative is based on the dominance of the logico-scientific over 
narrative and the focus of study the balance between the two within school.
Bruner makes a clear point in each area. I am forced to agree that learning 
really is as complex as he presents it. On the other hand not all the areas 
can be of equal significance. Should we not make a selection? Is not part of 
research a necessary reduction and simplification of the problem?
Bruner sees education as being plagued by insoluble “antinomies” and 
endorses what appears as a post-modernist model of narrative and 
integration (ibid: 91). Antimonies by their nature are permanent features of 
analysis, for example, the tension between individual and culture. Vygotsky 
would have seen these as contradictions whose solution lay in struggle and 
movement and eventual resolution through synthesis. Bruner’s cultural 
relativism makes it easy to incoiporate Vygotsky into his educational 
perspective, but more or less impossible to speak for a distinctive 
Vygotsky an perspective.
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A Dialectical Materialist Perspective
In sharp contradiction Michael Cole and Sylvia Scribner, in their 
introduction to Mind and Society, put Vygotsky’s ideas within the context of 
Marxist theory. Where Bruner had looked at, and rejected, the sudden 
political shifts within a Stalinist bureaucracy, they looked to the longer 
history of classical Marxist theory (Vygotsky, 1978: 6).
They argue that Vygotsky saw the methods and principles of dialectical 
materialism as a solution to key scientific paradoxes facing his 
contemporaries (ibid: 8). It was in fact a central claim of classical Marxism 
that it provided an approach that superseded the approaches of formal logic 
and science and provided a more powerful means of interpreting reality.
One introduction to dialectical materialism is provided by EV Ilyenkov 
(Ilyenkov, 2000). The starting point for Marx's theory was the philosopher 
Feuerbach (ibid: chapter 8, 3 of 13), who argued that people thought with 
their brains but only in unity and contact with nature. Marx argued that 
people did not have direct contact with nature but thought in unity with 
society and as a result of an historical process.
Vulgar materialists saw the ideal as a physical structure inside the brain. 
Marx argued that the ideal existed only as an image of activity. That activity 
was social activity situated in history. Humans only interacted with nature 
through their social being.
From this point of view the ideal is simply this objective being of the object 
and a dialectical materialist view of consciousness is simply the movement 
back and forward from material to ideal and back to material, mediated by 
the social reality of human existence.
An example of this process is the approach to value in economics. Ricardo 
defined value as equal to labour but also defined profit as value (ibid: 
chapter 10, 2 of 10). This led to a contradiction which was resolved when
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Ricardo's followers abandoned the labour theory, but the price of this was 
that value in classical economics is totally subjective. Value is what people 
think it is.
Marx rejected this but did not resolve the contradiction. He argued that the 
contradiction was necessary and was in fact built into each object as a 
contradiction between its value as a commodity and its use value. The 
contradiction was not resolved but instead acted as a source of movement, 
leading to the development of money as a medium of exchange, then to 
money as a commodity and then to financial crises.
The labour theory of value is not widely accepted, but few people are aware 
that the alternative is to see the massive crises of our world as being driven 
by an immaterial ideal construction, lacking material reality.
AF Chalmers attempted to apply the method of dialectical materialism to 
science by arguing that theories about science itself can be divided into 
‘subjectivist’ accounts that focus on the beliefs and sensoiy impressions of 
individuals and ‘consensus’ theory that focuses on a special kind of 
community, the scientific community. These theories tend to find it difficult 
to refute charges of relativism, while the subjectivist accounts are charged 
with a psychologist orientation. Chalmers argues for a third, objectivist 
theory where science can have a relative autonomy from both the individual 
scientist and the science community, but only if we adopt a dialectical 
materialist position and view science as ‘process without subject’
(Chalmers, 1980: 99-104). A more conventional Marxist approach would 
be to talk of praxis -  the unity of theory and practice. Gavin Kitching 
praises Marx for attempting to break from ‘picturing’ accounts of reality, 
but then accuses Marxism of simply adding dyamism to the picture.
Kitching argues that action can refute Marxist praxis because we can 
‘experience’ experiments and their outcome without language (Kitching, 
1994: 94-96). I would argue that this begs the question of where the
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apparatus and scientific cooperation came to carry out the experiment in the 
first place and opens up the questions posed by Vygotsky of word/meaning 
and the use of cultural tools)
Michael Cole and Sylvia Scribner link Vygotsky’s theory to Engel’s claim 
that tool use tmnsformed humanity through human transformation of nature 
(Vygotsky, 1978: 7). Engel’s Dialectics o f Nature was an attempt in 
practice to prove the Marxist claim of a more powerful analysis of reality.
Its analysis of evolution and human cognitive development asserts that 
people and societies transform themselves and the nature of consciousness 
through tool use. And they quote from Vygotsky’s unpublished journals.
”I  want to approach the study o f mind having learned the 
whole o f Marx’s method” (Vygotsky, 1978: 8)
They present this as evidence that he saw the dialectical method as a 
scientific tool rather than as an item of official ideology.
Michael Cole later returned to the issues when, with Wertsch, he compared 
the work of Piaget and Vygotsky and found support for social interaction 
within Piaget and for individual action within Vygotsky (Cole and Wertsch, 
1999: 1) and They identify what they consider to be a core element of 
Vygotsky’s theory with no correspondence in Piaget -  the primacy of 
mediation -  and quote Vygotsky;
“The central fact o f our psychology is the fact o f  
mediation” (Vygotsky, 1982: 166, quoted in Cole and 
Wertsch, 1999: 1)
In my view, Vygotsky would have seen very little to argue with in the 
Piagetian scheme if it were applied to learning in animals. The process of 
learning here involves action and a direct interaction with nature. He saw 
human learning as involving the manipulation of sign, but the sign is not 
created by the learner, it is already present in society. Humans learn in a
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much more abstract and generalised way than animals but, more than that, 
the greater part of learning no longer takes place as a direct interaction with 
nature. Learning is social and consciousness arises out of society, itself 
formed by a history of collective interaction between humans and nature. 
For Cole and Wertsch the higher mental functions are, by definition, 
culturally mediated, involving indirect action, taking material shaped by 
prior human production and incorporating it as an aspect of action.
Artefacts do not simply facilitate mental processes, but shape and transform 
them, (ibid: 3).
The simplest approach to mediation is to see the Piagetian scheme repeating 
itself, but this time manipulating not nature or objects, but manipulating a 
sign. This immediately means a higher level of abstraction because the sign 
represents not an object but a class of objects. Not only that, the word it also 
an empty concept, infinitely malleable and able to build an endless range of 
structures and linkages.
This means a more complex mental map which does not link object to 
object or action to action but builds a representation of a rather fuzzy private 
world where concepts are defined by their relationships. Metacognition 
becomes possible, as we can reflect back on our own mental structures and 
represent them also as concepts. A first approach to how such a mental map 
might be organised is presented by Ian Kinchin in an introduction to the 
theory of concept maps, where links between one concept and another build 
a broader mental structure which in turn becomes a superordinate organiser 
of the concept (Kinchin, 1998: 1-4).
Mediation also resolves the question of intersubjectivity. Concepts do not 
have to be the same but they do have to overlap especially in linkages and 
structures for effective public communication. This is especially so in 
subjects like mathematics and science where structure, relationship and 
foimal definitions dominate.
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This leads to two very interesting reviews of Vygotsky’s theory - an 
amplification of Vygotsky’s genetic law, where the intermental is a 
precursor of the intramental, that consciousness exists “out there” in the 
social setting before it is integrated into individual consciousness and the 
observation that the whole idea of a zone of proximal development assumes 
that in the presence of competent others we are capable of actions bevond 
our own individual competence (Cole and Wertsch, 1999: 4). The authors 
point to research on distributed cognition, situated learning and external 
symbol systems as points of departure for further development of the theory 
(ibid: 50).
The concept of mediation seems to me to provide a central theoretic support 
for my initial intuition as a teacher, that the process I was involved with was 
more to do with the presentation and acquisition of cultural constructs than 
facilitating pupils’ interaction with nature. Cole and Wertsch are also 
helpful in pointing away from grand theory to work that more directly 
relates to the classroom. Ideas of situated and distributed cognition (where 
part of the process of cognition is distributed in artefacts and actions in the 
environment and linked in time with earlier points in the culture) and of 
cognitive apprenticeship, where specific processes aid the learner in 
association with a more competent other.
These ideas link to ideas like contingent teaching, where the amount of 
support offered to the learner is increased or reduced as the learner gains in 
competence (Wood, 1989: 78-79). This appears to directly exploit 
movement in the zone of proximal development and show the use of 
external scaffolding and the ideas of situated and distributed cognition seem 
to offer a way of moving from the study of individual tuition to whole-class 
teaching.
Susan Carey introduced me to the idea of a novice - expert shift in concept 
formation - indicating that experts attended to different aspects of problems 
and organised their approaches in different ways (Carey, 1989:109). 
However Sara Hennessy points out that the practical applications of this are
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limited, since experts and novices do not normally share similar goals nor 
carry out similar tasks. Direct comparison between expert problem solving 
and the work of pupil novices is unlikely to be illuminating. In part this is 
because cognition is situated - the sophisticated mental models of experts 
are influenced by the social and cultural context in which the problem­
solving takes place. (Hennessy, 1993: 1-2).
Her critique serves as a introduction to the ideas of situated cognition; that 
problem solving is not a process internal to an individual mind, but one 
grounded in social practice. If the child learns a set of cultural conventions 
for tackling problems and presenting answers then educational ground-rules 
operate only in the traditional classroom, considered alien to the external 
community. This disjunction is fed by the individualist perspective of 
education, the decontextualised context of academic learning, the divorce of 
the emotional and intellectual and the formulaic nature of problems 
(ibid:3).
Distributed cognition argues that cognition cannot be localised within the 
mind of individuals but is supported and scaffolded by physical and cultural 
artefacts in the environment examples are provided by language use. Many 
words such as “I”, “you”, “here”, “there”, are indexical - totally dependent 
on context for meaning. Brown et al. argue that all words have this 
indexical element and, because meaning develops through activity, they can 
be thought of as tools. In a domain of knowledge students must use these 
tools in authentic activity - defined as coherent, meaningful and purposeful 
within a culture ((Brown et al, 1989: 34-35)
A Vygotskyan Paradigm
The issue here is the extent to which ideas of situated cognition would lead 
simply to a broadening of the context of development to make it more social 
or if they indicate a collapse of the Piagetian paradigm. The first conclusion 
would lead to a ’’weak” social constructivism in which Vygotsky's 
perspective is simply one of many competing tendencies and it would then
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be mistaken to speak of a distinct "Vygotskian" cognitive theory. The 
second would be strong justification for the investigation of Vygotskian 
theory to establish its overall plausibility as a general theory of cognitive 
development.
Are the different aspects of constructivism and socioculturism simply 
different perspectives explaining the different facets of a common reality?
Is what is involved either seeing mind as in the head, learning as cognitive 
reorganisation and signs as communication as opposed to mind being seen 
as the individual in social action,_leaming as enculturation and signs as 
carriers of social meeting and practice?
Paul Cobb argues that it is the case that we are dealing with different facets 
of the same paradigm and argues that convergence can be achieved when 
we examine the problems that each prospective faces. For example, the 
question of empirical and reflective abstraction, as developed by Von 
Glasersfeld, can be viewed as partly taking place "inside" as the 
accommodation of an experienced novelty and also as taking place 
"outside" within the cultural situation and with cultural tools. A further 
example is taken from Rogoff and the question of internalisation. Rather 
than seeing a shared understanding as in some way crossing a barrier, she 
suggests an individual appropriation of each shared practice. This 
overcomes the difficulty, but shifts the perspective towards an individual 
constructivism. A proper understanding, Cobb suggests, arises from seeing a 
movement from foreground to background between each theory (Cobb,
1999: 142).
Rogoff accepts this concept of two perspectives, but indicates that they 
cannot be achieved by adding a social dimension to Piaget. Rather 
individual learning must be set in the framework established by Vygotsky. 
She explains this by a reference to intersubjectivity. For Vygotsky, joint 
problem solving occurs between partners while for Piaget it occurred within 
the individual following communication of each other's ideas. However, 
rather than simply moving from background to foreground Rogoff suggests
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that the two theories may explain different cognitive activities. Vygotsky 
may best explain skills and understanding, while Piaget may best explain 
shifts in perspective (Rogoff, 1999: 7).
Bauersfeld adopts a useful perspective in supporting Von Glasersfeld's 
model of communication as mutual adaptation, but goes on to see learning 
as the subjective reconstruction of societal means and models. One 
interesting aspect of his perspective is the shift in focus away from the 
aspects of the situation which are explicit. In mathematics, and by 
implication, other school subjects there may a great deal of implicit 
negotiation about when to do what and how to do it. Bauersfeld suggests 
that these effects may be at their strongest in the microculture of the 
classroom. (Cobb, 1999: 138).
Among others. Brown et al. contrast the difficulties of formal learning with 
the informal success of apprenticeships to develop ideas of cognitive 
apprenticeship and situated learning (Brown et al, 1989). These approaches 
seem to be firmly within a Vygotskyan perspective and also to link back to 
earlier studies of the hidden curriculum -  focusing attention on what is 
going on in the classroom rather than what we expect to be occurring. Lave 
and Wenger extend these conceptions to develop the idea of legitimate 
peripheral participation. From this viewpoint learners are apprentices who 
achieve mastery by gradual absorption into a community. However this is 
not a simple acculturation. They are entering a community of practice in 
which they both learn by doing and also learn the meaning of what they are 
doing as they interact with the artefacts of the trade and the other 
participants. The structure of learning is organised around the needs of the 
community rather than any formal logical structure, for example a 
production process may often be learnt “backwards”. Learning in schools is 
not exempt. This also is a form of legitimate peripheral participation. Often 
what is learnt is how to be a member of the school community or how to 
enter the community of schooled adults rather than a specific subject, in the 
case of physics, for example, entry to the community of practice of physics 
would take place many years after learning school physics. In the process of
page 34
outlining this model of learning Lave and Wenger challenge the possibility 
of separating what is learnt from the situation in which it is learnt and the 
possibility of the sort of subjective and scientific learning which Vygotsky 
extolled (Lave and Wenger 1999: 21-27).
One way forward is to look again at theories which underpin cognitive 
theory and are often seen as explaining cognition, these theories, of biology, 
language and computation should be used not as explanations but as 
frameworks within which thinking and learning occur, constraints on the 
kind of learning that can occur and, with care, as an analogy for some of the 
processes of thinking. For example. Sacks’ evidence of adaptation by 
neurone groups offers some support for Jean Piaget's assertion of adaptation 
at higher mental levels and Carter's evidence of the final steps in neurone 
development occurring after puberty gives some support to the idea of 
stages in development (Caiter, 1999: 23), (Sacks, 1999: 60).
Bruner saw a need to break from a Piagetian concept of the solitary learner, 
and initially turned to a computational theory of mind, (Bruner, 1996: 6). 
The case for a biological and computational theory of mind has been argued 
in detail by Pinker who drew on the analogy of a Turing machine carrying 
out simple computations which showed an overall intelligence (Pinker 1994: 
78). Pinker also drew on the evidence produced by Chomsky of innate 
biological mechanisms involved in the acquisition of language and on 
further evidence of the combinatorial aspects of language and structural 
imposed by grammar to argue a biological determinism.
To some extent this is beside the point. Rogoff indicates that there is also a 
strong case for a cultural determinism (Rogoff, 1999: 72), but thinking is 
clearly emergent from culture and biology and still requires explanation in 
its own terms. In any case Bruner has argued for a cultural LASS (language 
acquisition support system) (Bruner, 1983: 27) rather than the genetic LAD 
(language acquisition device) suggested by Chomsky (Chomsky, 1993: 34). 
Brown and others point at the indexical nature of words and their reliance on 
position and total meaning (Brown et al, 1989:32). More recent research by
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Bredo draws attention to some of the differences between thinking and ! 
computation. The linear steps in a computer programme separate plan from 
action. In humans plan and action appear one reflexive process and there 
doesn't appear to be a need for a mapping, with many actions occurring 
automatically as movement takes place (Bredo, 1999: 30). Sack's 
introduction of Edelman's TNGS (the theory of neurone group selection), 
where groups of neurones compete to represent processes has value as 
analogy which is not at all like the computer analogy (quoted in Sacks,
1999: 58). Adaptationist theories of the brain, such as Edelman’s, draw 
attention to aspects of brain function that must constrain higher levels of 
thinking. That is, that thinking involves adaptation, involves simple, 
modular, automatic processes and requires a holistic framework to acquire 
meaning.
Overcoming the crisis in psychology
Vygotsky offers the outlines of a powerful overarching theory with gi*eat 
explanatory power and utitilty. It is best understood on its own terms rather 
than as part of a more general theory of social constructivism. Central to it 
as a theory in itself is the idea of mediation, present in Vygotsky but not in 
Piaget. Biological accounts of our behaviour can be subsumed within 
Vygotskyan theory as a base for higher mental functions but have to be 
rejected as an explanation.
Current work within social constructivism and situated cognition show a 
great range of study and a power of illumination but do not always articulate 
well with classroom practice. I  hope, by narrowing the focus to mediation 
and concept formation, to examine thinking more closely linked to the 
concerns of the classroom.
In summary, a Vygotskyan perspective offer the possibility of overcoming 
the crisis of psychology. It is able to accept that mechanical, automatic, 
biologically determined processes, especially those of perception and action 
can give rise to self-deteimination and self-consciousness. The contradiction
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between behaviour and action is overcome by dialectical movement. 
Thought does not exist mechanically in a brain nor disembodied in a mind. 
It is constructed both by movement upwards from biological processes and 
movement downwards from higher mental functions.
A Vygotskyan perspective can incorporate the adaptive processes of the 
Piagetian scheme but, as suggested by Rogoff, it would be qualitatively 
transformed by the fact that what is manipulated within the new scheme is 
the sign - an abstract cultural object.
It can be argued quite convincingly that ideas such as situated and 
distributed cognition and cognitive apprenticeship follow naturally from a 
Vygotskyan perspective that leaves meaning both inside and outside the 
individual human.
This interpretation of Vygotsky also has the advantage that it resolves the 
question of meaning. In Piaget's theory meaning was inherent in nature. The 
adaptive structure of the Piagetian scheme, where reflex became action and 
action became consciousness would have the end point of logical meaning 
because there was assumed to be a logical structure to nature and a logical 
structure within the brain that discovered nature's logic by resolving 
contradiction.
Finally the Vygotskyan theory allows a critical approach to arenas of 
situated learning. In both Vygotsky and Piaget the learner is an active 
learner. In Vygotsky's approach the question of intersubjectivity is resolved 
by a series of adaptations and approximations in which personal, 
idiosyncratic ideas are aligned with broader, formal, public definitions. One 
useful aspect of this conception is that it allows for both cooperation and 
conflict; between individual and individual, individual and group, individual 
and society and finally between group and group. The aspect of conflict 
means that contradiction does not have to be resolved. Different 
understandings can overlap, leaving some aspects of meaning fuzzy and 
ambiguous.
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Knowing in this perspective is a social product arising from social 
experience of an external reality, enshrined in the view of Lave and Wenger 
in ‘communities of practice’ (Lave and Wenger, 1999: 24). It always 
remains approximate, able to tolerate the idiosyncrasies of individual 
interpretations but also open to conflict with individual experience and 
vulnerable to our ability to think reflexively and carry out metacognition.
Of course much of this remains speculation. The construction of a 
convincing overarching theory is well beyond the scope of this thesis. What 
my own exploration of, and speculation about, theories of consciousness 
does to is provide a scaffolding on which I can base an investigation into the 
process of learning in the classroom, while making my own position as clear 
as possible.
Conclusion
The task now is to narrow down the perspective to small scale processes that 
can be observed and operationalised. I see a natural small-scale process as 
being the process of concept formation.
Vygotsky has already given a broad outline of this process in an 
experimental setting. Characteristics are associated with words as empty 
concepts. The characteristics gradually structure first as impressionistic 
heaps associated only by immediate perception, then as complexes grouped 
around some central perception, later as pseudo concepts which collapsed 
when challenged and finally true concepts.
Another valuable idea to arise from Vygotsky an theory is the idea of a zone 
of proximal development. In brief this is the gap between tasks that the 
pupil can achieve unaided and those that she can achieve with support. This
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is assumed to hint at the buds of developing concepts and to measure the 
educability of the child. It is mainly used by Vygotsky to illustrate the 
importance of teaching and of culture in the learning process, rather than 
viewing learning simply as a process of maturation.
The ZPD is widely used today. It is used directly in tutor-student situations. 
In classrooms it is often used to justify forms of scaffolding -  teaching and 
learning aids in the form of diagrams, models and so on, although the 
theoretical justification is rather weak, at some distance from the original 
conception and pointing with rather a broad brush at a whole series of 
teaching aids.
I want to look more closely at the process of concept formation and to 
theorise this as a developmental space. If I am successful in theorising this 
space I believe that it may offer insights into the development and use of 
pedagogical strategies and teaching aids in the classroom.
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Chapter 3
Modelling a developmental space
Introduction
In this chapter I want to look more closely at the idea o f a concept. I hope to 
resolve some of the ambiguities involved by comparing the Piagetian 
perspective on the formation of a concept with the Vygotskyan perspective.
Further clarification is sought in this chapter from looking at research studying 
misconceptions or alternative conceptions. My interest here is the possibility 
that there may be limitations on the way in which we can approach areas of 
knowledge, some of which may be imposed by the internal structure of 
language. Other restrictions will be imposed by individual worldviews into 
which new concepts have to fit and the budding concepts may also be 
constrained by modes of thought that help to determine the nature of the 
concepts formed and the relationships between them. Concepts may fit along 
dimensions between perception, language and structure. Rather than being 
determined by formal definition they may, I argue, exhibit a dialectical nature, a 
flux in which they both determine and are determined by the broader mental 
constructs within which they sit. It will be necessary to consider the extent to 
which concepts are situated in particular environments and the extent to which
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there is a tension between school knowledge, everyday knowledge and formal 
science concepts.
Finally I want to sketch a model of concept formation which will illustrate my 
initial ideas about the elements o f  à developmental zone and suggest methods of 
investigating such a zone.
A Piagetian model
I considered, early in the study, a ready made model of concept formation which 
aimed to link Piagetian and Vygotskyan approaches. This was the model of 
Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education (CASE) presented by Phillip 
Adey and Michael Shayer. I was presented with a guide to their model on a 
training course provided by the Northern Irish Southern Education and Library 
Board (SEELB). In outline the Adey and Shayer model suggested that only 
certain levels of cognitive difficulty led to concept development. Simple events 
were assimilated into existing models, very complex events were ignored while 
relatively difficult to understand events led to Piagetian accommodation and the 
formation of new concepts. The task of science teaching was to produce 
cognitive conflict. Class or group discussion of the processes involved would 
lead to metacognition and bridging which would generalise concepts and link 
across subjects (Adey and Shayer are summarised in CASE notes, SEELB 
Science Advisory team 1995: 13).
I rejected this as a model on the basis that I did not find it convincing as a 
model o f Vygotskyan processes. My reading of the model contained in the 
CASE literature was of a solitary learner interacting directly with nature and 
communication with others then leading to a more ‘Vytgotskyan’ 
metacognition. A Vytgotskyan process would involve interaction initially 
through cultural tools and a degree of intersubjectivity. Thus, even if  the results 
in terms of educational attainment were as the authors claimed, the claim that
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this proved the model of concept formation advanced would still be open to all 
the theoretical criticisms advanced of the Piagetian model generally. It seemed 
to me that the Adey and Shayer representation had all the hallmarks of a 
Piagetian model of the solitary learner interacting with nature, with language 
and culture playing a subordinate and secondary role.
As an alternative I aimed to construct my own view of concept formation and 
movement in a developmental space and felt that I should begin at the very 
beginning with the definition of a concept.
Concepts have a denotative aspect (sometimes called an identity concept) and a 
connotative aspect (sometimes called an equivalence concept. The concepts (or 
categories) can be understood as particular mental constructs for representing 
and organising the external world, standing alongside frames which represent 
the physical environment and scripts representing appropriate modes of 
behaviour in into natural concepts formed spontaneously by individuals and 
formal, rule based concepts (Taber, 2002: I I  and 27).
We may think of dimensions associated with concepts as follows: 
Figure 3.1 -  concept dimensions
eg dog -  pointing 
function/ simple
representation
denotative
eg cell -  formal 
definition as unit of 
life
Spontaneous concepts
Formal concepts
Jumble of idiosyncratic , 
individual associations, 
majority held in common with 
other people
connotative
Links to many other formal 
definitions -  nucleus, 
cytoplasm, membrane, tissue, 
organ
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The extent to which new rule-based concepts are formed in schools can be 
taken as a measure of learning, especially in subjects such as science (ibid, page 
12.)
The Piagetian approach to cognition suggests a solitary learner. The concept 
develops in relation to adaptive patterns of perception and action, initially 
genetically determined, which represent an external reality. The complexity and 
depth of the concept and its relationship to other concepts is the result o f a 
process o f maturation within the individual. Piaget saw the mature concept as 
resting on formal logic, because formal logic was 'out there' in nature waiting to 
be discovered by the learner. It would only be possible for an adaptive process 
to end in a logical structure if  the logical structure were built into nature or if  it 
were built into the nervous system -  which would essentially be the same thing. 
Piaget had some support for this idea in his understanding o f the biology o f 
evolution, where random processes led to complex biological forms. Lunzer 
argues in opposition that formal logic was only one of a number o f cognitive 
strategies and that many adults never arrived at a stage of formal logic (Lunzer. 
1989: 27). The role of language was to communicate ideas in a relatively 
neutral way, the words denoting public agreement between a range o f private 
concepts which overlapped.
Initial perception
The Vygotskyan approach to concept formation is not in contradiction to Piaget. 
It would tend to support some sort of adaptive process in learning in animals 
and in prelinguistic children. Modem theories in experimental psychology, 
such as Edelman’s Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (TNGS) allow us to 
picture the initial aspects of concept formation (Edelman’s theory is outlined in 
Sacks, 1999: 58). Perception and action are built out of subtasks which are 
largely automatic, based on reflexes, some of which are “hard-wired” by
page 43
genetics. Eysenck and Keane report that two separate neural systems, in 
different parts of the brain control different aspects of perception. One element 
controls object identification or what? and the other spatial identification or 
where? ( Eysenck and Keane, 2000: 69-76). These subtasks assemble larger 
structures extremely rapidly, yet eventually these automatic processes lead to 
consciousness and self-determination. It may be useful then consider an initial 
level of concept formation as being initial perception and action. There is strong 
evidence to suggest that mental activity at this level is made up o f a limited 
number of 'subroutines', for example, the recognition of lines, shapes, edges and 
so on (Carter, 1998: 39). These provide a 'filtered' representation of external 
reality. There is also evidence that these processes are modular, with different 
regions of the brain working together to create an ensemble (ibid). Daniel 
Dennett explains that it is this sort of ensemble that is consciousness. Descartes 
suggested a dualist mind/body junction in the pineal gland. Many modem  
theories cling to a Cartesian materialism that centres consciousness at a point in 
the brain. Dennett argues that information on nervous reaction times indicates 
that no such central processor can exist. Instead, modules produce ‘multiple 
drafts’ representing extemal reality which are selected by adaptive processes in 
the brain. The ensemble of these represents a narrative stream of consciousness 
which we can sample and examine as conscious thought (Dennett 1991: 105 -  
115).
Mediation
However human thought does not consist of simple mental representations of 
the extemal world. Human thought is dominated by word and sign. The unique 
aspect of Vygotsky's theory lies in the idea of mediation. Once the child 
acquires language adaptive processes in concept formation no longer occur by 
direct interaction with nature but are mediated by the word, part o f a repertoire 
of cultural tools that enabled what Vygotsky called the higher mental processes
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and enormously amplified human cognition. We can initially approach the idea 
of a developmental space by saying that it is layered by these ’higher’ and ’lower’ 
mental functions. Lower processes of perception, action and memory we share 
with other animals, especially with the Primates. Higher processes are 
specifically human and are built out of psychological and cultural ‘tools’ such 
as sign, language, mnemonic systems distinguished from other tools and 
techniques of human culture in that they point ‘inward’ to restructure the initial 
processes into human thought (Vygotsky, 1978: 54). Higher mental processes 
are built out o f lower processes, but cannot be reduced to them because their 
construction takes place in part outside the individual in a social and cultural 
dimension. In any case, as the higher processes develop they transform the 
lower processes so that they operate on the sign rather than by direct interaction 
with nature (ibid: 26).
The central element Vygotsky’s perspective is the word. Thought takes on a 
specifically human character through the word. The word is initially an empty 
concept - it points at an extemal object or at part of a discourse. The leamer 
accepts the word in the expectation that meaning will follow (Vygotsky, 1971: 
57) At this point the concept is ’fuzzy' -  humans can tolerate a great deal of 
ambiguity and Vygotsky suggested that a whole series of ephemeral stmctures 
such as 'heaps' and 'complexes' develop in the early stages of concept formation.
Vygotsky defines stages in concept formation as follows;
• Heap. Groupings formed by chance by being linked through the 
child’s perception.
•  Complex. Groups formed by real, concrete, immediate links but 
not by abstract or logical relationships.
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Pseudocomplex. In the pseudocomplex the outcome is identical 
to that for the concept, but the mental process is that o f  the 
complex.
Concept. Concepts form spontaneously and unconsciously from 
pseudocomplexes because the child’s thinking is constrained by 
the word and the public connections between words that they 
gradually make their own (ibid: 59-68).
The word serves a mediating function. It allowed the leamer to order and 
stmcture perception intemally via the sign. The word as sign is much more than 
a pointer. It immediately transforms human thinking into thinking about 
abstractions. Vygotsky makes the point that perception is initially integral. 
With speech it becomes analytical (Vygotsky, 1978: 33). The word is a 
psychological tool bringing to the situation the scaffolding of the existing 
stmcture of grammar within the language. The word points and names, 
embedding within a noun phrase or a verb phrase and attaching to itself the 
characteristics and expectations that the grammatical stmcture o f the language 
encourages.
The word
In Chapter 2 1 outlined Stephen Pinker’s belief, following Chomsky, that 
humans possessed an innate mechanism for acquiring grammar. In The 
language instinct he explains in more detail what he describes as a “tree-like” 
stmcture to language. A sentence is made up of noun phrases and verb phrases. 
The phrases are made up of mini phrases called X-bars made up o f individual 
nouns, verbs and modifiers. This allows children from an early age to generate 
infinite numbers of valid sentences with only limited errors. More importantly, 
from the viewpoint of this investigation, it allows a ready acceptance o f highly
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abstract concepts arising simply from the position of the; word within the I 
sentence structure (Pinker, 1994: 284-287). The situation and broader narrative 
structure allow opportunities for more cues about the concept.
My understanding is that we can look at pre-human reasoning as being a direct - 
interaction with nature based on action. Piaget's scheme seems to me to explain 
convincingly how a process of adaptation can modify actions that are initially 
instinctive. The simplest approach to mediation is to see the scheme repeating 
itself, but this time manipulating not nature or objects, but manipulating a sign. 
This immediately means a higher level of abstraction because the sign 
represents not an object but a class o f objects. Not only that, the word it also an 
‘empty concept’, to a large extent malleable and able to be used to build an 
endless range of structures and linkages. This means a more complex mental 
map which does not link object to object or action to action but builds a 
representation of a rather fuzzy private world where concepts are defined by 
their relationships. Metacognition becomes possible, as we can reflect back on 
our own mental structures and represent them also as concepts. Intersubjectivity 
establishes initial, public concepts which evolve into private concepts. Public 
and private concepts do not have to be the same but they do have to overlap 
especially in linkages and structures. This is especially so in subjects like 
mathematics and science where structure and relationship dominate. We can 
picture spontaneous concepts as being embedded in a social situation and as 
relatively autonomous and fuzzy. Formal concepts are embedded in the logical 
structure of a subject area. These are situated also, but in a different way, not 
being embedded in an immediate social situation but the historical product of 
the interaction between human society and nature.
In the Vygotskyan view the word mediates in that it allows a collective, 
intersubjective, definition of the concept. At this stage the emerging concept is 
highly situated. It exists within a particular context and may dissolve back out
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of consciousness. This local strueturing is supported by what Mithin calls 
intelligences (Mithin, 1996: 143) but what Bruner might see as narrative 
structures (Bruner, 1996: 95) and what appear in Osborne and Freyberg as 
categories or associations (Osborne and Freyberg, 1985: 29). The three 
perspectives all diverge in imagery. Mithin pictures innate mental modules 
such as social, technical and natural history intelligences. Bruner pictures an 
innate readiness to grasp narrative structures and Osborne and Freyberg see 
spontaneous concepts formed independently of schooling. What they all have 
in common is a belief that there is an initial, innate structuring that has to be 
taken into account when undertaking formal instruction.
Newly formed concepts gain in stability as they link to other concepts, undergo 
a process of accommodation and become structured in superordinate concepts 
(Vygotsky, 1971: 92-93). Linkage to other concepts in the classroom is 
associated with a background or assumed structure to knowledge in the syllabus 
and in assessment. One concept can be seen as close to another or they can be 
seen as based upon preceding concepts or as serving as the foundation for 
concepts yet to be formed, for example fertilisation may be based on a simpler 
concept of mating and itself be the base for a concept o f genetic transfer. The 
concept itself can gain in detail and structure. This often occurs in the 
classroom through exposure to a series of examples or case studies, for example 
burning a number o f  elements and writing word equations until the concepts of 
oxidation and oxides have formed. Greater detail and exposure to exemplar 
material often leads to a greater generalisation and abstraction. It might also be 
expected that a process of accommodation may take place. Piaget defined the 
acceptance into a mental structure of new ideas as assimilation -  the 
modification of the mental structures is called accommodation (Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1969: 6). An example of accommodation would be someone who 
believed that air caused burning who modified their ideas to understand the role 
of oxygen. New concepts are unlikely to fit snugly with the old and both new
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arid old are likely to change in the process of assimilation. This may involve 
aspects of cognitive conflict, but only to a limited extent as long as thé concept 
remains structured within a school subject boundary. The processes should be 
seen as adaptive and to involve logic only to the extent that the subject demands 
it -  a term in mathematics with different meanings might cause difficulty, but a 
word in a language lesson with two meanings would occasion little surprise.
The end result of such as process should be linkage to superordinate structures. 
These should be thought of as nested, in the sense that a concept might have a 
stable place within a subject while co-existing with a contradictory view in 
everyday life -  an example of this can be found in Susan Carey’s description of 
everyday Physics (Carey, 1989: 107). There also appears to be a more 
generalized, historical situatedness in that the evidence o f Carey seems to 
indicate that we carry individual models, adopted from the overall culture, o f  
our own understanding of, for example, ‘everyday Physics’ which structures our 
expectations of what will happen in a given situation and how it might be 
explained (ibid).
Vygotsky saw formal logic as one of the higher products o f human culture 
rather than arising naturally. Mature concepts were the product o f schooling and 
were held in sharp contrast to spontaneous concepts. What defined a mature 
concept was not simply logic but its embedding in more complex systems of 
ideas and philosophies. Because, in the Vygotskyan view, there is no 
predetermined outcome in concept formation there can be no single definition 
of what a concept is. Instead Vygotsky attempted to classify various stages in 
concept formation - primitive 'heaps', structured 'complexes', pseudo-concepts 
and so on.
A more general level of cognitive conflict might be expected with the 
development of what Vygotsky called the “mature concept”, where abstract.
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scientific knowledge and more subjective everyday understandings are united 
(Vygotsky, 1971: 92-93).
Contradictions between domains or subject may be resolved once w e move 
away from school knowledge -  for example into communities o f practice as 
outlined by Lave and Wenger or where elements of school knowledge are 
absorbed into a more general philosophy or world view (Lave and Wenger, 
1999: 21). For example, when training to be a tailor the process is more in the 
nature o f being absorbed into a culture than gaining instruction. Aspects of the 
process are learnt ‘backwards’ from a logical perspective and the concepts 
formed appear more holistic and spontaneous.
Stephen Dehaenes's investigation of what he calls ’numerousity' in babies, 
reported in chapter 2, is illuminating. The babies appear to focus attention on 
situations where number is not conserved. For example, their gaze is directed 
longer at situations where two objects are hidden but when the screen is 
removed one object or three objects are revealed. Dehaene calls this expectation 
of number conservation 'numerousity' and suggests that it is innate in the 
biology of the baby at birth (Dehaene, 1997: 49). This idea seems to have many 
aspects in common with Piaget's idea of the scheme. It is also, clearly, quite 
distinct from the concept of number. The historical record shows that number is 
a cultural concept that evolved over thousands of years, with many halts and 
difficulties such as the concept o f zero and of place value. Not only does 
'numerousity' mirror the Piagetian scheme and number mirror the Vygotskyan 
approach, it also appears that in human development number replaces 
numerosity and we manipulate the cultural construct rather than the vague 
perceptions of our prelinguistic stage.
Children’s conceptions
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A survey by Susan Carey quoted in Making Sense o f Secondary Science (^nwox 
et al) indicates that at six and below many children do not understand gender 
constancy and believe that gender is a matter of choice. Many believe that 
babies are already existing and do not understand questions about their origin 
(Driver et al 1994: 48). The conceptions that form seem to follow  a pattern. 
Initially it is thought that babies are manufactured from parts or that food that 
the mother eats is converted into a baby. Very often animism is  a feature of 
conceptions, with children imagining that sperm and eggs are capable of 
deliberate actions. An agricultural model, where a sperm or egg is planted in 
soil in the womb, is commonly held (ibid, 49). Interestingly, many o f these 
concepts were held historically as the modem scientific conception gradually 
developed.
At age eleven or twelve many children understand the role o f intercourse and 
that egg and sperm are joined. The fact that there are significant differences 
between the understanding of middle class American children and a more 
general survey of US children and also sharp differences between the views o f  
children in different countries indicate a strong cultural dimension to concept 
formation in this field (ibid).
In a study by Tamir and al reported in Driver (ibid) it appeared that most 
children were able to sequence stages of germination and embryo development. 
Only 66% of the sample however believed that a seed was alive. Again this was 
strongly situated, with only one pupil in an agricultural college rejecting the 
idea of life in the seed (ibid, 50).
Other studies showed a tendency to equate copulation and reproduction. Pupils 
found it relatively easy to identify examples of sexual reproduction in animals 
but often denied that sexual reproduction occurred in plants. These ideas were
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relatively immune to teaching and were linked to disinterest and a general lack 
of concept formation in this area (ibid).
Much of the interest in sciencemisconceptions is from a pedagogical viewpoint. 
The intention is to find a starting point on which the teaching o f  formal 
scientific concepts can be based. Driver et al present a pedagogical model 
somewhat similar to Adey's model of concept formation (Adey, 1994: 76). 
Elicitation of student concepts leads to conflict situations and the restructuring 
of the student's concepts in the direction o f scientific consensus (Driver et al, 
1989:88). Osborne and Freyberg argue for 'student dominance' of the 
curriculum so that student ideas and attitudes may be modified (Osborne and 
Freyberg, 1985: 8 5 -9 2 ) .
My interest in student misconceptions is focused in a different direction. By 
studying the range of common misconceptions I am seeking any hints of 
internal mental structuring that guides the way in which concepts are formed. Is 
there such a thing as a 'folkbiology' and if  so what would its structure be?
Cognitive domains
Susan Carey has done a lot to clarify this issue through her review o f the idea of 
cognitive domains. She quotes Chomsky who sees cognitive domains as a 
number of innate modules, each with a distinct set of phenomena and core 
principles (e.g. for language the core principles would be rules of grammar). 
Carey agrees that there are innate structures, but does not accept that these 
amount to cognitive domains. Rather there are more basic modules controlling 
aspects of perception and language.
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Carey posits the idea o f intuitive theories which are defined by ontological 
commitments plus modes of explanation( Carey, 1996: 190). The entities 
organised by the theory are collectively domains. From this perspective we can 
define a 'folkbiology* which is intemally constructed by age 10 -  earlier ideas of 
living and non-living are not extensive enough to merit this description in 
Carey’s view. At the outset o f language learning children assume each entity 
can have only one essence (fbidi,^l9A) (so taxonomy is built as a result of 
language). Many o f these domains share with early historical forms o f biology 
an animist conception -  the idea of a vital force that animates living matter. One 
consequence o f this line of reasoning is that the folkbiology is not innate, but is 
built from earlier cognitive domains. In this case, Carey argues that the parent 
domain is folk psychology (ibid: 210).
Frorii a different direction Mithin argues that social intelligence must have been 
one o f the first forms of intelligence to appear in human evolution, and that 
indeed social living may have forced intelligence. He argues further that early 
biology developed from social intelligence and was characterised by animism 
and anthromorphism. Finally he argues that it was the development o f language 
that allowed different domains of intelligence to link together as the basis of 
modem human cognition (Mithin, 1996: 99).
Keith Oatley, following earlier work by Peirce, suggested that the way in which 
we form concepts may be constrained by a relatively small number o f reasoning 
strategies. Peirce defined 3 mechanisms of reasoning; deduction, induction and 
abduction or hypothesis (Peirce, 1957: 128-129).
•  Deduction
Rule: all beans in the bag are white 
Case: these beans are from the bag 
Therefore result: these beans are white
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• Induction
Rule: these beans are white 
Case: these beans are from the bag 
Therefore result: all beans in the bag are white
•  Abduction
Rule: all beans from the bag are white
Case: these beans are white
Therefore result: these beans are from this bag
(ibid) r
Oatley argues that the most common form of reasoning is abduction and that 
this is selected for in evolutionary history because it works well in 
commonplace situations where the actor has a lot of background knowledge. It 
works well in narrative forms also because the narrative is a closed world, 
without the endless surprise of the real world. From this perspective narrative 
can be considered a form of emotional modelling o f personal and social 
situations, driven by abduction (Oatley, 1996:128).
Feldman and Kalmar suggest that a further structuring o f ideas occurs through 
genre, which acts as a lens through which we interpret the meaning o f text 
(Feldman and Kalmar, 1996:108).
Oatley goes on to argue that:
“Ry contrast, science has procedures from which the 
personal is, in a sense, factored out and by which consensual
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truths may be transmitted. It involves a more elaborate set o f  
; inferences. Peirce proposed that doing scientific research 
needs to use his three kinds o f reasoning in a specified order.
First, one uses abduction from observations to a possible 
explanation or hypothesis. From this, one deduces a fact not 
yet observed. Then several tests o f such fact are put together 
with the original observation to make a generalizing 
induction."
(Oatley, 1996: 134 drawing on Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 
1983)
In fact Oatley argues, there is evidence to suggest that the practice o f science is 
socially distributed, with different groups of scientists providing different 
processes to what is eventually announced as an individual discovery 
(ibid: 1 3 7 -8 ) .
A parallel position is taken by Bruner, who argues that there are Galilean and 
Aristolean modes of thought, one lending itself to the modes of science and the 
other to narrative (Bruner, 1996: 95 -98). The narrative form is more widely 
used and more closely linked to innate social skills of telling and understanding 
stories, the Galilean, also called the Togico-deductive’ mode by Bruner, is seen 
by him as a more recent cultural invention drawing on different mental skills.
A Vygotskyan model
In my view Vygotsky would have seen the process of mature concept formation 
as being completed when the everyday, idiosyncratic concepts of the individual 
were fused with the formal, structured definitions of science to form one 
overarching understanding, illuminating both the experiences of private life and 
the more abstract understanding of science. A further element o f the mature
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concept would be a level of metacognition. The pupil would not only be able to 
use the concept to solve problems, but could reflect from?the ‘outside’, able to 
examine their own understanding and ‘know that they know’
In order to complete the base for a Vygotskyan model o f cognition we would 
have to take account o f the growing literature, arising after Vygotsky, that 
indicates the highly situated nature of much cognition. Lave and Wenger go as 
far as to say that forms o f cognition do not exist separately from communities of  
practice and are a function both of the leamer and of the social environment in 
which they exist and carry out specific mental functions (Lave and Wenger, 
1996: 145).
A tentative initial impression of a Vygotskyan model of a developmental space 
would look like this:
•  Initial attention and perception -  fast, automatic and adaptive procedures 
in which the nature of situation and object under investigation is 
established.
•  The word -  an ’empty concept’ which already provides some stmcture 
arising from the underlying stmcture of language and also mediates so 
that the individual no longer interacts with objects alone, but with 
abstract classes signified by the word.
•  Modes and methods of thought which constrain and shape expectations 
about what the nature of a new concept might be.
•  The social situation -  the expectations associated with the social context 
in which we find ourselves.
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•  Outcome -  A new concept is one of a range of outcomes which include 
heaps, complexes and pseudo-concepts. They may be temporary or 
permanent, integrate with existing knowledge structures or reinforce 
existing beliefs in opposition to school knowledge.
Finally Vygotsky, I feel, would argue that the whole process was dialectical. 
That if it were true that the initial perception led to the final concept, it was also 
true that the existing conceptions structured initial perceptions.
An interesting footnote arises from this model right away. It suggests that 
cognitive conflict and metacognition are rather specialised mental activities that 
only arise when formal logic is engaged. I will look at this implication again 
later in the study.
Figure 3.2 -A  developmental space
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Reproduction in Secondary Science
What does the initial model of a developmental space tell us about reproduction 
in secondary science? The starting points would be everyday knowledge, which 
would almost certainly be knowledge of human reproduction, understood from
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a ‘folkbiology’ sensè,.with misconception such as confusing copulation and 
reproduction and sperm with semen. Alongside the everyday conceptions we 
would expect a separate ‘science’ understanding based on an asexual life cycle 
diagram, used as a major element of the explanation of reproduction in the 
primary syllabus. We might also expect a relative lack o f concept formation in 
relation to plants.
Reproduction in general, and plant reproduction in particular, have associated 
with them an extensive technical vocabulary. A Vygotskian perspective would 
indicate that pupils would accept this vocabulary automatically, using the words 
simply as pointers to indicate, for example, the parts of a flower and going on to 
develop linkages and connections between words to build initial heaps and 
complexes that would allow concept development. We might expect these 
local, temporary linkages toireceive scaffolding from standard science tools 
such as models and labelled diagrams, from techniques such as structured 
observation and the use of the hand lens and science concepts such as structure 
and function (the idea that the shape of living structures is associated with the 
processes carried out -  for example that the canine tooth is pointed becausejit 
carries out a biting and tearing function).
The first step towards a new understanding is simply a physical structuring of 
parts of the flower or of male and female sex organs. The new vocabulary is 
simply the naming of parts. Further structuring comes from structure and 
function. The testes produce sperm and the anther pollen. A further level of 
understanding involves process. The path of the sperm leading to fertilisation 
and the formation of a fertilised egg. Insect and wind pollination leading to 
fertilisation and seed formation. These ideas have to be integrated with ideas 
about puberty, the menstrual cycle, pregnancy and seed dispersal and
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germination in plants. At each stage we would expect, following Vygotsky, that 
the appropriate concepts would emerge first in a public, intersubjective way 
before being internalised by the individual.
We can think of stable concept formation occurring when the new concept of 
plant reproduction links with the concept of human reproduction. Both 
structures rest on a substructure of technical terms and themselves rest within a 
superstructure of generalization. The formal overarching science concept is 
where male and female gametes, human, plant or animal, fertilize to produce a 
zygote. These overall abstractions can be used to develop understanding of 
unfamiliar life cycles such as that of the frog or to understand the development 
of a reproductive science in areas like agriculture.
Most secondary science departments ‘do’ reproduction in a fortnight. It appears 
unlikely that most pupils would form mature science concepts in this time.
Figure 3.3 -  A developmental space for reproduction
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to outline the mental processes that would be 
involved in the formation and assimilation of a new concept and that therefore 
would constitute a developmental space. The task arising from this is the need 
to operationalise the model so as to provide research instruments and a research 
programme. To begin this process I will return to Vygotsky and look at his 
concern with research processes which he summarised as "the crisis of 
psychology". He suggested that existing research instruments were unable to 
overcome the division between humans as subjects and humans considered as 
objects but that dialectical materialism provided in principle a method of 
overcoming the crisis.
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Chapter 4
Developing Methodology
Introduction
In chapter 3 1 outlined a model of a developmental space, attempting to describe 
the processes that lead from initial perception and action to the formation o f a 
mature concept. In order to develop a methodology through which I can 
investigate such a space I must now give more detail about the nature o f a 
Vygotskyan perspective and attempt to show what a dialectical materialist 
position might be defined as in relation to other methodological approaches. I 
will outline my idea of the ‘structured situation’ as a research tool, indicate the 
extent to which this might be considered a case study approach and how it led 
to specific methods o f data collection. I will briefly outline the implications 
that my approach has for data interpretation and also outline the ethical position 
that flows from the above.
Vygotsky’s approach to methodology
Vygotsky began with an ontology of materialism and an epistemology o f social 
constructivism -  so these are also my starting points in adopting a Vygotskyan 
perspective. Vygotsky’s concern with a theory of consciousness was matched 
by a concern with methodology. In his view a fully developed science would
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develop a number of core concepts and models and these would be linked to a 
distinct methodology. For Vygotsky, the evidence for a crisis of psychology lay 
partly in the lack of agreed models and procedures (Vygotsky, 1926: 4) and 
partly in the fact that the different models contradicted each other (ibid: 11). In 
fact, as John Searle has remarked, in the absence o f such agreement subjects 
tend to remain within the realm of philosophy rather than science (Searle, 1999: 
158). From a philosophical perspective the crisis of psychology was illustrated 
by Vygotsky as lying between the old dichotomies o f the ideal and the real. He 
saw the dichotomy as being resolved by the application o f dialectical 
materialism to the crisis in psychology (Vygotsky, 1926: 5).
1 have already given a broad outline of the dialectical approach in chapter 2.
The Marxist perspective is often ignored in many outlines o f methodology. In 
others it is listed, only to be dismissed. For example, Slife and Williams list 
Marxism as one of a number of structuralist approaches. They criticise 
Marxism as explaining phenomena in terms of assumed structures that are not 
themselves open to examination and of offering a materialist reductionism that 
leaves no room for individual consciousness or action (Slife and Williams 
1995: 52). :
There are two problems with this approach. The first is that the critique offered 
is a critique of historical materialism, which is indeed part o f Marxism, but it is 
not a critique of dialectical materialism, which Marx adapted from Kant in 
order to avoid the problems presented by a purely historical materialism. A  
second problem is that when dialectical materialism is discarded and positivism  
is found insufficient, the search for other approaches tends to converge on 
postmodernism. For the postmodernist, the individual acting in a social setting 
is the irreducible element of meaning (ibid: 56). There is no appeal to reality, 
simply a demand for textual coherence within each individual perspective. As
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Slife and Williams themselves point out, postmodernist relativism removes the 
possibility both o f science and of an explanation of morality (ibid: 58).
Vygotsky wanted to adapt the Marxist method to psychology, and believed that 
in the realm of theory he hadideveloped the beginnings of a dialectical 
materialist approach through his concept o f word/meaning, a contradiction that 
moved outwards to make formal speech and inwards to the informal and 
idiosyncratic realm of thought (Vygotsky, 1978: 54). He searched also to find a 
dialectical methodology. This proved much more difficult to identify, in part 
because there is not one single method of inquiry, a single scientific method but 
rather a range of scientific methods which are used in an in empirical fashion by 
all scientists (Cohen and Manion^ 1989: 20). Cohen and Manion suggest 
however that there is a hierarchy of methods from simple observation through 
to mathematical analysis of rigorous experimental technique, and the range 
available would be restricted by the level of development of the science (ibid: 
21) .  . . .
Theory and methodology
In practice all the approaches to psychology have had linked to them a central 
methodology by which they have tried to develop a distinct science. Gestalt 
psychologists like Koffa relied primarily on a method o f introspection (Koffa 
quoted in Eysenk and Keane, 2000: 24). The preferred method o f the 
behaviourist Skinner was the experimental method, made objective by the rigid 
exclusion of any consideration of meaning and a concentration on the 
relationship between input and output (Wood, 1989:4). Piaget used the 
experimental method to convert action into meaning, or, more exactly the 
ability or inability of the child to construct meanings in given circumstances. 
This was made possible by the assumptions of the Piagetian theory, which
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assigned to the child a certain level o f understanding within the Piagetian 
categories. Piaget's approach was questioned by Donaldson. Essentially her 
work, and the work of her colleagues, showed that even small changes in the 
experimental conditions led to major changes in the outcome. The explanation 
advanced was broadly that the child; in all the stages of the experiment, 
assigned meaning and that therefore the tight control of variables which linked 
directly to a particular outcome or set of outcomes as required by Piaget's ; 
experimental method would not be possible even in principle (Donaldson,
1993: 171).
The use o f  naturalistic observation from the anthropological tradition was a 
reaction within the social sciences to the failure of the positivist approach to 
explain the meaning of social situations and activities. The use o f narrative to 
observe events as they happen in some detail allows a thick description which 
turns on its head the reductionist method used in the physical sciences. This 
allows the researcher to reflect, classify, search for pattern and develop 
grounded theory. The difficulty then is to break from subjectivity.
Methodology and meaning
It can be argued that, while the work of Donaldson et al is recognised by 
educational researchers as a classic piece of research and the negative 
conclusions in relation to Piaget's research methodology are clearly understood, 
the positive aspects of the research and the sort of methodology that 
Donaldson's work points towards are not so clearly understood. As Donaldson 
points out, children are perfectly able to obtain meaning from situations 
(Donaldson, 1987: 21) and it therefore seems likely that it would be possible to 
construct structured situations in which the situation is constrained in the 
expectation that only a limited number of meanings will emerge and in which it 
would be possible to elicit children's understandings without seeking that tight
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control of variables required by a positivist approach. This approach would be 
to a certain extent dialectical in that it would not reduce to sinipler behavioural 
elements but would be best understood by constantly shifting perspective 
between behaviour and meaning. It would not be à postmodernist approach in 
that the child's understanding would not stand by itself but would be compared 
to the concepts of science, seen as representing a more abstract and generalised 
representation of the natural world.
On re-reading Vygotsky it seems to me that there are hints o f this sort of 
approach in his work. His biographers complain about the lack o f detail in his 
experimental work. Where he does give details they indicate not a fine focus on 
procedure but the structuring of a broad situation which has been limited in 
some way, as with his concept blocks, and where the experimenter awaits the 
emergence of meaning. There are also indications o f interviews and 
conversations where the child's understanding is obtained simply by asking for 
their meaning. Above all, there is evidence of a holistic approach where the 
overall coherence of the observations, of the theory and of their interconnection 
is seen as lending authority to the Vygotskyan perspective. Michael Cole and 
Sylvia Scribner acknowledge that the lack of detail in Vygotsky’s work was 
due to the fact that much of it was in the form of pilot projects intended to map 
out areas for investigation and carried out under the pressure of Vygotsky’s 
illness. However they go on to indicate a range of techniques applied by 
Vygotsky which he called the ‘experimental- genetic method’. Vygotsky 
believed that the aim of psychological investigation should be to make visible 
hidden mental processes. The investigation should make available the 
maximum opportunity for the subject to engage in a variety of activities that 
would allow such observation (Cole and Scribner, 1978: 13).
Later work, such as the work o f Osborne and Freyberg, has used similar 
techniques of structured situations and relatively straightforward interview
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without the assumption o f  a great deal of overarching theory. Osborne and 
Freyberg describe a system of ‘interviews about instances’. To find children’s 
views about the concept plant they present line diagrams and ask the pupils 
about their status as plants. These were piloted and the diagramis changed until 
the researchers are sure they are recording the range of views present in the 
population -  a technique that does not fit well with the constancy o f variables 
demanded by positivist approaches. In a similar technique by the same 
researchers called ‘interviews about events’ the children are presented with 
situations, for example, light shining from different objects and presented with 
restricted outcomes from which they must select a response. From my 
perspective the interesting thing about the techniques is that, although they are 
seen as interviews, they have something of the aspect of experiments in the 
control and restriction of the situation. However what is controlled and 
restricted is not variables but meanings (Osborne and Freyberg, 1985: 6-8). 
These techniques have tended to disapprove Piaget's idea of stages, to show that 
the elicitation of pupil meaning is relatively straightforward, that only a fairly 
limited range of meanings are provided and that these meanings given 
indications o f broader structuring o f concepts into superordinate structures such 
as the idea o f animism in biology (ibid, 32).
Structured situations
I intend to investigate the possibility of a developmental space through a range 
of procedures I will term structured situations. A structured situation contains 
within itself the elements from which a concept (or a range of concepts, 
extending from heap to mature concept) can be constructed. However the 
situation can only act as a scaffolding and the concept requires the activity o f an 
individual or group in order for movement along a developmental space to take 
place and a concept to form. The actual use of structured situations will divide 
into the semi- structured interview and the structured task in the classroom.
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The interviews are conceived o f as semi-structured because of earlier 
experience in a pilot study o f using unstructured interviews. These were found 
to produce too wide a range of responses -  pupils seemed unable to determine 
the meaning of the situation and tended to retreat into silence or to respond with 
broad generalizations, on occasion based on an ontological substrate such as 
teleology. It seems self-evident that a tightly structured interview would tend to 
rule out the internal cognitive construction that I wish to observe. The 
structured tasks in the classroom are seen as a much looser constrain on concept 
development because of the greater complexity of social interaction in the 
classroom.
Structured situations can accommodate the adoption of a dialectical materialist 
position because we are able to look at each situation from different 
perspectives without falling into the confusions of an empiricist approach. 
Unlike postmodernism, dialectical materialism does not allow multiple 
perspectives of equal value. Rather situations are seen as fitting within two 
poles o f a contradiction. To the extent that the situation is experimental, resting 
on a tight control of variables then we are at one end of a dimension -  that of 
behaviour, with the person to object. To the extent that the situation is a social 
setting, resting on the intentions of the people involved then we are at the other 
pole o f the contradiction -  that of meaning, with the person as actor. We thus 
have the possibility of triangulation within each situation and of a further 
triangulation between situations. Slife and Williams object to such pragmatism 
on the grounds that the research now needs an overarching theory to explain the 
pupil as object in the interviews and the pupil as agent in the classroom  
observations (Slife and Williams, 1995: 45). Other researchers, such as Bird 
claim that an eclectic approach using different methods allows for triangulation 
(Bird, 1992: 127-43) or that case study methods serve a valuable role in 
allowing pilot studies to take place (Cohen and Manion, 1989: 274). Again,
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Slife and Williams would argue that, whenever the pragmatic argument for this 
approach, it leaves the requirement for new theory that has yet to be developed. 
Dialectical materialism provides such an overarching theory, without the 
requirement that all the contradictions within the situation be iihmediately 
resolved.
The case study approach
Both Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1978: 8) and following him, Lois Hood-Holzman, 
decry the absence of a dialectical materialist method (Hood-Holzman, 1996: 
88). However there is a dialectical materialist perspective. Hood-Holzman 
makes this clear when she contrasts the interpretation of social situations by 
supporters of a dialectical materialist position and those who interpret similar 
situations from a pragmatic perspective. She sees pragmatists as uniting 
behaviour and meaning in one unit o f action. From the dialectical materialist 
perspective behaviour and meaning don’t unite. Rather they are poles -  two 
contradictory elements of the same phenomenon that do not resolve in action 
but are better understood as activity, with understanding coming through the 
movement of history (ibid: 91).
In the absence of a dialectical materialist method the methods available tend to 
split into those associated with a behaviourist approach which abstracts reality 
using quantitative analysis and those that try to interpret action and meaning 
through small-scale research interpreting the specific (Cohen and Manion, 
1989: 11 and 40). Both methods can be adopted by a researcher applying a 
dialectical materialist position. The key issue is the research question. In this 
case concept formation points to the individual in a social setting -  not to the 
broad brush of the individual in general and the social setting in the round, but 
to the singular -  the single individual in a specific social setting.
page 68
Michael Bassey maps the case study on a dimension of sampling versus 
singularity, and argues that some aspects of the case study serve to produce 
predictive fuzzy generalisations and other aspects produce interpretive stories 
(Bassey, 1999: 4). I plan to observe both behaviour and meaning and to unite 
them through a holistic overview o f the life history of concept formation.
My research falls into the case study perspective in the sense that I observe 
closely the activities of a particular case -  in this case o f concept formation in 
the secondary school classroom — and to probe deeply to establish the life cycle 
of concept formation about reproduction in the classroom. I expect to be able to 
generalise to the wider population to which the instance belongs (Cohen and 
Manion, 1989: 124). At the heart of the case study lies a method o f  
observation, in this case the structured situation. A major role o f the observer is 
to minimise reactivity. My role of teacher allows me both to structure the 
situations and also to make invisible the role of research by providing ‘cover’.
Cohen and Manion suggest that there is a dimension to the case study approach. 
Highly structured approaches, for example that of Lambert et al (reported in 
Cohen and Manion, 1989: 137), may be linked to explicit theoretical 
approaches which the study is meant to prove or disprove. Other researchers, 
such as King, also reported in Cohen and Manion, go in without any such clear 
picture and are looking to the study of the case to produce grounded theory— 
even this, as Cohen and Manion point out, is a theoretical perspective (ibid:
141). At one pole the researcher attempts to emulate the rigour o f the positivist 
approach from an interpretive standpoint. At the other pole researchers hope 
for close observation and reflection to produce grounded theory with which they 
can generalise to other cases.
My intention is to move along this methodological dimension as I attempt to 
walk through the life cycle of concept formation. The focus here will not be the
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case as situation as posited by Cohen and Manion (ibid: 124) but rather the case 
as issue as defined by Stake (Stake 1995: 16-17). The case as a bounded 
system is given. It is the secondary school classroom and pupils to which I have 
ready access. It is not this in itself that is the focus of study. Rather it is 
instrumental in allowing the study of something else, an issue or generality of 
which this case is simply an instance. The case as issue is the process o f concept 
formation itself. The initial and final phases will be investigated by interview 
and the methodology o f interview will predominate, although it will still be 
seen as part o f a Case study perspective because both the interview and 
classroom observation will take place within structured situations filtered by a 
focus on the issue of concept formation.
Outline of the research
An initial task will be to define what a formal scientific concept o f reproduction 
would be.
The initial interview will aim to establish the existing views of the child by a 
structured situation based on concept cards and a board. When assembled this 
will give the child’s explanation of a life cycle involving reproduction, extended 
by a limited number o f probes to see if  more detailed concepts are held.
This understanding is confirmed by the child’ s narrative account.
At the opposite pole of this naturalistic account will be elements that focus on 
behaviour. Accounts where the human life cycle is elicited first will be 
contrasted with situations where the plant life cycle is elicited first. I will also 
look at evidence for different cognitive processes by observing behaviour.
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The final interview will be similar in nature. The major task will be to apply 
the concept o f reproduction in unfamiliar situations. Observation of 
manipulation will be confirmed by narrative. Plant and animal accounts will be 
shifted in order and contrasted.
Between the two interviews lie the classroom observations. These are again 
structured situations, based around classroom tasks, models and activities 
prepared in advance and based on my own picture of concept development in 
this area. However in these cases the task binds the situation much more 
loosely so the pole o f observation is much more naturalistic, with an 
expectation that ‘grounded theory’ will arise from reflection, giving more detail 
about how concepts form in practice and hopefully shedding some light on the 
question o f intersubjectivity and how, if  Vygotsky is correct, concepts can form 
externally before moving inwards. Again the interpretive will contrast with 
behaviour, with a contrast between those developing the concept o f  human 
reproduction first and those attempting understanding o f plant reproduction 
first.
Finally I will attempt to use syllabus and textbooks to analyse school knowledge 
and assess the extent to which the task of forming scientific concepts is central 
to school science.
Approach to data analysis
The framework for data analysis will be, yet again, the issue of concept 
formation. A basic model of male and female gametes fusing to produce a 
zygote will be used as a standard to assess pupil responses. Much reliance will 
be placed on the pupil’s narrative and manipulation of sign but, again, these 
accounts will be contrasted with behaviour.
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In the initial interviews completed concept boards and pupil narratives will be 
used to assess pupil knowledge. The extent to which there is a statistical 
difference between those who Study plants first compared with those who study 
humans first will be assessed in order to establish if  there are internal “modes of 
thought’ that can assist or block understanding. Videos will be analysed to see 
if  a range of strategies for establishing the concept can be identified.
The focus o f study in the classroom w ill be the group. In each area o f study a 
key task will be set -  for example, jumbled concept cartoons to establish how  
the pupils jointly arrange a narrative or building a model flower to establish the 
extent to which technical terms are accepted and used as empty concepts. 
Overall I hope to establish a picture of interaction between individual, group 
and classroom and of the operation of intersubjectivity in the process o f concept 
formation. Again there will be a comparison between those who study plants 
first and those who study humans first to establish if  different cognitive 
processes are involved.
The final interviews will interpret the sequencing of cards and narrative by 
pupils to establish their ability to apply a concept of reproduction in new  
circumstances. I w ill attempt to establish through analysis of the response to 
probe questions scaffolded by line diagrams the pupil’s ability to link structure 
and function in flower structure and their ability to state the formal scientific 
definition of sexual reproduction in an unfamiliar situation.
The analysis of the science curriculum and texts w ill rest upon my 
understanding of formal definitions in science as being nested within 
superordinate structures and linked to subordinate definitions. To what extent 
do the texts demand a scientific concept? What Vygotsky would have seen as a 
mature concept?
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Thé question of ethics
If one accepts a dialectical materialist approach then the question o f ownership 
of research is tied to the nature of the research. To the extent that those 
involved were subjects of research, constructing meaning with the researcher 
then they can credibly claim ownership of the research and its findings.
In this case I would argue that my pupils, and to a lesser extent their parents and 
the school and staff are both the subjects and objects of research and my duty as 
researcher is one of care, which involves within itself the duty o f obtaining 
informed consent and extending ownership by making as explicit as possible 
the nature o f the research question and what is being asked o f them. I believe 
that the topic o f research involves specific problems and I intend to explain how 
I fell into this particular research question and how I dealt with the problems 
involved.
I intend to go into greater detail about the research instruments, data collection 
and analysis and resolving ethical issues in the next chapter.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to explain Vygotsky’s commitment to a 
dialectical materialist perspective as a method of resolving the crisis of 
psychology. It is difficult to transmit this commitment into a particular 
methodological approach, but I suggest that in the intimate area of a 
developmental space an approach I call the ‘structured situation’ might bear 
fruit. Dialectical materialism is not itself a method, but it does suggest a 
shifting of perspective from objective to subjective that should provide a form 
of triangulation for the study. This led me in the direction of research 
instruments that I believe fit within the case study tradition. In the next chapter 
I intend to go into more detail about the research tools I developed and the 
practical and ethical issues that I faced in carrying out the research.
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Chapter 5
The study as case study
Introduction
In chapter 4 1 attempted to walk my way through from Vygotsky’s concern 
with a theory of mind to his concerns about methodology. These were 
linked by his view of a crisis of psychology caused by the inability of 
psychology to overcome the contradiction between the human as agent and 
the human as object. In Vygotsky’s view this contradiction could be 
overcome, at least in principle, by an understanding of dialectical 
materialism. I suggested that a method, which I call the ‘structured 
situation’ could be used to allow the study of meaning and that a dialectical 
materialist approach would allow different perspectives on a situation that 
would serve as a form of triangulation. I then outlined the life cycle of my 
own study, suggesting that the approach was similar to the case study 
approach in its focus on the individual case and on abstracting meaning.
In this chapter I want to contrast my approach to the case study as the study 
of a particular issue with the study of the case as an instance. This will 
suggest the extent to which the study can be generalised, allow me to go into 
more detail about the environment in which the case study was carried out, 
explain the ethical position in more detail and also outline some elements of 
a ‘chapter of accidents’ that constrained the study and restricted to some 
extent the firmness of the conclusions that I could draw. In considering the 
generalisablity of the case study as issue an important aspect should be what 
Schofield considers the ‘life cycle’ of the issue. He views the quantitative
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study as often resembling a snapshot, while qualitative studies can be seen 
as movies, following the development of an issue over time (Schofield, 
1993:105). I will expect to follow the development of the concept of sexual 
reproduction through out its life cycle -  from initial perception to mature 
concept. In general my initial expectation is of the sort of general process 
seen in figure 3.2, with the specific elements more clearly expressed in 
figure 3.3. My expectation would be that the internal coherence of the 
narrative would provide a form of triangulation, showing the extent of 
movement through a developmental space.
The case study as situation
Insofar as the case study can be regarded as the study of the instance, the 
instance in this case clearly has a dual nature. On the one hand it is the 
study of an issue -  the life cycle of concept formation. However, it is also, 
on the other hand, the study of concept formation in a particular situation -  
the situation of a secondary science classroom. This clearly has 
implications at all sorts of levels and I will want to look at some of them in 
more detail when I analyse the outcome of the research. For example, 
Vygotsky saw the formal ‘scientific’ approach in schools and the explicit, 
self-reflexive nature of the activity as advanced forms of thought allowing 
metacognition. Dillenbourg defines metacognition as the process of 
becoming aware of one’s own knowledge or one’s own cognitive processes 
(quoted in Puntambekar and du Boulay, 1999: 245). Brown defines 
metacognition as reflection leading to a strategic view of one’s work guided 
by a clear view of its goals (quoted in Black, 1999: 126).
To what extent is it the case that school knowledge has the character and 
status assigned to it by Vygotsky? Lave and Wenger saw the concept as 
firmly embedded in the social situation (Lave and Wenger, 1999: 23). This 
would indicate that school concepts are a special form of knowledge distinct 
from those in the outside world -  an idea to some extent endorsed by the 
early work of Susan Carey (Carey, 1989: 107). However at this particular 
stage I want to look at the situation as a sample. To what extent is it
page 75
representative of a more general population? Traditionally the positivist 
approach would have seen this as simply a matter of statistics, a view 
justified by the assumption that the elements under investigation were 
variables rather than elements of meaning. Schofield suggests a number of 
approaches that would allow the researcher to generalise from the case 
(Schofield, 1993: 98-105). The approach that seems most valid is the study 
of the typical. Typicality taken to extremes would lead to its own 
contradiction -  a situation that was average in every way would clearly be 
untypical. However by improving the ‘fit’ of a situation the researcher 
would be able to combine the nature of the situation with ‘thick’ description 
to make more informed decisions about the generalisability of the situation 
(ibid, 99). The pupils are within the normal range of the secondary school 
population in the sense that they have been assessed as covering the 
standard ability band within that group and a range of social classes (with 
the skew, reported before, that most able pupils and, to an extent, higher 
social classes, are not represented). The activity the pupils are undertaking 
is, at least in its rough outlines, common to all pupils subject to the common 
science curriculum.
The not quite typical
An important aspect of the study, linked to questions about generalisablity 
later, is to make explicit the extent to which this study of the typical is a 
Study of the not quite typical.
The fact that I am a teacher in full time work effectively constrains the area 
of my researches to my place of work, a small, rural, co-educational 
secondary school with an enrolment of 430. (One alternative was available, 
as I also teach adults in a night class once a week, but I believed that data 
about concept formation would be more generalisable from a study of 
children).
Constraints on an investigation would be presented by pupils studying for 
key stage three or four examinations. Effectively this restricted me to
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Northern Ireland years eight and nine (in Britain this would be years seven 
and eight). Plant reproduction, the topic around which I had decided to base 
my investigation, was on the year eight programme of study and there were 
fewer special needs pupils in my year eight group -  the year nine group 
might have presented problems of design and data analysis later because of 
a number of pupils with specific learning difficulties needing some level of 
individual support. With the year eight groups there was some fear of an 
induction effect -  that as newcomers they would have a different approach 
to teaching and learning to the old hands who made up the bulk of the 
school population, but as the bulk of the research would take place in the 
spring and summer terms, this seemed to be a minor consideration.
There are about ninety pupils in year eight, of whom 22 are taught directly 
by me. The pupils have been through an 11+ transfer procedure in which 
the vast majority had scored below Grammar school entry level. A top 
stream is selected on the basis of reports from their primary school, 
induction tests and transfer tests. The other groups are considered to be of 
mixed ability.
Initially I hoped that this would be, in a rather miniature way, a multi-site 
case study with interviews and observations across the four first-year classes 
that would tend to compensate for aspects of the study such as different 
teaching styles but, for reasons that I explain below, I had to restrict the 
range of the final study. This had the effect, which I again explain later in 
more detail, of increasing the reactivity of the study.
The research relationship
Much of the conduct of the research, and to an even greater extent my 
approach to the ethical questions that arose, came from my view of the 
research relationship with my pupils. The Vygotskyan perspective 
suggested to me a dimension/contradiction between the pupil as agent and 
the pupil as object of research. It seemed to me, on reflection, that in the 
overall production of research the pupil, and to a certain extent the
page 77
parents/guardians and staff of the school, were to a certain extent the objects 
of research, in that we did not have a common goal of research -the goal 
was my intellectual invention -  rather I had their willing and knowing 
consent to co-operate in the research. My responsibility lay with a strategy 
to develop and present the outcomes of the research process in such a way 
as to maximise the element of common ownership. Part of that strategy was 
to ensure that the pupils, paients and staff had a right to access the results of 
the research involving them and from that perspective I have decided to 
make available the final thesis in the school and inform the participants of 
its availability in line with BERA guidelines (BERA, 1992:2).
Consent and support, from parents and pupils and from the school principal, 
was rather easily obtained by letters requesting support and, in the case of 
the pupils and parents, of patient follow-up over a period of weeks (see 
appendix A .l). What was left then was a duty of care in my role of teacher 
and researcher.
This duty existed at a number of levels. I had to ensure that variations in the 
curriculum were such that I did not know in advance that pupils would be 
disadvantaged by being taught one scheme rather than another. I had to 
preserve the anonymity of the pupils, as far as was practical, by giving the 
school an invented name and coding each of the pupils with a research name 
that did not provide a clue to their actual name -  although I did preserve the 
distinction between male and female -  often seen as a factor in 
differentiation in educational studies.
The circumstances of interview were the focus of detailed discussion with 
the principal in line with BERA guidelines (BERA, 1992:2). They had to 
meet with the provisions of the school’s child protection policy (see 
appendix A. 2) that discouraged private interviews between pupils and staff 
in isolation. Insofar as was practicable two staff should be present at 
interview and, where this was not possible, doors should be left open to 
create a public interview space. Elements of this policy produced difficulty, 
as the point of the interview was that it would be private. After some
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discussion we agi'eed an interview setup which met the requirements of the 
policy (see appendix A.3). The children were interviewed in the science 
preparation room. The technician was present in the backgound but had no 
active role in the interviews. The interviews were videotaped and children 
awaiting interview were within sight in the foyer but not within hearing 
range. Children who finished interview were allowed to read in the 
classroom next door. The initial interviews were completed in two days to 
reduce reactivity. It seemed evident to me that the longer the interviews 
went on the more they would be the subject of discussion amongst the 
pupils and the more likely this would be to change the responses of the 
pupils interviewed later.
There was a further level of care that needs discussing. I think I need to 
explain how a middle-aged man came to be interviewing young children 
about sexual reproduction. I have explained in the introduction how the 
initial impulse for the research came from a lesson on plant reproduction. I 
began to carry out pilot work and used the same topic as framework. It was 
only when I began to design the final study and looked at the structure of the 
knowledge required that I realised that the science model, when generalised 
to cover the general outcome of fertilisation and the formation of a new 
individual, covered both plant and animal reproduction. Even then there 
was a ‘quality of easiness’ arising from many years of teaching the topic 
that hid the rather more difficult position of the researcher. In the event I 
gambled that the distance from the topic, the trappings of the science 
department and familiarity with myself reduced embarrassment to a low 
level.
I prepared to cut short interviews in the case of difficulty and had a 
supplementary probe about embarrassment for pupils who had long pauses 
or difficulty in answering. In the event only one pupil claimed 
embaiTassment with the task of explaining human reproduction -  he was 
subsequently unable to explain the process of plant reproduction. Another 
pupil became confused about the sequence of events in human reproduction 
but insisted on being interviewed again the next day and was then able to
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explain in detail about human reproduction and insist that they had known 
the details all along!
I do not believe that the nature of the topic inhibited pupil response -  in fact 
I was rather taken aback by the ease with which the majority of pupils 
discussed the issue. Reflection did however alert me to the sensitivity of the 
topic and suggested that this may have constrained and structured the 
science curriculum and science pedagogy in the past. I will return to this 
issue when I consider the nature of science in the secondary school 
environment.
Obstacles to the investigation
The preparatory stages of the investigation went well. I issued and collected 
letters establishing parental permission (see appendix A .l) and negotiated 
the support of the principal, the technician and the other science teachers. I 
began the investigation and immediately ran into trouble. I had planned to 
videotape all the initial interviews and had been promised the loan of a 
library board camera. We ran into trouble with a camera fault and, when the 
technician and I struggled with it, the board called and asked for it back.
We started the interviews with just audio and notes, obtained another 
camera from the teachers centre -  but they asked for it back after 2 days.
We finally obtained a loan of a camera from the Partially Hearing Unit 
attached to the school but this had a number of drawbacks. It was large and 
obtrusive and the battery was permanently flat so it had to be connected to 
an electrical outlet to function and it was not available at all times. We were 
able to overcome these difficulties and carry out the interviews, but I had 
also arranged with the technician that we would run a series of preparatory 
tapes in the science classrooms simply to acclimatise the children to the 
presence of the camera. Because of a heavy workload on both myself and 
the technician we frequently forgot and, when we remembered, the camera 
was not present in the science block. However we were able to carry out six 
video ‘dry runs’ and a similar number of audio tests. An interesting
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observation at this point was that the children appeared to adjust very 
quickly to the camera but never seemed to acclimatise completely to the 
audio equipment. My speculation would be that they are familiar with video 
cameras and with the concept of ‘reality TV’ but that audiotaping is now 
relatively uncommon.
Finally I fell ill and lost a week. When I returned disaster had struck. An 
inspection of the school had been announced. Really it became impossible 
to ask any other members of staff for co-operation as they prepared for the 
inspection and my own time was severely restricted. I completed the first 
set of the initial interviews and prepared the teaching and interview 
materials I would use later, but lost April and most of May. I could see that 
my design for the study would have to be amended, and as a precaution I 
decided to interview all the members of my own class. My feeling was that 
the size of the pupil sample was likely to get smaller as we approached the 
end of the school year and a number of families took early holidays. I felt it 
would be wise to gather information in as great a depth and detail as the 
situation afforded.
Following the inspection I received a great deal of support from the 
principal. It was agi'eed that I could retain all my non-cover classes to 
complete the study, but to make full use of this I had to carry out the 
“classroom observation” just on my own time. I therefore had to take my 
own pupils and, to retain a comparative element, I split the class group of 20 
into two groups of 10, one of which, group A, would begin with a study of 
human reproduction and then study plants and the other, group B, that 
would reverse the path of study, studying plant reproduction followed by 
human reproduction. This was to follow my initial model of a 
developmental space in figure 3.3. I planned to contrast the two gi'oups to 
see if the order in which the topics were approached had an effect on 
learning. I was not able to choose the membership of the groups. That was 
determined by who was available at the fixed point on the timetable. The
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class groups had been amalgamated for other subjects at that time, so 
effectively the choice of which pupil went into which group was random. I 
looked at the lists for the two groups very carefully and I was unable to see 
any particular difference in background or ability that would affect their 
performance as a group.
The change from class group to experimental group had a number of effects. 
The pupils showed a very clear reactivity. It was not the same as a real 
lesson and they did not appear to be as committed to class work as in normal 
science lessons. Secondly the sample size was smaller and it would be more 
difficult to generalise from it. Thirdly everything had moved further back in 
the school year and this had an impact both on attention in the classroom 
and on the final interviews. These were so late in the school year that I 
began to run into the problem of children going on holiday early and 
eventually had to take whoever was present on those days. As I tried to 
stick to the original interview schedule I ended up with rather a mixture of 
children who had simply been interviewed and those who had been 
interviewed and taken part of the classroom study (and a few who came 
along anyway).
I did however have a few pieces of luck. The school obtained a modem 
compact digital camera which was put at my disposal. I came across an 
earlier tape of pupils in one of the other classes which the technician had 
recorded in my absence and which proved useful comparative material. 
Finally it turned out that the alteration between plant first and human first, 
which I had fallen into almost by accident, showed a quite significant 
difference between the two groups in the classroom observation element.
Conclusion
As it was both the instance and the issue of the case acted to constrain the 
conduct of the research. The instance dictated the sort of sample that was 
available and the extent to which it was available as a research subject. 
Accidental elements defomied and constrained the data available. The case
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as issue presented some problems, especially of an ethical nature in the 
sense that there are obvious difficulties about discussing human 
reproduction with children that become invisible from within the everyday 
world of ‘doing’ reproduction in the science lab. These problems led me to 
reflect on the way in which the science curriculum, and commonplace 
science pedagogy, responded to the issue of reproduction. I began to 
suspect that one factor influencing the curriculum was to make the issue of 
reproduction ‘safe’ for adults and children.
In the next chapter I want to focus in more detail on the nature of the initial 
interviews, the data collected and the ways in which I interpreted it and the 
outcomes in terms of the conceptions about plant and animal reproduction 
held by the children at the start of the study of concept formation.
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Chapter six
‘Structured situations’ part I 
Interviews and interpretation
Introduction
In chapter six I explain my perspective in approaching the initial interviews as 
‘structured situations’. The structuring of a developmental space in relation to 
reproduction and the sort of outcomes that I expected are laid out. The conduct 
of the interviews is explained and the outcomes are set out in some detail and 
represented in graphical form and I then interpret the meaning o f these results 
and revisit some elements of the literature to see the extent to which my 
interpretation can be supported. In some aspects the results were as expected. 
In others there is an element of surprise and it is on the interpretation o f these 
results that I focus, arguing that my interpretation gains validity from the 
movement between interpretive and behavioural elements of the study.
Structured situations
The initial interviews can be seen as structured situations in that a structure is 
provided by concept cards and boards that can be used by the pupil to construct
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meaning. The interview element essentially consists o f a series o f probes to 
elicit meaning from the pupil with further extension probes to see if  the pupil 
can extend the meaning that they have already ascribed to the situation.
The situation contains two forms of inherent meaning. The first, summing up 
the goal of schooling and resting on many of the assumptions o f science, is the 
scientific model of reproduction. A connotative set of associations can be 
reduced to the model; male gamete, then female gamete, fertilisation and the 
formation o f a zygote or new organism. The second form of inherent meaning, 
through which the observations of the researcher are made, is the concept of 
scaffolding and the zone of proximal development. The items that provide 
structure to the situation can be regarded as a form of scaffolding. The structure 
that is potentially present in the situation can only be elicited if  the concept of 
sexual reproduction is within the zone of proximal development. I can be 
reasonably confident that some aspects should be available to the pupils given 
that a simplified form of the life cycle is taught at primary school. Driver at al 
indicate that I can expect a number of responses from children that can be put in 
order in the sense o f going from the simple to the complex; from the idea o f  
growth to the concept of mating, from mating to the idea o f the womb as garden 
and the sperm as seed, from there to the concept o f fertilisation and hence to the 
full science concept of gamete and zygote ((Driver et al 1994: 49).
So the first outcome of the initial interviews is a type o f structure; the formal 
science structure, an alternative structuring or unstructured arrangements o f the 
cards. The extent to which this represents meaning will be supported by an 
accompanying narrative. I will also be able to compare the pupil’s ability to 
understand reproduction in plants and humans by comparing the numbers able 
to provide coherent explanation in each case, and I will be able to obtain some 
evidence of internal mental process by contrasting the time taken to complete 
the life cycle in each case and the effect of alternating the first interview on the
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human life cycle with a group who attempted the plant life cycle first. Other 
evidence for internal mental events will be achieved by looking for strategies in 
handling the cards -  my belief is that the more structured the internal activity 
the less the cards will be manipulated.
The various activities can be represented along a dimension of meaning as: 
Meaning
•  Explanation o f life cycle
•  Arrangement of life cycle
•  Comparing of plant and human results
•  Contrasting of plant and human results
•  Gesture analysis
Behaviour
It is expected that, to the extent that the behavioural pole of the analysis 
supports the pole of meaning, a form of internal triangulation of the study will 
exist.
The interview setup
The interviews were carried out in the science store, organised to meet both the 
privacy requirements of individual interview and the child protection policy of 
the school (see appendix A.3). Two concept boards were supplied, one for 
plants and the other for humans and cards for insertion into the boxes (appendix 
B). The boards were organised in dual circles with a central square given 
(exploding pod for plant, foetus for the human). Copies of the boards were held
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on individual interview record sheets which were filled in for each pupil (see 
appendix B.7). All but the first six interviews were videotaped. All interviews 
were audiotaped and the time taken to complete the life cycles recorded.
The children were asked to set out the life cycle, to explain the life cycle, to 
identify the new life and to indicate where the new life came from (The 
interview schedule is printed on the record sheets). Alternate pupils either 
started first with the human life cycle or with the plant life cycle. The intention 
was to establish the pupils existing concepts, to see what role manipulation of  
sign had in developing or confirming concepts and to see if  there was support 
for the idea that concept formation was aided by a social intelligence which 
would aid concept development with the human life cycle, or a natural history 
intelligence that would aid the plant cycle.
Overview of the initial interviews
All 41 pupils in the initial interview showed an interest in, and enthusiasm for, 
the tasks they were asked to carry out, often showing a high degree o f emotion 
and frequently anxiety. As the study progressed I began to feel that this was a 
highly significant observation and I will explain why later in the study. The 
vast majority of the children (35) had some difficulty with the task of 
construction of a life cycle using the cards, even though life cycles are a major 
element of the primary science curriculum. A persistent tendency was the 
tendency to lay out all the cards in a single cycle, ignoring the information and 
structure contained within the board. This dominated the attempts o f 15 pupils 
who persisted to the end of the task, and was present to some extent in most o f  
the other pupils who corrected the initial single-cycle tendency.
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27 pupils (66%) succeeded in constructing a human life cycle using the cards. 
Only 19 pupils (46%) succeeded in constructing correct plant life cycles. All 
the children who successfully constructed life cycles were able to explain in 
narrative the life cycle process, but only two boys who failed to construct a
coherent life cycle went on to give a correct narrative. 30 pupils (73%) correctly 
identified the embryo as ‘new life’. 22 pupils (54%) were able to correctly 
identify the seed as the source of new life.
None of the pupils indicated a full understanding of the science model for 
reproduction. Some part o f this failure may be due to embarrassment, but given 
that the failure was even greater with plants this is unlikely to be the main 
explanation. Some of the embarrassment that was evident was, it appeared to 
me, due to an everyday understanding that copulation was involved, but where 
pupils were willing to answer the concepts they advanced were in line with 
Driver (Driver et al 1994: 48) and with Susan Carey (ibid) -  that is that the baby 
grows in the mother’s tummy. One pupil claimed to be unable to answer any 
questions about the human life cycle because of embarrassment, but was equally 
unable to answer questions about plant reproduction, where one would imagine 
embarrassment would not be an issue. Another pupil, who was unable to 
answer questions insisted on being re-interviewed the next day, when they were 
able to give fairly full answers. In this case the embarrassment o f not knowing 
was greater than the embarrassment o f knowing!
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The comparative element of the initial interviews
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As is shown in graph 6.1, 15 of the pupils persisted in trying to construct the 
human life cycle by arranging the cards in a single cycle. 13 pupils were unable 
to complete a coherent life cycle and 2 eventually succeeded. Of the 26 pupils 
who used the dual cycle structure of the concept boards 4 pupils were unable to 
complete a coherent life cycle and 22 eventually succeeded. 18 pupils attempted 
to construct the plant life cycle by arranging the cards in a single cycle. 13 
pupils were unable to complete a coherent life cycle and 5 eventually 
succeeded. O f the 23 pupils who used the dual cycle structure of the plant 
concept boards 9 pupils were unable to complete a coherent life cycle and 14 
eventually succeeded.
Contrasting plant and human
O f the 27 pupils who correctly completed the human life cycle 14 (52%) 
attempted the human life cycle first and 13 (48%) attempted the plant life cycle
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first. Of the 19 pupils who succeeded in constructing a plant life cycle 12 
(63%) attempted the human life cycle first and 7 (37%) attempted the plant life 
cycle first.
Of the 20 pupils who attempted the human life cycle first 14 (70%) got the 
human life cycle correct and 12 (60%) went on to get the plant cycle correct.
Of the 21 pupils who attempted the plant life cycle first 7 (33%) got the plant 
life cycle correct and 12 (57%) went on to get the human cycle correct.
There was a small overall faster response from the pupils who attempted the 
human life cycle, although this was not always connected to an accurate 
response.
11 pupils (27%) were unable to identify the human foetus as new life. 8 o f these 
attempted plant first (graph 6.2). This suggests that the plant task in some way 
blocks thinking about human reproduction.
17 Pupils (41%) were unable to identify the seed as new life. 14 o f these 
attempted plant first (graph 6.3). This suggests a greater difficulty in thinking 
about plant reproduction from a biological perspective.
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Graph 6.2 
failed to Identify embryo as new life
□  plant first
□  human first
Graph 6.3 
failed to Identify seed as new life
□  plant first 
□human first
A comparison of completion times proved useful. The following graph (graph 
6.4) shows results for both human and plant concept boards, following the 
sequence in which they were carried out
Graph 6.4
Life cycle completion times (or both plant and human concept boards
OHIime 
□  R im e
I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
Pupil sequence number
Graph 6.4 indicates that human life cycles were completed faster. Average time 
for completion of a human life cycle was 68 seconds and average time for 
completing a plant life cycle was 82 seconds. (I excluded candidate 5 from the
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average on the ground that completion times for this candidate were twice the 
next slowest candidate).
This might suggest simply greater ease and familiarity with the concept of the 
human life cycle, so I took into account the order in which the boards were 
completed as follows:
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Graph 6.5
Life cycle completion time (human cycle attempted 1st)
M hi
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□  Ptime
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Pupil number In sequence)
In graph 6.5 the average completion times were 66 seconds for the human life 
cycle and 76 seconds for the plant life cycle.
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Graph 6.6
Life cycle completion time (Plant cycle attempted 1st)
□  Htime
□  Ptime
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Pupil number In sequence (Pupil number 8 excluded)
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In graph 6.6 the average completion times were 74 seconds for the human life 
cycle and 92 seconds for the plant life cycle.
In summary the results are as follows:
Table 6.1
Concept board completion times (seconds)
Human Plant
time time
overall 68 82
human cycle 1st 66 76.
plant cycle 1st 74 92.
1 went on to establish trend lines for completion times. The results are as 
follows:
Graph 6.7
Trend in completion times for human life cycle
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Graph 6.7 
Trend in
completion times 
for hum an life
Graph 6.8
Trend in life cycle completion times (Plants)
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Graphs 6.7 and 6.8 appear to indicate that there is a level of reactivity arising 
from pupil chat between those who have completed the interviews and those not 
yet called. It does not appear strong enough to falsify the data. However it is a 
stronger trend for the human life cycle, suggesting relative unfamiliarity with 
the plant life cycle.
Interpretation
A major surprise of the interviews was the role of the single life cycle, learnt as 
part of the primary curriculum. The single cycle life cycle does not appear to be 
a mature concept and fits with the Vygotskyan idea of a complex -  it should 
disintegrate when challenged (Vygotsky, 1971: 61). In fact it proved 
remarkably resistant to change, fitting m with Carey’s evidence of the 
persistence of spontaneous concepts (Carey 1989: 106) and O sborne’s evidence
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of children’s ‘minitheories’ which were resistant to change (Osborne and 
Freyberg, 1985: 132) but, in this case the resistant mental structures are not 
spontaneous concepts arising from everyday experience but appear to fit more 
easily with Engestrdm’s idea of encapsulation -  special mental structures 
formed in the process of schooling (Engestrdm, 1996: 155) and Hedegaard’s 
view that school knowledge is mostly empirical and, because it lacks a 
theoretical understanding, is not incorporated with existing knowledge 
(Hedegaard, 1996: 180). It thus appeared to serve a dual function, for some 
pupils serving as the base line of a ZPD that they could travel along to form a 
more developed concept of reproduction, for others acting as a barrier 
preventing further development of the concept.
The fact that pupils tended towards a faster response in constructing the human 
life cycle and did rather better at it would hardly come as a surprise. What was 
surprising was that the order in which the life cycle was attempted seemed to 
make a significant difference. Beginning with attempts to resolve the plant life 
cycle tended to produce a poorer response to both plant and animal life cycles 
and to the detail in which pupils could respond. In my opinion this finding fits 
in with the findings in Driver et al that plants are regarded in a different way 
from other living things (Driver et al, 1994:19) and provides grounds for 
suggesting that different thought processes about different catagories may block 
each other in line with Carey’s argument that different modes of thought are 
involved (Carey, 1996: 187), and in line with Mithin’s idea that different 
intelligences assemble different aspect of reality within the brain (Mithin,
1996: 78) and with Carey’s idea that a spontaneous ‘folkbiology’ is not 
innate(Carey, 1996: 210). In fact she suggests that biological elements of 
human life would be more easily assimilated because the pupils would already 
operate a developed ‘folkpsychology’ in which these elements would be 
accommodated.
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A study of gesture led me to identify a number of approaches adopted by the 
children that may be indicators of the maturity of internal mental structures and 
thus of the individuals position on the zone of proximal development -  those 
with fully internalised and developed concepts would have little need for 
extensive external gesture.
•  Reflection involved pauses with veiy little manipulation of  
the cards. Often one card was held on the lips or near the 
face.
•  Laydown meant that the cards were organised at one side of 
the board and then transferred to the board.
•  Restructuring meant that the cards were laid out on the 
board on some rough order and then moved back and 
forward until the pupil was satisfied.
•  Jumble meant that the cards were moved back and forward 
apparently randomly, often with jerky ‘hunting’ movements.
I believe however that there is too great a distance between the behaviour and 
my speculation about its meaning. A study o f gesture would involve a more 
experimental setup father than an interpretive one. However for the main 
findings in this section I believe that a form of triangulation does exist in that 
the interpretive element is supported by the more objective analysis o f  
percentage success at various stages and by the comparison o f completion times 
in tasks differing only in the sequence in which they are carried out.
The trend lines in graphs 6.7 and 6.8 are interesting. They suggest a level of 
reactivity in that those interviewed later in the schedule had some knowledge of  
what the interviews are about. I saw the two pupils who gave correct narratives
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and incorrect concept board structures as being strong examples o f reactivity. It 
may be that they had questioned pupils earlier in the interview list and, knowing 
‘the answer’ had not bothered to engage with the concept boards. The graphs 
tend to suggest that this reactivity did not make a significant difference to pupil 
responses and, interestingly, that responses were less affected where plants were 
involved, suggesting that information picked up was less easily understood by 
the pupil.
Conclusion
Certain outcomes from the study were as expected. It is not surprising that the 
single-cycle life cycle taught in primary school should predominate or that 
pupils lack full understanding of the scientific model o f sexual reproduction. It 
is surprising that the primary understanding should, in a number o f pupils, act 
as a barrier to further understanding, that ways of thinking about plant and 
animal reproduction should appear so different and that it appears to be so 
difficult to move from a ‘plant reproduction’ mode of thinking to a ‘human 
reproduction’ mode and relatively easy to move in the other direction. The 
‘structured situation’ seems a robust mode of enquiry and should prove 
effective in classroom observation.
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Chapter 7 
‘Structured situations’ part II: 
Classroom observation
Introduction
I saw the classroom observations as yet another example of ‘structured 
situations’. The structure is constrained as an issue in that, as before, I will 
be providing visual cues, activities and instructions out of which I hope the 
children will elicit meanings. As before I hope to be able to establish those 
meanings through the children’s statements and by examining the written 
records that they provide. I will need to bear in mind also that the situation 
is structured as an environment in that it will tend to produce the responses 
typical of a secondary classroom. The search for meaning will only partly 
focus on the individual. There is an expectation that the new concepts will 
begin life as intersubjective ideas and, as they gain in formal meaning 
externally, they will also assimilate internally as idiosyncratic, individual 
representations of the science concepts involved, so part of the outcome will 
be my interpretation of observations of pupils interacting in classroom 
groups.
page 98
structured situations
The classroom observations are structured situations comparable to the 
interviews in that they involve materials that can be assembled by the pupil 
to give meaning. They differ from the interviews in that:
• The materials and instructions have a looser connection to 
the eventual meaning.
•  The conceptual space is much larger and broader.
•  The numbers involved are greater.
• The social situation is much more complex, with movement 
between the teacher, the class, the group and the individual.
• In the interviews it was assumed, from their primary history, 
that most pupils would hold at some level the concepts I was 
trying to elicit in the interview. In the classroom observations 
the starting point was the assumption, based on interview, 
that many of the pupils did not hold more detailed concepts 
about reproduction, at least in terms of a mature scientific 
concept.
An assumption was that the meaning will emerge in some way from the 
group. This in some way involved the concept of intersubjectivity and one 
of the purposes of the observation was to theorize the process through which 
the intersubjective concept emerged from social activity.
Intersubjectivity
Initial ideas about how this might happen can be found by looking at the 
work of Piaget and Vygotsky. Both had a concept of intersubjectivity as the 
sharing of concepts between individuals (Rogoff, 1999: 80) but for Piaget 
the concept existed first in the individual and was then shared in discussion 
amongst equals. For Vygotsky the concept existed in the culture and was
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internalised through common practice which depended on the tension 
between the child and the more experienced other (ibid).
Piaget saw the learner as being in solitary interaction with nature. Concepts 
would form through this interaction, with greater abstraction becoming 
possible as the child matures (Piaget and Inhelder, 1973: 13-19). Social 
debate would therefore be an exchange of information about already 
existing concepts. The process by which these private concepts become 
public and intersubjective is an outcome of decentering by the individual, 
who is then able to shift perspective to examine the other’s view (ibid).
The perspective for Vygotsky was in some senses the opposite of that of 
Piaget. The child did not interact directly with nature but through the 
mediation of the word and sign provided by human culture (Vygotsky,
1971: 44). The meaning already existed in some way intersubjectively 
before it was adopted by the child. The focus of attention was the 
mechanism by which this intersubjective meaning became internalised 
within the individual pupil as a personal, idiosyncratic meaning. It would 
tend not to occur in peer interaction unless one of the individuals had a 
greater level of skill (Rogoff, 1999: 77). A contrasting argument from 
Piaget suggests that the greater authority of the adult can suppress thinking 
skills in the child (ibid: 78).
I see Vygotsky's idea of heaps, complexes and pseudo-concepts as being 
extremely useful in attempting to imagine the mechanism of concept 
formation within a group. It suggests that the individual pupil will be 
extremely tolerant of loose associations and groupings and will await the 
emergence of more detailed links and associations allowing the 
development of the detailed concept. The model of a developmental space 
that I advance suggests that the word of representing the new concept and 
the hints about meaning contained in language structure and in the social 
situation will be rapidly adopted. The model of developmental space also 
indicates how the goal of the full science concept might be arrived at, but is 
less clear about the factors that might inhibit the emergence of the concept.
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My initial expectation was of a debate and turn taking in which thé word 
and potential structures of meaning represented by the materials provided 
are advanced by different pupils until a consensus is arrived at.
As with the interview, I  will be able to take a dialectical materialist position. 
I will be able to make some assessment of the meaning arrived at and the 
extent of that meaning. I will be able to estimate the frequency with which 
members of the groups arrive at meaning, compare these frequencies for 
tasks involving plants and humans and contrast outcomes for humans and 
plants. By reflecting on the observations I expect to produce grounded 
theory about the role of intersubjectivity in concept formation and the role 
of the group in the classroom situation.
The classroom setup
As I have indicated earlier, my experience during the pilot was that it was 
virtually impossible to observe and teach, so I decided to rely almost 
entirely on video and audio recording, with some support from brief notes, 
in the knowledge that I was throwing away a great deal of data in exchange 
for the freedom to return to the same details over and over again.
My intention had been to introduce video cameras without comment. I had 
mentioned them when obtaining permission for the study from parents and 
children and I had arranged a series of six trials when the technician went 
around the class with the camera and a further three trails with the camera 
on in fixed positions. The records of these trails were not kept, but I did 
view them to get a feel for the data and to establish the best points for fixed 
cameras and the quality of sound. In the event I collected sound from both 
the audiocassettes and cameras, but the camera sound turned out to be of 
much better quality, although the reverse had been the case in the 
interviews.
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My difficulty was that I now had to change the structure of the study from 
the observation of everyday classroom activity to half-class sets. ; I had to 
explain the change and therefore draw attention to the use of cameras and 
increase pupil awareness and self-consciousness.
I explained the change as due to the shortage of time, but that the study 
would consist of material on the year eight science syllabus and they would 
be examined about the content of the course at the end of the year with the 
rest of the years work. I explained that the focus of the research would be 
the use of new materials and teaching methods.
General instructions were that they must work in groups, that each member 
of the group should give an opinion of the work as they went along and that 
they should at the end produce their own individual reports for each activity. 
This procedure was explained at the beginning of each lesson.
In the course of the classroom activity several new ethical issues arose. One 
was the level of misdirection. I had given the impression to the pupils that 
the focus of the research was the materials when in fact they themselves 
were the focus. I had in my inti'oduction reminded the pupils of the 
voluntary nature of the activity and this was taken by one pupil, Matt, as 
indicating that he could leave in the middle of a lesson and go to a sing­
song. My response was to indicate that he could withdraw from the activity 
but not from the classroom, as I had been assigned as the teacher 
supervising him. The effect was rather to erode the status of the research as 
voluntary. Finally I broke confidentiality to discuss the behaviour of one 
pupil with the Special Needs co-ordinator. In this case the pupil was being 
assessed for ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity syndrome) and I am 
convinced that I was acting in the pupil’s best interests.
The layout of the recording apparatus is shown in appendix C.l.
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Making sense of the recordings proved very difficult. I worked through the 
videos looking for some overview with no success. I then attempted to 
focus in on individuals, one at a time, and observe in frames of one minute 
at a time. I observed plenty of behaviour, but achieved very little in the way 
of understanding meaning.
I got very badly stuck at this point and analysis was held up for some time. 
Finally came a breakthrough. My insight was to work backwards from the 
outcome of the activity, which I labelled task completion because for the 
majority of the pupils it involved copying from others rather than any active 
construction of concepts. I was then able to focus on the division of labour 
in the processes leading to task completion, with a minority of pupils 
actively working and the other members of the group onlookers involved in 
social activities and that in turn led me to look at initial negotiation of roles 
and the contrast between implicit and explicit aspects of the task -  the 
explicit being what had been formally set as the activity and the implicit 
what actually engaged the attention of those involved.
I decided to narrow down my observation further, by concentrating on 2 
workgroups. One, in the A class, had started by studying the human life 
cycle and another in the B class who started with the plant lifecycle. I 
decided not to select the typical, a way suggested by Schofield for 
increasing the generalisability of research (Schofield, 1993: 99), but to look 
at groups who were somewhat more likely to resist classroom discipline, as 
my intuition was that there were also issues of motivation, attention and 
goal to look at.
Group A’s schedule is shown below:
Lesson 1 human lifecycle Lifecycle story
Hidden story -  the sex organs
and intercourse
Hidden story -  fertilisation
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Lesson 2 Build a flower Use of empty concepts
Lesson 3 Flower dissections Linkage of empty concepts
Microscopic view of pollen 
and ovule
Lesson 4 Flower story Plant life cycle
Hidden story -  Bee trip and
pollen
Hidden story -  pollination and 
fertilisation
Group B’s schedule was:
Lesson 1 Build a flower Use of empty concepts
Lesson 2 Flower dissections Linkage of empty concepts
Microscopic view of pollen 
and ovule
Lesson 3 Flower story
Lesson 4 human lifecycle
Plant life cycle
Hidden story -  Bee trip and
pollen
Hidden story -  pollination and
fertilisation
Lifecycle story
Hidden story -  the sex organs
and intercourse
Hidden story -  fertilisation
See appendices C for lesson worksheets.
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I followed the groups on video through the sequence of lessons, recording 
my results and trying to explain my observations and beginning with group 
A. Sample nanatives are recorded in Appendix C.5 and C.6.
Group A ’s conceptual journey
Lesson A l
In lesson A l the tasks are to complete the concept board of the human life 
cycle first presented in the interviews, to sequence a set of diagrams 
showing the 'hidden' story of fertilisation and convert these into a short 
narrative. Some more detailed notes of activity and conversation are given 
in appendix.C.5 and C.6. I did not keep any of the concept boards, as these 
were identical to those used in the interview and were completed 
successfully. However some samples of fertilisation sheets and narrative are 
given in appendix.C.7. The outcome of the lesson was that all pupils 
appeared to complete these tasks set and presented completed diagrams and 
convincing narratives.
The group process. The group settled in quickly and listened attentively to 
the teacher outlining the first task. When the teacher finished speaking and 
distributed the materials the pupils very rapidly undertook a series of 
nonverbal gestures, body postures and eye contacts which appeared to be 
nominations of the person who would actually carry out the task. The target 
of the group seemed to be Helen, but she turned her gaze away and appeared 
to refuse the nomination. The group gaze fell on Peter, who reluctantly 
began to assemble the life cycle. Sandra and Collete chatted absently. In 
the background the teacher was called to the entrance of the store and asked 
something by the technician. Dave took the opportunity to shout loudly that 
he knew the answer -  which he then presented as copulation (Driver et al, 
1994: 49) the class made no response. Helen chatted on and off with Sandra 
-  a scandal about some other girl conducted in mouthed whispers, but 
became the target of banter from the boys in group alpha. Dave was
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suggesting that she was very knowledgeable about sex and she was 
protesting about the innuendo, but in a rather flirtatious way. The teacher 
suddenly called time. Helen pulled Peter’s work over and silently approved 
it. The three girls quickly copied out their own versions.
The class showed greatest levels of concentration when listening to the 
teacher. All of the pupils were at some stage ‘busy’ on their own, but for 
the most part this appeared to be mechanical activity, absently cutting things 
out or arranging shapes. Pupil-pupil interaction within the group was either 
chat or copying with a few elements of debate about the sequence of laying 
down the cards between Colette and Sandra. At the beginning there was the 
announcement about copulation by Dave to the whole class -  there was little 
response to this beyond a few sniggers. At the end there was a rapid range 
of glances and remarks from pupil to pupil within the groups and then 
between groups.
Interpreting the meaning of the activitv
I think it worth pointing out again in the context of the classroom 
observations that the pupils were happy to adopt the tasks set by the teachers 
and to assume the role of pupil in the classroom setting.
It seemed, however, that being busy was an end in itself, often mechanical 
and seemingly a way of relaxing or a cover for chat about other things. This 
seemed to be a greater factor with the girls than the boys. Generally the 
boys were rather louder but also more enthusiastic.
Reflecting on the different intentions of the teacher and pupils in the 
situation led me to believe that there were two distinct levels to the activity. 
One was the formal, explicit purpose of the activity in terms of the concept 
of reproduction within the human life cycle. The end of this activity was 
not clearly visible to the pupils. On the other hand there was the informal, 
implicit social life of the classroom, pupils relaxing, having a chat, 
exchanging banter which weaves in and out of the actual content of the
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lesson. The implicit and explicit were linked together by ‘task completion’. 
The pupils strove to have some product at the end of the lesson linked to the 
task presented by the teacher. Often this was ‘farmed out’ through non­
verbal exchanges at the beginning of the activity, with the results 
generalized by copying at the end.
It is also possible to interpret the pupils behaviour through the model of a 
developmental space. Most of the children either already had, or were close 
to foiTning, a concept of reproduction close to the one offered. In that sense 
the activity was at the veiy beginning of a developmental zone -  confirming 
what is already known. The suggestion is that there might need to be the sort 
of tension that Vygotsky suggested was represented by the zone of proximal 
development for learning to take place. Finally what the pupils succeeded 
in doing was in essence the assembly of a narrative -  a task that Carol 
Feldman and David Kalmar suggest might be an automatic, inbuilt activity 
(Feldman and Kalmar, 1996:107).
Activity A 1 .2
Activity A l. 2, a follow-on activity in the same lesson, involved sequencing 
a series of pictures to outline the ‘hidden story’ of fertilisation, again to be 
able to nanate the story.
Outcome
The pupils were successful in the task, in that they produced worksheets that 
recorded coirect sequences in the process of copulation and fertilisation.
Process
Again there was little in the way of pupil-pupil debate. Again the pupils 
showed great interest and attention. They were very busy with the task 
sheets, but this appeared to be very mechanical activity. Chat was almost 
non-existent at the start of the class, but became more strongly developed
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later. Almost no elements of the chat invloved attempts to elicit the process. 
Most of the pupils did not know the importance of fertilisation (Driver.
1994: 48) and their solution was to ask the teacher. Brief question-answer 
sessions between the teacher and small groups or individuals allowed Dave 
and Colette, for example, to form a correct solution and extensive copying 
and comparison led to whole-class solutions.
Interpretation
Interpreting the situation from the model of a developmental zone, it 
appears that the teacher saw the concept of fertilisation as in some way 
implicit in the situation. This was not in fact the case. The assembly of the 
different cards into a coherent concept relied on external model provided by 
society. The cards could only be used as scaffolding in these circumstances 
-  a reality indicated by the brief bursts of teacher-pupil interaction which 
appeared to aid the pupils concerned in moving quickly to an understanding 
of the role of fertilisation. The greater difficulty may be linked to the fact 
that the concept was not in fact a narrative form, but is more readily 
understood as a scientific model.
Lesson A2 -  build a flower
Task -  to construct a model flower using a flower kit and set on instructions, 
with the vocabulary of a real flower -  caipel, stamen and so on.
Outcome -  all successful -  each group produced a completed and accurate 
model flower.
Process
Again the groups were very quick to settle and to concentrate on the 
teacher’s instructions. The groups automatically split into pairs and worked 
together in concentration, readily using the vocabulary to denote the part 
they wanted. There was some indication of an understanding of a
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coîinotative function in that they had to put pollen (sulphur dust) on to the 
anther and use Pritt to make the stigma sticky. Discussion about this 
showed a ready use of the structures of language to imply relationships 
between the parts of the flower and hinted at a connection between structure 
and function.
This said, the level of reflection was quite shallow. After a short time the 
consti'uction took on an absent-minded, automatic aspect. Chat and play 
increased as time went on. Each pair panicked in turn when they could not 
find the carpel. This was not present because it had to be constructed in a 
sub-assembly. There was no attempt at deduction or debate. The first group 
to be stuck immediately asked the teacher and most pupil-pupil 
communication within the formal task was simply passing on the teacher’s 
explanation.
Boys were somewhat more enthusiastic than the girls, but also more 
dependent and more inclined to play towards the end of the activity. There 
was less copying but to some extent the activity looked less challenging.
Interpretation
This lesson tends to support the points made in the last lesson. On 
reflection, from the perspective of a model of a developmental space, it is 
not clear that this activity actually involves progress through the space. The 
pupils could carry out the activity without any model of reproduction and it 
is only when they connect to the real flower and its functions that progress 
can be assumed. If this is so, then it is evidence that task completion is the 
goal of the pupils and they feel no cognitive conflict if the activity does not 
appear to have any meaning. What seems to have occurred is extremely 
rapid initial assessment of the difficulty of the task. Once it was assessed as 
easy the pupils committed themselves to it, but without any goal on their 
own part to forni new concepts or challenge old ones or feeling any need to 
reflect on the activity. Engagement in the task and being able to carry out 
the explicit instruction to construct the flower was sufficient. I would
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interpret the gender difference as being in part linked to the differing levels 
of maturation. The girls in general had a higher level of social skills and 
were able to commit to chat interlinked with activity. The boys were less 
skilful at chat and this meant a greater involvement in the task at the 
beginning but also a tendency to more obvious banter and play when the 
task proved less demanding.
Lesson A3 -  Flower dissection
Task -  dissect and name flower parts for a number of different flowers
Outcome -  pupils carry out activity successfully. All the groups produced 
cards with the parts of the flower sellotaped in the correct boxes.
Process -  initially the pupils work individually, but quickly join into pairs 
and easily and automatically use the science vocabulary to identify the parts 
to each other. The transfer of the science vocabulary occurs 
unselfconsciously. Hand lens use is quite skilful and does not appear to 
involve any doubt or hesitation, despite relative infrequency of its use in the 
laboratory. As time goes on the process seems to become more mechanical. 
Chat increases and non-verbal agreement leads to one pupil doing the actual 
work while others observe languidly, with the odd direction or comment.
A defining moment comes when Sandy finishes a dissection, mounts it on a 
card and asks the teacher if it correct. The teacher directs him to his partner, 
Dave. Dave explodes angrily; “Don't ask me - 1 don't know'' (with the clear 
implication that it is the teacher’s job to correct). The teacher becomes 
quite anxious about pupil inactivity and moves around trying to force 
individuals to be less passive. The activity does not fit the expectations of 
his model and he is unthinkingly trying to force reality to fit the model.
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Activity A3.2 -  Pollen and ovule
Task -  the pupils are to identify pollen and ovule after examining them 
under a microscope and show, by linking structure and function, that they 
identify them as sex cells or gametes.
Outcome -  The pupils appear perfectly happy examining the pollen and 
ovule and seem to recognise them and link them to the work they have been 
doing. They do not however seem to understand that they are part of the 
system of sexual reproduction of the flower. Asked to link the structure of 
the gametes to the function they carry out they simply draw rough labelled 
diagrams.
Process -  The pupils examine the samples individually. They seem 
interested and excited and remark to each other about the appearance of the 
pollen and ovule -  “It's like an emerald' calls out Sandy. However 
conversation does not move beyond appearance and no-one asks other 
pupils or the teacher about the function of the gametes.
Interpretation. -  Again task completion seems the dominant activity. The 
pupils show little curiosity and do not ask about the gametes. The pupils 
would now succeed in answering correctly many elements of the Key stage 
3 paper questions on flower structure, but do not appear to have moved 
along the developmental space to form a concept of plant reproduction.
This is in line with other research that indicates the difficulty that the task 
seems to pose (Driver, 1994: 50).
Lesson A4 -  Beetrip
Activity 4.1 -  the plant life cycle -  is completed quickly and accurately 
without a great deal of thought.
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Activity 4.2 -  construct narrative of bee pollination and subsequent 
conversion of ovary to fruit.
Outcome -  success, with some mistakes in sequencing. The groups 
produced sequenced cartoons of Bees collecting and delivering pollen and 
the subsequent withering of the flower and gi*owth of the fruit. A number of 
pupils were quite vague about the role of the Bee and confused because 
there were two bees.
Process -  Again the pupils play close attention. Initial cutting of cards is 
automatic. Sandra and Colette glance at each other. Both are holding the 
card and both want to cut. Without any real pause, and without a word, 
Sandra tears the sheet in two and they both cut happily. Later Colette takes 
charge of the sequencing while Sandra kibitzes. The activity is low-energy 
and there is no discussion of the task. Some of the boys are evidently 
completely off-task and the teacher excludes Charlie for a time because he 
insists in talking very loudly about football.
Again task completion is the children’s goal. They feel no cognitive 
conflict and do not reflect on the meaning of the tasks given. The teacher 
evidently believed that there was some internal pressure in the situation that 
would push the children to understanding of the mechanism of pollination 
and fertilization, but the children seem happy with an unorganised heap of 
impressions.
Activity 4.3 -  pollination and fertilisation- construct definitions of 
pollination and fertilisation from diagrams showing the process and key 
words supplied.
Outcome -  a number of pupils provided the expected outcome, but 
somewhat in the nature of providing the solution to a crossword rather than 
showing a genuine understanding of the processes involved. There is a 
great deal of confusion, of off-task behaviour and appeals to the teacher.
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Process and interpretation -  The teacher has expected that the concept 
would emerge from a developmental space by being constructed from 
earlier activities. In fact this does not happen. A certain expectation of 
meaning has held the activities of the teacher and pupils together, but now 
there is confusion and frustration. The girls chat and the boys get stuck and 
play. Some boys demand support from the teacher and the outcome is 
miniteaching events where the teacher responds with questions and draws 
out a series of statements which he confirms or denies until the pupil arrives 
at a satisfactory conclusion. Task completion for the other pupils is a wave 
of copying running across the class at the end of the session.
Group B s conceptual journey
Lesson B 1 -  build a flower
Task -  to construct a model flower using a flower kit and set on instructions, 
with the vocabulary of a real flower -  carpel, stamen and so on.
Outcome -  all completed identical ‘mutations’ with sepals inside petals. 
Vocabulary used automatically.
Process -  Initially all pupils interested and attentive. However once activity 
began the levels of play and chat were higher than for group A. In part this 
was due to one pupil, Bart, with a specific learning difficulty. He stood out 
in that he made no concessions at all to the explicit task of constructing a 
model flower. His exceptional behaviour in making the implicit social 
aspect of the activity explicit threw into sharp relief the willingness of the 
other pupils to accommodate the stated purpose of the lesson and ‘borrow’ 
the teacher’s goals as part of their own activity. Even Bart assumed the 
demeanour of the on-task pupil when under the direct observation of the 
teacher. As it was he went through an amazingly inventive routine of all the 
things you could do with the kit parts until excluded for a time by the
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teacher. The extent to which this was seen as exceptional behaviour was 
illustrated by the fact that the other pupils eventually turned away in disgust 
to at least attempt the class activity.
The class then settled to assembly, but with rather low energy. As with A, 
they had problems with the carpel. There was a greater level of chat and 
play. When the teacher demanded completion Margaret swiftly completed 
the assembly and the rest of the class copied.
Interpretation
As with A group, the activity could be divided into explicit and implicit 
levels linked by the goal of task completion. I saw the pupils as being 
confused because they were attempting to model the flower with any full 
concept of plant reproduction or context of human reproduction. The 
activity appeared meaningless and levels of engagement were less. I believe 
the lower levels of energy encouraged the adoption of the mutation. The 
‘petals’ were green and at the beginning of a developmental space 
perception would dominate. Vague memories of the outside of the flower 
being green would be enough to produce Margaret’s mistake. Low levels of 
energy meant the absence of reflection and unthinking copying. A correct 
structuring would have been secured by an understanding of the flower as 
the reproductive organ of the plant. The mode of thought -  folkbiology -  
that would have allowed understanding was not present (Carey, 1996: 202).
I began to suspect that my picture of a developmental space was mistaken. 
Rather than ascending from perception to the concept the pupils needed the 
concept to ‘ascend to the practical’ and structure their perception of the 
flower (Davydov, quoted in Engestrom, 1996: 159-160).
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Lesson B2 -  flower dissection
Activity B 2.1 - flower dissection
Outcome -  overall success and adoption of vocabulary to new situation -  
some exceptions and confusion.
Process -  level of interest rather lower than group A. Pupils are slumped 
and rather glazed. Brian was an extreme example. He slumped with his 
head in his arms and then sprang into action. His first dissection was 
completed in minutes, with bits of flower jammed into boxes in the record 
sheet. This was task completion without any meaning for the pupil. Brian 
then began to chat and play. Pupil-pupil interaction in the rest of the class 
was limited. The vocabulary of flower parts was used but in a denotative 
way -  there was little sign of more structured sentences that would have 
shown understanding of the flowers role as a reproductive organ. 
Background noise, confusion and play
Activity B 2.2 -  microscopic examination of pollen and ovule.
Outcome
Pupils glanced at the parts under the microscope but showed little interest 
and exchanged few comments. They copied some notes unto the back of 
the worksheet. The teacher showed some anxiety and began pressing 
individual pupils for explanations, but received only reluctant, muttered 
replies.
Interpretation
Although vocabulary was transferred from the model flower to the real 
flower, meaning did not follow. In a developmental space it appears that the 
concept comes first and dominates perception. The pupils did not have a 
concept of plant reproduction with which to interpret what they saw and
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hence saw nothing they could clearly understand. The actual structure of 
the situation had rested on ‘discovery science’ ideas and some of the pupils 
had demanded more guidance from the teacher and looked to the teacher to 
provide significance.
Lesson B3 -  Beetrip
Card construction of the plant life cycle -  is completed quickly and 
accurately without a great deal of thought.
Task -  construct narrative of bee pollination and subsequent conversion of 
ovary to fruit.
Outcome -  more or less correct sequences, but the focus is on the bee and 
not on pollination
Process - ‘Pass the parcel’. Brian rejects the worksheet by pushing it away. 
Alfie reluctantly begins work. Eventually a general busyness in which 
everyone joins in, with a mixture of chat and work. However when the 
teacher calls time final decisions are made without discussion. Martin 
orders; ''''stick it (representation o f ripe fruit) in there" and Alfie obeys 
without question.
The second session, meant to elicit definitions of pollination and 
fertilization, produce greater confusion. The pupils collaborate in that they 
take turns to write short notes, but there is almost no discussion and little 
indication that they really know what they are doing.
Interpretation. Confirms last lesson. Meaning is largely absent. The pupils 
complete tasks but they lack meaning. On reflection it appears that they 
lack both the concept and the mental structures that would support the 
formation of a mature concept.
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Lesson B4 -Human life cycle
Task -  to complete human life cycle and go on to sequence diagrams of 
copulation and fertilisation in order to arrive at definition of fertilisation.
Outcome -  life cycles completed but concept of fertilisation and zygote 
formation appear to be absent.
Process -  relaxation at teacher introduction and renewed interest but life 
cycle assembled quickly -  Brian calls out and Brian sticks down without 
discussion. Then chat and play until teacher protests. Millicent and Cath 
ask the teacher to check their sequence but he refuses, saying that they are in 
charge.
Second task leads to widespread giggles and banter but the understanding 
arrived at seems to be that copulation leads to pregnancy. Sperm and ovum 
only receive peripheral attention. Teacher presses for detailed answers but 
refuses requests for dialogue and the pupils largely give up. Slowly writing 
vague notes when the teacher is present, chatting and playing when he 
moves away.
Interpretation
Again an absence of meaning, due to many of the processes already listed. 
An extra dimension is added when groups A and B are compared. There 
seems to be some evidence that the human life cycle, taken first, provides a 
residual meaning that provides structure for pupil activities when they 
attempt to understand plant reproduction but that attempts to study plants 
without already holding a concept of plant reproduction is both ineffective 
and can act as a barrier to understanding human reproduction.
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Overview of the classroom observations
An overview of the classroom observations suggested to me that the 
children’s behaviour could be viewed as spread along a dimension from 
ontask to offtask behaviour. The ontask behaviour was formal and directed 
at the explicit goal set by the teacher. The offtask behaviour was informal 
and bound up with implicit aspects of the situation, leading to chat and play. 
Mostly these behaviours were purely social, but they did interact with other 
aspects of the situation, as when the topic of the human life cycle interacted 
with banter about how much individuals knew about the facts of life.
The pupils seemed usually to begin by adopting the classroom activity 
presented to them by the teacher. They accepted the structured situation 
presented to them without question but often did not adopt the teachers goal 
fully and showed little indication that they understood what that goal was.
The implicit, unstated aim of the teacher was that the pupils would form a 
new conceptual model of reproduction, but explicitly he asked them to carry 
out specific tasks by discussing amongst themselves. The intersection 
between the aims of the teacher and the aims of the pupils was task 
completion. The pupils canied out the task or produced the work demanded 
but did not feel the need to go further and incorporate new meanings into 
their mental structure. Their implicit aims appeared to be largely social.
The beginning of each task appeared to involve a rapid assessment of its 
difficulty. A sort of silent coercion seemed to deliver difficult tasks to an 
individual while the rest of the group relaxed. On the other hand there was 
a lot of competition for easy, mechanical tasks.
The expectation that meaning would arise from pupil interactions was 
usually not met. The vocabulary of the science concepts was used without 
question, but simply in its denotative sense and only on rare occasions was 
any greater structuring seen. The reverse was often the case. Pupils 
indignantly denied that they had any role in judging the truth or falsity of
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the outcome and consistently demanded teacher intervention to provide 
meaning and structure or to assess what they had already done.
An expectation arising from a Vygotsky an approach would be that the 
formal structure of schooling would allow metacognition -  that the pupils 
would reflect on what they knew, know that they knew it and be able to 
observe the process by which they gained knowledge ‘from outside’. This 
was not observed as an activity of the individual pupil nor as an aspect of 
pupil-pupil activity within this pupil group or with this activity. What was 
observed on occasion was a rapid exchange of questions between the 
teacher and the individual pupil. This exchange seemed to be a form of 
intersubjective metacognition, with the teacher questions acting as a form of 
scaffolding and forcing the pupil to re-examine and structure what they 
knew.
An assumption of the model of a developmental space that I began with was 
that the individual could interact with nature in something of the way that 
Piaget advanced, constructing meaning with the word mediating to allow a 
more complex generalised process to take place. The evidence of the 
classroom observations does not support this. It appeared to me that there 
were close linkages between the children’s behaviour and their position on 
the developmental space that I had posited. When group A assembled the 
human life cycle there was little tension and a fair amount of chat because 
they were consolidating what they already knew. They were able to 
advance from this to an understanding of fertilisation and to follow the 
structuring of the model flower and then the real flower. Beyond that point 
their comprehension failed and play and chat took over.
I believe that a key point came with the observation of the pupils studying 
the pollen and ovule under the microscope. The element of perception was 
there, as were the technical words, but they did not lead to understanding 
and this understanding was not available in the next task of defining 
pollination and fertilization. On reflection it appears to me that this would 
never be the case. Perception, even with the mediating influence of the
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word, would not lead to the automatic assembly of the concept. Rather the 
process occurs in the other direction. The pupils required the concepts of 
pollination and fertilisation in order to structure their perception of the plant 
cells under the microscope. My view now is similar to that advanced by 
Lois Hood-Holtzmann. The dialectical unit of concept formation is 
simultaneously tool and result (Hood-Holtzman, 1996: 89). The scientific 
concept of reproduction is both the outcome of the activity and the tool 
needed to assemble itself fully. The struggle for the pupil, according to 
Davydov, is to ‘ascend to the practical’ (Davydov, quoted in Engestrom, 
1996: 159-160) and restructure their understanding of a range of phenomena 
in the light of the new concept.
The comparative aspect of the classroom study seemed significant. It 
clearly made a great difference to group B that they began with the plant life 
cycle rather than the human life cycle. Group A, beginning with the human 
life cycle, seemed to be able to assume a background level of meaning that 
supported them through most of the activities. Group B seemed to struggle 
throughout. This lends support to the findings by Driver et al (Driver et al, 
1994: 50) and by Osborne and Freyberg indicating that plants are not seen in 
the same light as animals (Osborne and Freyberg, 1985: 6). There was also 
in group A support for Driver’s finding that understanding of human 
reproduction was based on copulation producing babies, without an 
understanding of the scientific concept. Bruner’s idea of the relative ease of 
a narrative Aristolean process as opposed to a more abstract and symbolic 
Galilean process seems to offer insight here in suggesting that the pupils 
could more easily approach a human narrative than the abstract scientific 
model that would illuminate a plant biology standing alone (Bruner, 1996: 
95). It seems to me also that the classroom observations bolstered Carey’s 
view of an innate ‘folkpsychology’ (Carey, 1996: 202) or of Mi thin’s idea 
of a mental module supporting social intelligence (Mithin, 1996: 88-95) that 
allowed for an acceptance of the human life cycle but indicated that the 
pupils did not hold an innate ‘folkbiology’ that would have supported
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understanding of the plant life cycle. (Again there is some support for this in 
Mithin, who argues that understanding of the natural world and of living 
things is often couched in terms of an anthropological understanding).
Conclusion
In chapter seven I attempted to look at concept formation in the classroom.
I expected to produce grounded theory on the mechanisms of concept 
formation and of intersubjectivity. The study appeared to confirm the 
Vygotskyian perspective on intersubjectivity rather than the Piagetian. 
Vygotsky saw concept formation as developing intersubjectively when the 
learner worked with a more knowledgeable other. The pupils groups did not 
have this structure and an expectation on my part that the structuring of the 
situation by teaching materials and teacher instruction would compensate 
and allow concept formation did not bear fruit. There was some evidence 
that it would have been possible for the teacher to provide a form of 
intersubjective metacognition through miniteaching interventions.
More generally there was confirmation of existing research on the sort of 
misconceptions/alternative conceptions held by children in this area and a 
suggestion that there may be ‘modes of thinking’ that structure the 
formation of concepts.
I will return to this issue after I look at the outcome of the final interviews 
(chapter eight) and examine the structure of the school knowledge -  
formally the object of concept formation in school (chapter nine).
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Chapter 8
‘Structured situations’ part III 
Final interviews
Introduction
In this chapter I will outline the rationale behind the design of the final 
interviews and the extent to which the design is based upon my assumptions 
about the nature of a developmental space. The children were sorted into 3 
groups -  groups A and B of the classroom observations and a group C 
consisting of pupils from other classes who had followed a more traditional, 
text-based approach. The responses of the 3 groups are compared, 
completion times are collected for the frog life-cycle task and those carrying 
it out first contrasted with the group attempting the life cycle task last.
The final interview set-up
One further difficulty caused by the delay in the timing of the study was the 
late timing of the final interviews -  half on the 23^  ^of June and half on the 
27^\ with term ending on the 29^. The main result was to reduce the sample 
size. 41 pupils had taken part in the initial interviews, but only 25 were 
available for the final interviews.
The conditions for the final interviews were as those for the initial 
interviews, held in the science store with a fixed route in and out (see
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appendix A.3). They were held in line with the schools child protection 
policy following discussion with the principal and with the technician 
present in the background during the interviews.
Again the term interview is something of a misnomer. As in the first set of 
interviews I intended a set of structured situations that would require a 
response from the pupil. Cues suggesting elements of the concept would be 
provided and the pupils would have the opportunity to manipulate the cues 
to construct meaning.
Interview details
The pupils were asked to generalise from the specific case studies of human 
and plant to arrange the elements of a Frog life cycle, to identify male and 
female parts of the flower, explain that this is where reproductive cells were 
formed, define fertilisation and finally to apply the generalised model of 
reproduction — male and female cells joining to form a new organism -  to an 
unfamiliar problem.
Because, at what I expected to be an end point in a developmental space, I 
expected to find evidence of a greater variety of concepts and structures, the 
situation is more heavily weighted towards the interview. In the initial 
interview there had essentially been one concept and a number of tightly 
focused cues to be manipulated into a meaningful pattern. In the final 
interviews I am looking for a broader spread of related concepts and the 
cues are rather loosely focused. An interpretive element of the interview 
attempted to establish which of the sub-concepts were understood by the 
pupil. In a comparative element the questions were alternated between a 
schedule which asked about animal reproduction first and one which asked 
about animal reproduction last.
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The interview schedule was as follows:
1. Here are cutouts of a frog life cycle (Appendix D.4). Can you set 
them down to tell the story of the of the frog life cycle? (The time to 
set out the cycle was recorded.)
2. Can you tell me the story of the frog life cycle?
3. Here is a diagram of a way of growing carrots indoors (see appendix 
D.2 ). You chop up the carrot, put the pieces in a special jelly and 
you get lots of small carrots. Scientists call this asexual 
reproduction. Why is it called reproduction?
4. Whv is it called asexual?
5. Here is a cutaway picture of the inside of a flower (see appendix 
D.2). Can you point to the male bit?
6. Can you point to the female bit?
7. Now, can you tell me why the male bit is called the male bit?
8. Now, can you tell me why the female bit is called the female bit?
9. This is a picture of a seed (see appendix D.3). A few seconds before 
it was there as you see it, but it wasn’t a seed. What has happened to 
turn it into a seed? (If response is fertilisation, ask what that means).
The questions assumed a rough hierarchy of knowledge as follows:
Understanding reproduction as an increase in the number of organisms
(Question 3)
Ability to identify the male reproductive organs of the flower. (Question 5)
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Ability to identify the female reproductive organs of the flower. (Question 
6)
Ability to state that the male reproductive organs of the flower contain male 
reproductive cells. (Question 7)
Ability to state that the female reproductive organs of the flower contain 
female reproductive cells. (Question 8)
Ability to deduce that fertilisation occurs just before seed formation 
(Question 9a)
Ability to define fertilisation as the union of male and female reproductive 
cells. (Question 9b).
This sequence of questions is transposed with the sequence 3—4— 5—6—
7— 8—9— 1—2 in alternating interviews, so that half the sample were asked 
about an unfamiliar form of animal reproduction at the beginning of the 
interview and half at the end, essentially repeating the plant -  animal 
transpositions of the earlier paits of the research.
The overall structuring of the situation was in accordance with my model of 
a developmental space. The questions, taken as a whole, and not in the 
order in which they were put, were meant to map out a steady progression 
from a basic, undifferentiated understanding of animal reproduction to an 
identification of plant reproductive organs, being able to state their function 
and hence to deduce and apply a generalised scientific concept of sexual 
reproduction.
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Process
Pupils readily accepted the situation, accepted the goals of the teacher and 
showed great concentration and emotional interest, with a great deal of 
anxiety about their success with the questions.
Outcome:
The vast majority of the pupils (20 or 80%) were able to define reproduction 
as an increase in numbers of organisms. 2 pupils (8%) were unable to 
define reproduction and 3 (12%) had a confused or unclear understanding. 
There were some indications that everyday understanding of human 
sexuality or human growth blocked development of a broader scientific 
understanding. Only a few (3 or 12%) showed evidence of understanding 
what asexual reproduction was and 4 others (16%) showed a confused 
unclear conception -  this sort of understanding of the difference between 
sexual and asexual would have indicated a very deep knowledge of the 
scientific significance of sexual reproduction. The small number of pupils 
who had such understanding seemed to base it on information obtained from 
the home or from independent reading rather than to have developed the 
understanding from classroom activity and discussion.
The majority of pupils were able to identify the stamen (19 or 76%) and 
carpel (18 or 72%). However only 6 pupils (24%) were able to indicate that 
the stamen was the source of male reproductive cells and another 6 pupils 
showing elements of a confused understanding. The pupils achieved almost 
identical results for the carpel (7 showing understanding of the concept, 5 a 
confused understanding). The majority of the pupils (21 or 84%) were able 
to construct a frog life cycle and 19 of these were able to narrate the 
sequence of events within the frog life cycle.
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It is possible to walk through my imagined developmental space by 
graphing the relative success of various groups of pupils. It is however 
important to bear in mind that a large majority of pupils did not demonstrate 
that they had formed a scientific concept of reproduction.
Graphs comparing the performance of the groups are as follows:
Graph 8.1 Final interview group B
D E F I N E I  F R O G  
R E P  LG
FROG ID ! ID I  F U N C T l  F U N C T p E D U C ^ D E F I N E j D E F I N E |  
STORYpTAMEhiCARPELjSTAMEIvicARPELj j | |
RESPONSE
Graph 8.1 shows that a majority in group B, who studied plants first in the 
classroom, appear to have general understanding of reproduction and some 
understanding of fertilisation, but the majority appear not to have formed 
the formal concept and hold something closer to the Vygotsky an complex.
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Graph 8.2 Final interview group A
100 /o
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RESPONSES
In graph 8.2 group A, who studied humans first in the classroom, show a 
similar pattern to B, but with a much stronger response in relation to plant 
reproduction.
Graph 8.3 Final Interview group C
100%
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D E F IN E
In graph 8.3 group C, who were formally taught following the book, show 
the highest level of success in suggesting the formation of the formal 
concept, although even here many did not move beyond basic ideas.
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Interpretation
Group C are a group of pupils who were taught by other teachers using the 
conventional textbook exercises.
The graphs are not a highly reliable source. The small numbers involved 
mean that a mistake by single pupil indicates a shift of 10, and sometimes 
20 percent. However the pattern that arises from comparing results is 
plausible and is to some extent supported by the earlier finding of the study. 
The graphs show:
A sizable majority of pupils in all the groups can provide a simple definition 
of a life cycle. Group A, who examined the human life cycle first, 
outperformed group B in identifying the male and female parts of the 
flower. However group C outperformed both A and B when it came to 
defining the functions that the reproductive organs carry out. Groups A and 
B did not appear to have developed a clear concept of the role of pollen and 
ovule. It is worth noting that 1 did not count as giving a correct answer a 
sizable number of pupils who were not able to answer clearly. Many of 
these pupils appeared to hold concepts of growth and copulation which, 
rather than helping them advance towards a more advanced understanding, 
actually acted as a block to further development..
Contrasting element of findings
As in the initial interviews and the classroom observations, it was possible 
to compare the pupils who completed the frog life cycle first with those who 
tackled it last. The results are as follows:
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Graph 8.4. Completion time for frog life 
cycle (frog first)
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Graph 8.5 Completion time for frog life 
cycie (frog last)
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The average completion time was 21 seconds for those pupils who 
attempted the task at the start of the interview and 33 seconds for those who 
attempted it at the end. The order of tasks appeared to have a significant 
effect on outcome.
Interpretation
Some accidental features of individual variation account for part of the 
result. Of the pupils who showed least knowledge, two were absent from 
most of the lessons, two were exceptionally weak with a strategy of 
completing tasks as a way of avoiding stress rather than reflecting on the 
plausibility of their answer and one is believed to be suffering from ADHD. 
Group C contained a large number of pupils assessed as being more able. 
However the overall pattern seems to fit in well with other aspects of the 
study.
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The most consistent pattern, found in other parts of the study, is that the 
order in which tasks are attempted -  human or animal first or plant first -  
has a major impact on the time taken to complete a task. This supports 
findings by Driver et al (Driver et al, 1994; 50) and Osborne and Freyberg 
(Osborne and Freyberg, 1996: 88) that children consider plants to be 
different entities and lends support to suggestions that thinking may be 
constrained by a narrative mode (Oatley, 1996: 128) or a social intelligence 
(Mithin, 1996: 88-95). Even more plausibly it suggests a ‘folkpsychology’ 
rather than folkbiology as a way of organising mental processes (Carey, 
1996: 202). The fact that group A, which studied the human life cycle first, 
outperforms group B also supports these possibilities.
The major surprise of this element of the study is the relative success of 
group C, taught through conventional text-based studies, compared with 
both A and B. The science book texts begins with an outline of the concept 
of fertilisation, then plant reproduction, then human. On reflection 1 see this 
as pointing to a major fault in the model of a developmental space that 1 
began with. The idea that initial perception, even aided by the word, would 
assemble into a mature concept now seems unlikely and too close to the 
Piagetian model. My view now is that it is the model which works 
backwards along a developmental space to structure perception. This leads 
to a rather difficult dialectical conception which Hood-Holtzman calls 'both 
tool and resulf (Hood-Holtzman, 1996: 89). The formal concept is both the 
outcome of the developmental space and the major element in its formation.
Finally it is worth noting the number of confused answers with links to 
copulation and to concepts of growth. This suggests that earlier concepts 
may not act as a base in the development of later ideas but may in fact 
become a barrier to conceptual progress -  what Engestrom calls 
encapsulation ((Engestrom, 1996: 155).
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Conclusion
In this section of the study I have explained the connection between my 
model of a developmental space and the way in which the final interviews 
were structured. The outcome was to suggest that formal concepts were not 
formed by the majority of pupils. Again the group who studied human 
reproduction first outperformed the group that did not and again there was a 
difference in timing between those who took the frog life cycle first and 
those who attempted the question last. The results suggest again that 
different modes of thinking may come to play in different situations, with 
the narrative form the most accessible. The major surprise of the final 
interviews was the better performance of those not involved in the 
classroom study, leading me to further question my initial model and to 
consider restructuring the model to take account of Hood-Holtzman’s idea 
of the formal concept as a combined tool and result.
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Chapter 9
Deconstructing Texts
The contextual element
One of the elements that should be considered when addressing the issue of 
concept formation and movement in a developmental space is that of 
context. For the post-modernist, there is nothing beyond action in a social 
setting, seen as the irreducible element of being (Slife and Williams 1995: 
52). For the mutualists, action in a social setting is both constituted by 
human action and is also the medium in which that action occurs (Still,
1998: 93). For Lave and Wenger learning is both a function of the learner 
and of the social environment (Lave and Wenger, 1996, 145).
In the light of the above it would appear important not to take the context of 
schooling as a given. I plan to examine one particular element of context in 
school, that is, the formal goals of the learning process as presented in 
curriculum materials. In line with the rest of the study, the exemplar 
material will be the science curriculum elements dealing with reproduction 
as presented in:
NICCEA Key Stage three curriculum
The textbook in use in the school
NICCEA Key Stage three assessment material
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In order to present a full picture I will also examine the curriculum as it was 
presented to the classroom observation groups A and B.
I believe it useful to consider the texts from the following perspective, to 
some extent the linking themes for much of the work in this study.
Is the curricular material part of a developmental space in which the concept 
acts as an organiser, linking and structuring other concepts? This idea is 
presented by Ian Kinchin, who argues that individuals can build a concept 
map that begins with one superordinate concept and progresses in a 
hierarchical way until the ‘ bottom’ of the map is reached with concrete 
examples of the concept (Kinchin, 1998: 2). In this case the key idea would 
be the science model of male and female gametes fusing in fertilisation to 
form a zygote or new organism.
Are the concepts in the curricular material structured by superordinate 
structures, not simple concepts but rather worldviews on which they depend 
for full meaning as suggested by Vygotsky? (Vygotsky, 1971:68).
Does a narrative structure or a hypothetico-deductive structure, as proposed 
by Bruner (Bruner, 1996: 95 -98) underlie and structure the texts?
To what extent can explicit structures be identified in the texts and to what 
extent would these be accompanied by underlying implicit structures?
Syllabus
The science syllabus content for reproduction at key stage 3, as presented by 
the curricular authorities (NICCEA, 1996: 13), is as follows:
PLANTS
Leam about the structure and functions o f the component 
parts o f the flower (limited to a named dicotyledonous 
plant), including names of the parts -  sepals, petals.
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nectaries, stamens, (anthers and filaments), carpels 
(stigma, style and ovary) and receptacle,
• self and cross-pollination, insects and wind as 
agents o f pollination,
• fruit and seed dispersal - wind, animals, water 
and explosive mechanisms,
• seed structure - radicle, plumule, cotyledon, testa, 
endosperm,
• seed germination (limited to a hypogeal seed),
• investigate the conditions which affect 
germination -  temperature, adequate water, 
oxygen supply.
ANIMALS
Be introduced to the structure and functions o f the 
component parts o f the reproductive systems in humans, 
including:
naming the parts o f the male system -  testes, scrotum, 
sperm ducts, prostate gland, urethra and penis, naming 
the parts o f the female system -  ovaries, oviducts, uterus, 
cervix, vagina and vulva.
• fertilisation in the oviduct,
• role o f the placenta,
• birth (limited to contraction o f the uterus and 
dilation o f the cervix)
• find  out about the requirements to maintain 
healthy bodies and healthy babies during 
pregnancy.
(above taken from NICCEA (now CCEA) Key stage 3 syllabus, 1993: 13 
and 14)
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Deconstructing the syllabus
Organising concept?
Quite clearly the model of fertilisation is not an organising concept for the 
syllabus. It is mentioned only once, in the section about human 
reproduction, and is not mentioned in the plant section at all.
Superordinate structures
There appear to be two superordinate structures. One, not mentioned in this 
extract, is the section of the syllabus within which the element of 
reproduction is situated. It is listed with nutrition, respiration and so on, 
under the heading ‘life processes’. This would appear to be itself based on 
the materialist, as opposed to the vitalist tradition of modem science. The 
idea of organisms as operating a mechanical way with material processes as 
explanations for the functions of life is a relatively modem one. However 
life processes would be a relatively weak organiser and its significance is 
not made explicit in the syllabus. What is of major significance is the 
related concept of structure and function, repeated throughout the syllabus. 
This is the idea that body structures adapt and shape themselves to function 
-  again this concept is not made explicit and is presented only via examples. 
Finally there is a concept of health and social concems.
Text structure
The syllabus contains both hypothectico-deductive and narrative structures. 
The listing of names and the linkage to stmcture and function suggest larger 
structures in some way explained by the assembly of substructures. There is 
also a narrative structure listing plant and human life cycles, but this follows 
behind the hypothectico-deductive and appears somewhat subordinate to the 
initial structuring.
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Implicit and explicit
The explicit element of the syllabus is an account of structures and 
processes of plant and human reproduction. Implicitly there is a heavy 
reliance on technical vocabulary that appears to present science as authority. 
This authority appears to be used in the syllabus to reinforce knowledge 
about health. It also seems likely that the practice of presenting plant 
reproduction first, given its relative unfamiliarity, is a way of making safe 
and scientific a rather difficult topic for teachers and for society in general.
The text
The flavour of the Science Now! text (Fullick et al 1996: 106-121) can best 
be given by summarising ‘Key ideas’ given at the end of each chapter. The 
sequence is as follows:
• Fertilisation is the joining of a male and female sex cell.
Pollen made in the stamen of one plant lands on the stigma of 
another. This is called pollination. The pollen fertilises the ovules 
in the ovary and these develop into seeds and new plants.
Fruits help seeds disperse using wind or animals.
Testes are male sex organs which make sperm.
During puberty a girls ovaries start producing an ovum (egg) each 
month.
During sexual intercourse sperm are released. If a sperm meets an 
egg fertilisation takes place.
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• The menstrual cycle lasts about 28 days. If an egg is fertilised it will 
implant on the wall of the uterus.
• When a woman is pregnant she has a growing fetus in her uterus.
The process of giving birth is called labour.
Organising concept?
The science model of fertilisation is an organising concept in the text. It 
introduces the section and is restated in each section when explaining plant 
and human reproduction. The centrality of the model is not always evident 
because of the heavy narrative structure of the text (see appendix F.l)..
Superordinate structures
In line with the syllabus the main concept repeated throughout the section is 
that of structure and function. Again, this is not made explicit -  examples 
are presented in each section.
Text structure
The vast majority of the text is organised in a narrative format. Even the 
key concept of fertilisation is presented as a journey. Insofar as 
hypothectico-deductive elements are present, mostly in diagrams, they are 
balanced by a greater number of pictures and illustrations.
Implicit and explicit
In some sense what appears to have become implicit is the science 
dimension of the topic. The question of human reproduction is presented in 
some detail as a narrative and health issues are covered. In the background 
is quite a lot of science -  the issue of structure and function, line diagrams 
of processes, the fertilisation model and a large technical vocabulary. The 
narrative structure however, appears so overwhelming as to make invisible
page 138
alternative ways of structuring the information. The model of fertilisation is 
not used to investigate processes, rather it structures narrative. The 
technical vocabulary is dealt with in a narrative format, printed in bold with 
definitions and then followed up and consolidated with cloze procedures. 
Again plant reproduction comes first and this appears again as a way of 
making safe a rather difficult subject.
The assessment material
Some exemplar material is presented in appendix F.2. In general the 
questions are structured around line diagrams. Pupils are required to 
identify elements of the diagram using the correct scientific vocabulary. It 
is only in the later stages of the questions that the pupils are asked to 
demonstrate knowledge of fertilisation. There appears to be a hierarchy of 
answers, linked in the marking scheme to levels of attainment. Initial 
achievement is around naming parts. The next level is based around 
structure and function and the highest level appears linked to an 
understanding of the process of fertilisation.
Organising concent?
Both structure and function and fertilisation are key concepts in the 
questions.
Superordinate structures
It appeared to me that the concept of science as fact and authority rather 
than science as investigation was dominant. For example, where names 
were requested the mark scheme was based on recall of the technical 
vocabulary and no marks were available for meaning or understanding.
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Structure
The structure was very definitely hypothectico-deductive. Questions were 
based on line diagrams and on substructures from which the whole was 
formed. Explanations were in terms of structure and function and function 
in turn depended for its definition on the process of fertilisation.
Implicit and explicit
As assessment material the questions in general were, of course, implicit, 
with the candidate given the task of providing meaning.
Groups A and B
Grout) A’s schedule is shown below:
Lesson 1 human lifecycle Lifecycle story
Hidden story -  the sex organs
and intercourse
Hidden story -  fertilisation
Lesson 2 Build a flower Use of empty concepts
Lesson 3 Flower dissections Linkage of empty concepts
Microscopic view of pollen 
and ovule
Lesson 4 Flower story Plant life cycle
Hidden story -  Bee trip and 
pollen
Hidden story -  pollination and 
fertilisation
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Group B’s schedule was as group A, with lesson 1 taken last.
(This information is also presented on page 94)
Organising concept?
In both group’s work the model of reproduction was present but rather than 
being an organiser it was the implicit goal of activity, to be constructed by 
the pupils out of the activity. For group A the elements of the model lay 
within the reasonably familiar territory of the human life cycle. For group B 
it lay within unfamiliar territory of the plant life cycle.
Superordinate structures
The organising structures here are the reproduction model itself and the 
constructivist model of concept formation, both visible only to the teacher.
Structure
From the teacher’s perspective the structure is hypothectico-deductive, 
meant to reveal the model of reproduction from a scientific perspective. 
From the pupils point of view it may appear as a series of unconnected 
narratives.
Implicit and explicit
The implicit structures are the science perspective on reproduction and the 
teacher’s constructivist stance. What is explicit to the pupil is a series of 
tasks, mainly based on sequencing or narrative.
Overall Interpretation of texts
It could be argued that the formal concept of reproduction is an indirect 
organiser of the syllabus in that the syllabus is organised fairly tightly 
around the concept of structure and function and in this case the function is 
reproduction. This seems to me to be stretching the point. When we follow 
the structure and function concept as organiser it tend to explain pollination
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and copulation respectively as the process around which structure is built, 
rather than explaining fertilisation, an invisible outcome of the process. In 
fact understanding comes from the other direction, with fertilisation giving 
meaning to the other processes and to the structures. In my view the lack of 
the formal concept of reproduction as a direct organising principle, along 
with the concentration on structure and vocabulary, suggests a particular 
view of science as composed of unquestioned factual elements. A common 
criticism of the syllabus is that it is too heavily weighted towards content 
and I feel that this reflects an approach to science as a series of facts. The 
concentration on structure and vocabulary tend to an overall impression of 
authority rather than discovery or inquiry, an impression which is 
strengthened by my analysis of both book and exam questions.
The textbook appears to provide the concept of fertilisation as an overall 
organiser, but it does so within a narrative structure. This seems a valuable 
approach, but there appears to me to be a gap between the narrative 
approach of the text and the hypothectico-deductive of the assessment 
material and of science as a whole. It seems to me that for the concept to be 
fully expressed it has to transfer from narrative to hypothectico-deductive 
structure.
Further insight can be gained if we use a perspective taken from the 
classroom observations -  that there are different levels of meaning, which 
are sometimes contradictory, within the social setting. At one level, the 
level of explicit meaning, the syllabus is a list of science concepts which 
must be learnt. At another level, the implicit level, there are a whole series 
of social concerns which are reflected in the syllabus. The most important 
of these concerns is the difficulty and danger of the taboos of giving sexual 
information to children. From this perspective it makes a great deal of sense 
that both the syllabus and the textbook begin with plant reproduction. This 
establishes from the beginning that the activity is scientific, abstract and 
safe. It also tends, I think, to reinforce the idea of science as fact and 
authority.
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A byproduct of this implicit structure of the curriculum is that it tends to 
fragment the explicit curriculum. Without the formal science concept of 
fertilisation as organiser there is a tendency for the pupil’s understanding to 
break up into what Vygotsky called pseudoconcepts (Vygotsky, 1971: 66) 
and what Engestrom calls “encapsulated knowledge” (Engestrom, 1996: 
155). This suggests two kinds of formalism in school. One is the scientific 
formalism which Vygotsky referred to and which he saw as progressive and 
liberating for the pupil. The other is the situated cognition identified by 
Lave and Wenger, where pupils learn to be schooled and find it both 
unnecessary and difficult to integrate school knowledge with their everyday, 
spontaneous concepts (Lave and Wenger 1999: 21-27),
Another aspect of school knowledge, pointed out by McDermott, is that it 
contains within the school situation the expectation that pupils will fail and 
that there will be a hierarchy of knowledge. Both success and failure are 
built into the school structure, he argues, awaiting individual pupils to take 
their place and be labelled (McDermott, 1999: 18). If this is the case then 
the full scientific understanding of fertilisation, at the top of a hierarchy that 
I suggested was built into the syllabus, would not be available to the 
majority of pupils.
Conclusion
My final interviews found that many pupils -  those involved in the 
classroom observations and also those taught conventionally, did not form a 
formal scientific understanding of reproduction. Analysis of the syllabus 
and other texts suggests that there are likely to be different levels of activity 
in school -  the explicit task occurring alongside other goals that are implicit 
in the social situation. I suggest that this may prevent the development of a 
full concept and that alternative pseudoconcepts may form instead and that 
the conflict between implicit and explicit may be linked to Vygotsky’s 
praise of the formalism of schooling and Lave and Wenger’s suggestion that 
the situation merely allows us to learn to be schooled.
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Chapter 10 
Revisiting the literature, 
reviewing the model
Introduction
I began my research with the assumption of a model of developmental space 
in which concept formation could take place. The model saw the concept 
beginning with ‘lower’ mental processes that were largely automatic, the 
again automatic adoption of the word as an ‘empty concept’, initial meaning 
as coming from the denotative function of the word and from expectations 
arising from the structure of language and then a whole series of linkages 
and association leading, in the right conditions, to the formation of a formal 
concept through a series of ‘heaps’ and ‘complexes’ that were loose 
associations of ideas rather than concepts. In school science I assumed the 
abstract procedures of science would operate, with the outcome being the 
formal scientific concept. I now want to look at the extent to which the 
research supports that model and, to the extent that it does not, look again at 
the evidence to see if it is possible to modify or replace it with a new model.
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To what extent did the research support the initial model?
The initial interviews
I did not observe ‘lower’ mental processes, nor should I have expected to. 
These occur too rapidly for the techniques I was using to detect them -  the 
best I could do was to observe that pupils had different problem-solving 
strategies when manipulating the cards. I consider standard positivist 
experimental techniques to be of more utility in observing initial aspects of 
perception and action -  the ‘crisis of psychology’ does not arise here 
because consciousness is not a factor in the timeframes of 0.2 -  0.3 seconds 
over which the phenomena occur. As John Shotter comments, the human 
can become object and the subject of psychology behaviour (Shotter, 1975: 
15). Nonetheless these processes are still important because they filter 
consciousness at this early stage and because the adaptive processes 
involved, as in Dennett’s idea of ‘multiple drafts’ competing within the 
mind to define the situation, may illustrate how some ‘higher’ processes 
operate (Dennett, 1991: 112).
With the expectation that adaptation within ‘lower’ mental processes might 
effect higher processes I looked at Edelman’s theory of TNGS (the theory 
of neurone group selection) (Edelman, 1992: 83-87). The processes that he 
describes would occur too quickly to be detected by the techniques that I 
was using. However I felt that there remained an important element to the 
study which also applied to my work -  that is the suggestion that the initial 
stages of lower mental process involve a process of adaptation not governed 
by the rules of formal logic or under conscious control. I would tend to 
argue by analogy that we would expect to find adaptive processes in the 
initial elements of higher mental functions. The work of Rita Carter on 
form and perception contains similar references to adaptive processes, but 
goes on to argue that filtered input from the senses moving upward interacts 
with existing conceptions moving downwards (Carter, 1998: 19). This sort 
of dialectical process was, I feel, missing from my existing model of a
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developmental space. For example, just how basic some biological 
categories may be is illustrated by Rita Carter when she recounts the story 
of a patient who, because of damage to her perceptual systems, could not 
recognise any kind of living thing other than other humans, but had normal 
perception of non-living objects (ibid: 116). Later in the same section she 
explains the operation of a ‘Face recognition unit’ that automatically 
identifies people that we know (ibid: 122).
One weakness of the initial interviews was my failure to fully consider the 
conceptions that the pupils were bringing to the situation. Osborne and 
Freyberg argue, with some justification, that these should be the lynchpin 
around which the curriculum should be organised (Osborne and Freyberg, 
1985: 84). An important point of their ‘generative learning’ theory would be 
the assertion that pupil’s learning is constrained by what they already 
believe rather than by Piagetian stages. Instead of looking at the question of 
generative learning, my starting point was the last element of the primary 
curriculum that they had studied -  the single-cycle life cycle. More or less 
accidentally I found, when attempting to construct a more realistic cycle 
involving sexual reproduction, the persistence of previous ideas - attested to 
by Vygotsky, by Carey and by Osborne and Freyberg. My feeling following 
the interviews was that the phenomenon was best understood, not as some 
generalised persistence, but as a process I would now call ‘encapsulation’ -  
the idea put forward in Engestrom that special mental structures form during 
the process of schooling. Of some interest was his linking of the process of 
encapsulation with a model of school learning where the outcome was to 
successfully answer the teacher’s questions rather than any deeper 
understanding of the phenomena (Engestrom, 1996: 157). I believe that the 
failure of a number of pupils to resolve the new life cycle is best understood 
as encapsulation.
An aspect of the initial interviews that caused surprise was the emotional 
aspect that I had not considered. In a ‘tutorial’ situation the pupils not only
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adopted the goals of the teacher but showed a great deal of anxiety to meet 
the goals.
There is, I think, strong evidence for an aspect of a developmental space not 
fully considered by me initially -  that of different modes of thought. One of 
the strongest elements of the research was the continuing discrepancy in all 
the structured situations between sequences which began with plant 
reproduction and those that began with human reproduction. I believe this 
is strong evidence that we find it easier to think about some aspects of 
reality rather than others. There is a great deal of debate about the nature 
and number of innate intelligences and the extent to which they are innate or 
acquired, but researchers such as Mi thin and Carey agree that at least a 
‘folkpsychology’ and ‘folk physics’ (social and technical intelligence 
according to Mithin) are fundamental elements of human thought and both 
agree that ‘folkbiology’ or ‘natural history intelligence’ arise from social 
intelligence through process of analogy mapping across domains (Carey, 
1996: 206) -  in Mithin’s case the analogy is anthropomorphism (Mithin, 
1996: 48). 1 would also tend to argue for the plausibility of a view that we 
tend to think in certain ways rather than others -  that the structures of 
narrative come easier to hand than the more abstract models of science. 
Bruner, while making this point, argues that we can link the two in the 
history of science, when analogy and metaphor are initially used to 
construct models from narrative (Bruner,. 1997: 124)
It should also be noted that thinking about thinking, or metacognition, was 
not a usual aspect of most of the structured activities, although a few pupils 
showed signs of very deep individual reflection, including whispered 
conversations with themselves, in the initial interviews. 1 now believe that 
processes of formal logic and metacognition would be endpoints of the 
developmental space rather than starting points
Finally one of the most useful aspects of the research was my development 
of the ‘structured situation’ -  the idea that meaning could be potentially 
present in a situation and be assembled by the pupil. Initially 1 drew upon
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the ideas of Margaret Donaldson (Donaldson, 1987: 69) and Osborne and 
Freyberg’s ‘interviews about instances’ (Osborne and Freyberg, 1985: 6-8). 
However, when I came to contrast the relative utility of the materials and 
prompts in the initial and final interviews I began to see that this was not the 
whole story. I believe now that the encapsulated idea of a single asexual life 
cycle stood at one pole of a ‘zone of proximal development’, with 
spontaneous knowledge of human sexuality and copulation forming the 
other pole. It is only when in a ZPD that the structured situations can be 
usefully used to explore a developmental space. In some ways this can be 
seen as a reverse perspective of scaffolding. Instead of an external structure 
lending support it becomes a mechanism for revealing the extent and 
internal structuring of knowledge. Vygotsky was, as usual, ahead of me in 
seeing this relationship (Vygotsky, 1971:108). Mariane Hedegaard, while 
not addressing structured situations, defined the relationship between 
spontaneous and scientific concepts as the basis of instruction (Hedegaard, 
1996: 175).
The classroom observations
One surprise of the classroom observations was the unreflective 
automaticity of what Vygotsky would have considered ‘higher’ level mental 
functions. I observed this in very rapid processes which establish the 
‘aboutness’ (defined later in the chapter) of a situation -  in the interviews a 
very rapid adoption of the tasks set and in the classroom group adoption of 
the tasks is followed by very rapid negotiation between the members of the 
group about who will carry out which roles. The automatic processes are 
already social and this something that was absent from the initial model of a 
developmental space. The importance and strength of these behaviours was 
shown up by the exception -  the ADHD pupil who simply did not share the 
orientation towards a group activity that the other pupils displayed. Even 
here the rapid changes of behaviour when under the direct gaze of the 
teacher showed that the pupil was aware of the behaviour and activity 
expected, even if he was unable to adopt them spontaneously.
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If initial perception and activity were more social than I expected then the 
use of new technical vocabulary, while fitting into the model I had assumed, 
was much more automatic than I had expected, in the sense that the word 
itself, it’s denotative aspect and initial structuring were all accepted with 
extreme ease -  so great an ease that there was very little sign of the 
reflection that would presumably be needed in concept formation. The 
‘mutation’ of the model flower when group B assembled it so that everyone 
ended with identical but mistaken models was, I feel, a significant indicator 
of this lack of reflection.
During most of the classroom activity the teacher was trying to protect his 
role as researcher by refusing to engage. This led to a struggle with the 
children, who demanded that he remain in charge of the learning.
Eventually he was cornered into a miniteaching episode which seemed, on 
later reflection, to be a sort of external metacognition -  a rapid exchange of 
questions and answers that led the pupil towards the required answer and 
also demonstrated the processes that the pupil would have to internalise if 
she was to achieve metacognition herself. It seemed likely also that 
metacognition was not generally occurring because we were not at that point 
in the developmental space. An important tool was the concept of 
fertilisation itself, which they had yet to form. This appears to echo Hood- 
Holtzmans’ idea of the concept as simultaneously tool and result.
The most enlightening observation was the examination of pollen and ovule. 
In my view the children could not assemble a concept of fertilisation 
through simply reflecting on the activities and looking at the pollen and 
ovule and I began to accept the view that in fact the reverse process was the 
important one -  the concept of fertilisation was what allowed an informed 
perception of the pollen and ovule.
The idea of ‘aboutness’ can be studied further by contrasting pupil 
behaviour in the interviews with pupil behaviour in the classroom. In both 
cases the teacher defines the situation and, in both cases, the pupils largely 
accept the teacher definition without any problems. However the pupils
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exhibit a great deal more emotional commitment and concern and are much 
more clearly on task in the interviews. I would tend to argue that this can 
best be understood by separating the elements of the situation into implicit 
and explicit elements. Implicitly the teacher wants concept formation but 
explicitly what is asked for is task completion. In the interview the gap 
between implicit and explicit is small because the group consists of only 
two people and the teacher is transmitting both verbally and non-verbally 
the importance of the implicit element.
In the classroom the implicit elements of the situation are social -  the group 
arranges a division of labour where some pupils carry out the work and 
relaxed advisors engage in chat and play. Only if the task is assessed as 
very interesting or easy does it engage everyone and there are small-scale 
fights over resources. Normally there is very rapid communication leading 
to one individual undertaking the task while the rest advise and copy. This 
contrasts very sharply with real science, where the group would tend to have 
a shared goal as well as shared tasks. In the classroom the outcome is task 
completion and this appears to me to aid the formation of pseudoconcepts. 
At the end of the process we get a form of encapsulation of some aspects of 
the situation which can be reproduced successfully in exams. Flower 
structure seems to me an example of such synthetic knowledge.
In my model of developmental space I had expected intersubjectivity to be 
structured by the props and vocabulary of the structured situations and lead 
the pupils upward through a developmental space to the concept. This did 
not happen. The main reasons for failure were that the differing goals of 
teacher and pupils were met through task completion and also because I 
now see the chief organiser of the structured situation as being the concept 
itself. A more realistic model of a developmental space would work 
backwards and use the concept to explain phenomena rather than 
phenomena to explain the concept. This view of the concept as organiser is 
echoed by Grady Venville in her study of concept formation in secondary 
school genetics. (Venville, 1977: 245).
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The final interviews
One of the main elements of the final interview, noted earlier in the chapter 
was to suggest that structured situations were a special form of scaffolding 
of use as a research element only to the extent that they were situated within 
a zone of proximal development. The props and prompts of the final 
interviews did not seem to be so situated. The failure of the majority of the 
pupils, no matter how the topic was approached -  group A, B or 
traditionally taught from the textbook -  to form a fully developed formal 
scientific concept of reproduction could not be fully investigated with the 
research instrument that I used. I suspect that a much tighter focus, for 
example creating the possibility of linking copulation and fertilisation, 
would have been more effective.
From this viewpoint I began to look again at what constituted scaffolding. 
The evidence from the final interviews seems to indicate that the long 
period of work in constructing model flowers was not effective. Group C, 
exposed only to labelled diagrams, were just as effective at identifying the 
parts of the flower as group A and far more effective than group B. The 
model flower kit seems to me to be an example of mental tool that pointed 
outwards. A more effective tool, pointing inwards, were the concept boards 
themselves, generating very detailed concentration and reflection in the 
initial and final interviews and, in one case, what was clearly a process of 
deduction. I tend to believe now that the concept itself acts as scaffolding. 
The evidence in the study is that on the one hand, the failure of the ovule 
and pollen investigations to ‘build upwards’ to help generate concepts and 
on the other, the relative success of group C who began their unit on 
reproduction with a brief narrative account of the process of fertilisation 
which appears to help organise their later work.
The svllabus
The key stage 3 syllabus for the North of Ireland, very similar to the British 
syllabus, also has implicit and explicit aspects. Explicitly it is about science
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-  but where science tends to mean authoritative, factual and certain rather 
than about any process of enquiry or investigation. Implicitly it appears to 
me that the consistent practice of dealing with plant science first is a way of 
dealing with taboo -  of establishing that the coming conversations between 
the adults and children about human reproduction are safe and scientific. In 
addition the syllabus contains a tension between narrative structuring and 
hypothetico-deductive, scientific ordering. These tensions, of implicit and 
explicit, science and narrative are repeated to some extent in the other 
curricular texts. The result, I believe, is a tendency to allow a fragmented 
understanding made up of separate, encapsulated elements, a tendency 
reinforced by Key stage 3 exam question that focus on vocabulary and on 
labelled diagrams. Again this was a process recorded by Venville as 
occurring in the Australian syllabus (ibid: 243)
It seems evident that one outcome of the research process should be a 
revised picture of what I mean by a developmental space, but in order to do 
so I will need first to revisit the literature.
Is there an automatic aboutness to social situations?
I would tend, on reflection, to situate the automatic elements of a social 
situation much higher up the table of mental functions. Rather than being 
concerned simply with elements of perception and action they embrace a 
whole panoply of social behaviours necessary for us to operate in a group. I 
have termed this ‘aboutness’. Aboutness is defined by Daniel Dennett as 
intentionality -  the ability to select and attend to salient aspects of a 
situation. He sees this skill as being made up of an ensemble of more basic 
skills of perception and action (Dennett, 1991: 333). My definition differs 
somewhat in that in this case I see it as an intersubjective skill, made up of 
very rapid, mostly unselfconscious, negotiation between the members of a 
group about the nature of a situation and the division of tasks.
What my research was able to suggest as an automatic starting point of a 
developmental space was the immediate establishment of the aboutness of a
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situation in the classroom immediately followed by rapid nonverbal 
negotiation of roles. This automatic comprehension of a social situation is 
attested to by Donaldson. She argues that young children interpret 
communication by a combination of understanding the language itself, 
interpreting the intention of the teacher, mainly through non-verbal cues and 
lastly by an interpretation of the situation (Donaldson, 1987: 69). She 
argues that when we consider the task of decentering we should distinguish 
between the child’s appreciation of what the other sees and their 
appreciation of what the other is feeling or planning to do. The latter, she 
argues, is a very fundamental human skill (ibid: 15).
Bredo argues that mental processes occur within a holistic world of thought 
and action (Bredo, 1999: 28). It would follow from this that the situation 
itself and the sort of mental activity and role required must be the product of 
extremely rapid processes. We do not normally observe people deciding on 
the requirements of a situation and then undertaking mental activity. When 
on occasion people adopt an inappropriate response to a situation it is 
detected immediately by those around and often causes embarrassment.. In 
humans plan and action appear one reflexive process, with many actions 
occurring automatically as movement takes place, (ibid: 30). Bruner argues 
that in entering social situations we make use of minimal cues. We 'do not 
linger’ in our decisions about the nature of a situation (Bruner, 1974: 142).
Wood refers to semantics and pragmatics -  ‘hidden’ rules of communication 
-  how the meaning of utterances is influenced by the relationship between 
speaker and listener and the social situation (Wood, 1989: 162). It is 
suggested that a special type of mental structure called a script allows us to 
make sense of routine activities (Taber, 2002: 27). Joiner et al suggest that 
the simple presence of peers, even without communication, can significantly 
change outcomes (Joiner et al, 1998: 301).
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Can social situations be seen as composed of implicit and explicit levels?
To some extent the quote from Wood in the paragraph above, and the 
references in Donaldson suggest this implicit and explicit relationship. 
Donaldson is, I feel, arguing that the child attends to meaning and that the 
meaning is in the social situation rather than fixed firmly by formal logic or 
the literal meaning of questions (Donaldson, 1987: 69).
Bruner strongly supports this perspective with evidence from research in 
Africa. Facts are facts because the teacher says so -  there is no need for 
independent checking (Bruner, 1974: 48). Discussions are finished when an 
unanswerable point is made -  and social status often makes points 
unanswerable (ibid: 49). He sees social situations as divided into intrinsic 
and extrinsic elements (ibid: 78).
Lave and Wenger argue that legitimate participation unites thought and 
action in a culture to make one unified reality from which meaning emerges 
-  and that it very rarely emerges from any simple logical sequence (Lave 
and Wenger, 1996: 145).
To wbat extent does language share this automaticity of social 
situations?
The position of Stephen Pinker, drawing on Chomsky, would seem to be 
that language, while produced automatically and spontaneously through an 
innate mechanism, is highly rule-bound and structured and thus constrains 
situations through its internal logic ((Pinker, 1998: 118). Still draws on 
Wittgenstein to argue that language itself has implicit and explicit levels -  
in this case the pole of meaning on the one hand and, on the other its use to 
carry out actions and meet goals (Still, 1998: 92).
In fact there are strong arguments that there is a great deal of automaticity 
‘higher up’ a developmental space. Mithin argues very convincingly that 
humanity, from the beginning, had a form of social intelligence that enabled
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us to read the goals and feelings of the other, and that transfers into 
anthropomorphism, making it easier to form models of the behaviour of 
prey for example. This would suggest that much thinking is unreflective, 
drawing on unconscious assumed metaphor. Carol Feldman and David 
Kalmar argue that the mode of thought in which cognition naturally arises is 
narrative. Genre is a specific mode of thought arising from narrative and 
also imposed on it by the reader (Feldman and Kalmar, 1996: 1060). Again, 
there would be a series of assumptions about the ‘story’ that would inhibit 
reflection. Carey argues that an innate ‘folkpsychology’ acts as the structure 
on which more modem modes of thought, such as ‘folkbiology’, are based. 
The suggestion of innateness is not meant by Carey to suggest genetic 
determinism, but it is meant to suggest an inbuilt, automatic mechanism that 
is deployed reflexively in new situations (Carey, 1996: 190).
I find myself rethinking the role of speech. Throughout this study I have 
seen speech as one of the higher mental processes, by its very nature 
containing meaning. The unthinking adoption of vocabulary by the pupils, 
with very little reflection, forced me to look again.
Peter Smagorinsky argues that speech and other mediational tools are 
simultaneously higher mental functions and the intersubjective tools out of 
which the higher mental functions can be built (Smagorinsky, 1994). 
Tinker’s insistence on genetic determinism in language acquisition suggests 
a certain unthinking dimension to its use (Pinker, 1998: 118). Wittgenstein 
separates meaning from language use in determining action and goal 
(Wittgenstein quoted in Still, 1998:91).
What converts unthinking speech into a new conceptual understanding? My 
suspicion would be that metacognition, when we turn back and review our 
understanding in the light of a new concept, building new linkages and 
mental maps, is when speech and meaning unite.
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Encapsulation
An inbuilt automaticity could be taken as a strong reason why movement 
along a developmental space often does not lead to full concept formation. 
Without reflection mental structures dominated by perception, by language 
and by the internal assumptions built into modes of thought can form and 
persist. Vygotsky listed heaps, complexes and pseudo-concepts as mental 
structures that were likely to form, with only the pseudo-concepts persisting 
(Vygotsky, 1971: 59-67). Permanent structures, not formal concepts, that 
persist sound similar to some characterisations of misconception/alternative 
conception. Engestrom presents a new light on misconceptions or 
encapsulated knowledge when he presents the work of Wagenschein who 
argues, from a study on misconceptions about phases of the moon that 
schooling often produces ‘synthetic stupidity’ (Wagenschein quoted in 
Engestrom, 1996: 155). What is of special interest about the misconception 
-  that phases of the moon are caused by the Earth’s shadow -  is that it is 
easily disproved by direct observation. The argument is that ‘empty 
sentences’ formed in schooling actively block knowledge.
Engestrom produces a model of such learning where the object of school 
activity are not about the phenomena under study but about displaying the 
text presented (ibid: 157). This seems close to my own observation of task 
completion as a shared goal of classroom activity. The requirements of the 
tasks in the classroom observations were met by a formal representation of 
the information. The pupils seemed well aware of this and lacked interest in 
any need to produce meaning.
A similar finding was produced by Grady Venville in her study of concept 
formation in genetics. She found that on a four-step construction of what she 
described as an ontological pathway the vast majority of pupils (44 of 58) 
did not advance beyond level two (Venville, 1997: 201). If her pathway is
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seen as a developmental space then there is no reason to believe that the 
pupils will advance further from a particle understanding of genes and a 
form of encapsulation will have occurred.
Models for learning meaning
Engenstrom presents a number of models to overcome a tendency to 
‘encapsulation’ of knowledge in formal schooling;
Davydov’s view of ‘ascent to the practical’, where the curriculum is 
searched for key idea or models and these are then applied to explain 
phenomena. Davydov argues that this approach in ‘instructional 
psychology’ follows on automatically from what he sees as 
Vygotsky’s refutation of the formal local idea that concept formation 
proceeds through generalisation from the concrete to the abstract. 
(Davydov, 1985: 59-61).
Lave and Wenger’s view that ‘communities of practice’ be built 
within the school and authentic knowledge gained through legitimate 
participation.
Engestrom’s own view that schools be dedicated to critical study in 
broader networks of learning (Summaries of the models of Davydov, 
Lave and Wenger and Engenstrom in Engenstrom, 1996: 161-167).
I will return later to the issue of school learning in general. My view of 
concept formation is now rather similar to Davydov’s. We ascend to the 
practical in the sense that the concept itself is what forms and structures a 
formal understanding. Hood-Holtzman quotes Vygotsky in seeing method 
and language as simultaneously tool and result and I believe we can picture 
the concept as simultaneously tool and result (Hood-Holtzman, 1996: 89 ). 
Indeed Vygostky very explicitly makes the point that mastery of a new 
concept leads to a re-structuring of the ideas from which the concept arose -
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our understanding of number changes when we master algebra (Vygostky 
1971: 115). He argues elsewhere that sciences can only be understood 
‘backwards’ in that historical processes can only be understood in terms of 
their outcome (Vygostky, 1926: 14 ). Support for the idea of tool and result 
can be drawn from the mutualist view that social structures are both the 
object of social interaction and also the medium in which the interactions 
take place (Still, 1998: 93). The concept is at the endpoint of the 
developmental space and also the major factor structuring that space.
Left to itself the above statement sounds rather like a dogma. It does not 
make a great deal of sense to speak of a circular, self-referential explanation 
of concept formation or to appeal generally to an unspecified dialectical 
process. The concept must begin somewhere. I would speculate that the 
initial phase of concept formation lies in innate mental constructs such as 
Mithin’s concept of an innate social intelligence ((Mithin, 1996: 69) and in 
Carey’s idea of an innate folkpsychology (Carey, 1996: 210). These enable 
a human understanding of the protoconcept or model, lent structure by an 
automatic understanding of nanative and genre (Feldman and Kalmar,
1996: 1060). Bruner argues that the prepositional -  in this case the model -  
is dominated of necessity by the rule of the symbolic and that deduction, 
induction and abduction tame and decontextualise earlier modes (Bruner, 
1996: 99) The concept can then act as tool, re-examining ideas in a new 
light and building a ‘concept map’ which re-organises earlier ideas (Taber, 
2002:33).
A new model of a developmental space
From what has been said a new model would start with a structured situation 
based on existing conceptions or encapsulated knowledge. Ian Kinchin 
argues that each individual’s concept map is unique (Kinchin, 1998: 4), but 
in my view, by analogy with Donaldson’s findings on meaning in social 
situations, there are only a limited number of meanings that would be 
represented by such maps, even though individual maps would differ in less 
central respects.
page 158
Pupils w ould  estab lish  the abou tness o f the situation. I f  they  focus on 
im p lic it m ean ing  then they w ould  be in a position  to form  an in itia l narra tive  
concep t and, by app ly ing  the concep t to exem plar m ateria ls , develop  
m etacogn ition  and  transfer from  a narrative m ode o f  though t to form al 
scien tific  rep resen tation . I f  the pupils adopt an ex p lic it m ethod  o f  task 
com pletion  w ithou t understanding  the concep t then en capsu la tion  is the 
ou tcom e.
T he m odel is as fo llow s:
Figure 10.1 -  A new model of a developmental space
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The significance of emotion
It should be noted that the process depends on the initial structuring of the 
situation by the teacher taking place in an ‘area of tension’ -  that is, in the 
zone of proximal development. Mariane Hedegaard follows Leontiev in 
arguing that it is in the interaction between everyday concepts already 
acquired and scientific concepts in the process of being acquired that the 
ZPD lies and where instruction can take place (Leontiev reported in 
Hedegaard, 1996: 172). Ideas about establishing where this starting point is 
are provided by Cosgrove and Osborne and their ‘generative’ model of 
teaching and learning (Cosgrove and Osborne, 1985: 106)
Another crucial area is in the area of implicit and explicit meanings in the 
structured situation. It seems to me that this involves issues of the extent to 
which the teacher dominates the situation. In tutorial or interview situations 
the teachers’ implicit meaning dominates. In classroom activity and 
especially in group work, this is less likely. We hear stories of inspirational 
teachers able to impart their own vision of a subject to their pupils, but this 
seems an unlikely everyday method. What seems decisive is emotional 
charge, producing real anxiety in interview situations and contrasting with 
the pupil’s relaxed attitude in the group. Lois Hood-Holtzman notes that 
Vygotsky expressed concern about the separation of the intellectual and 
affective aspects of life -  but promptly forgot about the affective in the rest 
of his study (Hood-Holtzman, 1996: 80).
At one level paying attention to the role of emotion might lead the 
researcher to follow Watts and Bentley in suggesting ways to improve the 
classroom as a ‘non-threatening environment’ (Watts and Bentley, 1989: 
159). In my view what is at issue here is not emotion as feeling but emotion 
as pointer to action. Rita Carter tells the story of a patient, robbed of 
emotion by injury, who found it totally impossible to make effective 
decisions (Carter, 1998: 81).
page 160
From  this p erspective  w hat links in te llect and em otion is goal. It is w hen 
the pupil share the goal o f the teacher that she becom es em otionally  
involved . O ne o f  the special fea tu res o f school life is that the goal o f  
activ ity  is often no t c lear to the pupil and  no t shared  by them . W hen  the 
im plic it goal becom es exp lic it learn ing  occurs. W hen  the im p lic it and  
exp lic it d iverge  m ere schooling and  en capsu la tion  result.
T he new  m odel, app lied  to rep roduction , w ould  look like this:
Figure 10.2 
A developmental space for reproduction
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Conclusion
In chapter 101 looked again at my model of a developmental space. It did 
not hold up to the tests imposed by the research. In many ways it retained 
elements of Piagetian ‘discovery learning’ Implicit in the model was a 
solitary learner, ascending with little effort from activity to concept 
formation. In the real classroom intersubjectivity, culture and emotion 
define goals and, even in a dialectical process of concept formation, the 
concept tends to structure phenomena, not the other way around.
Drawing on the insights of the investigation and the literature I am 
proposing a new model. Like Davydov, I am ascending to the practical, 
from the general theoretical construct to the practical application 
(Summaries of Davydov, in Engenstrom, 1996: 161-167). The model is not i  
regarded as final, but hopefully presents a closer approximation to reality, i 
The task of redefining goals and guiding emotional engagement are difficult 
ones. Lois Hood-Holtzman claims that a definitive theory of learning will 
have to engage with history (Hood-Holtzman, 1996: 93). Given that in the 
history of many pupils there is the knowledge that school, like schooling, 
produces failure alongside success (McDermott, 1999: 18) we can see how 
difficult the generalisation of science concepts will remain.
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Chapter 11
Overview
Before I make any attempt at further development of the ideas in the main body 
of the thesis I intend to contact the objects of my research. I include in this my 
teaching colleagues and staff at the school, the pupils involved and their 
parents. Given that the responses and actions of the pupils and other actors are 
their own, to that extent the work is jointly produced with the pupils and others. 
If I apply the perspective of the research to the research itself it can appear, from 
my individual perspective, to make itself explicit as an individual work with 
one author. However the implicit framework is that I am embedded in a social 
situation where I depend on the responses and actions o f the pupils, the co­
operation of the parents and other members of the school community and a 
range of assumptions from the Open University and the academic community 
generally about what constitutes authentic and legitimate educational research.
Within that framework I have a number of responsibilities to the people who 
took part in the research. The most important of these is a duty o f care. The 
main duty of care is to ensure that no-one is harmed through being identified in 
the study. Clearly the school is relatively easy to identify, but I believe that I
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have encoded the information sufficiently and left a sufficient level of 
generality about pupil details to avoid the identification of individuals. I now 
want the subjects to reassure themselves of that and I want a mechanism where 
such consultation can take place but that is not so open as to demand 
amendment o f the work from pupils and parents when they feel no strong need 
to propose such amendments. The mechanism that I intend to use is a letter to 
all those involved, giving a brief outline of the structure o f the work and its 
findings and the extent to which observation of subjects plays a part in the 
work. I will inform the subjects that a full copy o f the thesis is available from 
the school librarian and that I am willing to discuss particular sections if  anyone 
feels they have been identified or their responses incorrectly interpreted (BERA, 
1992:2).
The research question
In some ways what I have attempted to do in this thesis is a classical journey in 
conceptual change as presented by Rosalind Driver (Driver et al, 1989:88) and 
to a certain extent reflects my final model of concept formation. I began with 
one model, used it as a tool to construct an investigation and research the 
literature and ended with a new model of concept formation. With this new 
model I can look back, with a changed gaze, on my earlier conceptions.
My research question asked
To what extent is it possible to define a developmental space based 
on Vygotsky’s theory that charts the learner’s movement, during 
classroom instruction, from initial perception and introduction of 
technical vocabulary as empty concepts to the internal development 
of fully formed concepts?
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The question was contextual in the sense that the focus o f investigation was 
not learning in general but classroom learning about the topic of reproduction 
in particular. Implied in the question was the expectation that it would both 
lead to an advance on Vygotsky’s theoretical standpoint and allow new  
insights from which both teaching and learning could be understood and that it 
would also allow the development o f specific strategies and teaching aids that 
would assist in the teaching and learning of reproduction.
It is my contention that I was successful in both areas. I was able to develop a 
general model as shown in figure 10.1 that, I believe, has a great deal o f  
explanatory power and, although complex, is not so complex as to become self- 
referential and would, in fact, generate a range o f questions that are testable and 
could be the focus o f further research.
I was also able to apply the model to the topic of reproduction (see figure 10.2) 
and generate a model of concept formation in this area that I have subsequently 
used as the basis of a teaching plan. This involved beginning with the human 
narrative -  beginning with the misconception of the asexual life cycle taught in 
primary school, constructing through teacher -  whole class discussion a 
narrative of human reproduction, looking at the ‘hidden story’ and constructing 
through teacher-pupil interaction an initial model of fertilisation and using the 
model to ‘ascend to the practical’ and explain plant pollination and fertilisation.
‘Internal tools’ used in the sequence that could be further developed as teaching 
aids were the asexual and sexual life cycle, the fertilisation model itself and the 
‘beetrip’ cartoons used as a sequencing device to construct a narrative o f plant 
reproduction. I was able to test this sequence with a new year eight group but 
was not able, in the time available, to study the results in any structured way
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and include them in the thesis. However my view is that concept formation 
using the fertilisation model appeared to occur in the majority of pupils and, in 
fact, appeared to be largely problem free.
A model of developmental space
A number of insights were generated from the final, general model o f a 
developmental space. The main insight is that the concept, in a sense, forms 
itself. It follows from this that activities based on ‘discovery learning’ and . 
group work, at least during the early stages o f concept formation, are largely 
misplaced, that learning occurs in the area of tension around the zone of 
proximal development and that this usually involves the pupil and a more 
knowledgeable other -  normally the teacher. The division between implicit 
and explicit demands of the situation in the classroom are normally resolved by 
task completion and this encourages ‘encapsulated knowledge’. Metacognition 
appears not to be a normal part of internal pupil activity. What I observed were 
interactions between the teacher and individual pupils, where teacher questions 
act as a sort o f  scaffolding. My intuition is that this is the precursor of  
metacognition occurring, as Vygotsky indicates with other mental structures, 
first outside the pupil in a social space. I believe that what is being learnt is  not 
only how to conceive o f the information presented in a structured way, but also 
the sorts of processes that will later allow the pupil to interrogate herself. This 
would suggest that metacognition is more important later in the developmental 
space and probably used more widely by more able pupils. I was unable to test 
this thesis because of the skew in my sample due to the fact that locally the 114- 
selection system still operated. What seems to be important overall is that 
the process of concept formation begins with the existing conceptions o f the 
pupil, that it engages initially with a ‘way of thinking’ familiar to the pupil -  
normally a narrative structure -  and a familiar ‘mode o f thinking’ -  normally 
Carey’s folkpsychology or Mithin’s ‘social intelligence’. My research did not
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contradict findings on pupils misconceptions/alternative conceptions as 
presented in Driver et al (Driver et al, 1994: 48). What it does do is follow  
Carey in arguing that some misconceptions may be spontaneous concepts 
formed through constraints on our ways of thinking and support the ideas o f  
Engstrom that other misconceptions are actually the products o f schooling -  
encapsulated mental structures falling outside the bounds of spontaneous 
concepts on the one hand and the structures of the formal concept on the other.
A key question that I have to deal with is the extent to which my new model is 
trustworthy and well founded. From a dialectical materialist perspective this can 
be regarded as two combined questions. At one pole the question is the extent 
to which the procedures o f the research were objective, the sample random, and 
the conclusions appear to be tightly bound to the data and observations. At the 
other pole I should indicate the extent to which the meaning I construct 'makes 
sense', stands as a plausible account of what I observed and is tightly bound into 
other conceptual frameworks. In my view the study is plausible both from the 
point of objective tests and from the point of view of providing coherent 
meaning.
The number of pupils involved in the project was reasonably large. The skew 
caused by selection would leave open the possibility that the responses may not 
be fully representative of more able pupils, but there seems little reason to doubt 
that what was observed would not be typical of many pupils and classes in 
secondary schools and many comprehensives. The behavioural aspect o f the 
interviews was caught in the timing and in the frequency of different types of 
response and I was able to compare and contrast the responses of different 
groups of pupils
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24 (2 groups of 12) pupils were involved in the classroom observations, with 16 
(2 groups of 8) normally in the foreground o f the video programme. The 24 
were members of my own science class, so this meant a further skew on the 
ability range -  the class had been drawn at random from the pool left following 
selection of a ‘top’ class -  for some reason this is referred to as ‘mixed ability’. 
There was a clear reactivity to the unusual circumstances o f the study - 1 had 
been forced to carry out the observations with groups rather than with whole 
classes. During the sessions there was initial reactivity to video equipment and 
to a much greater extent with audio equipment. I think that the pupils were 
more familiar with the now commonplace video camera that they were with the 
tape recorder. By using video I restricted very sharply what I could see.
On the other hand, all the indications were that most sources of reactivity died 
away during the early part o f the lessons and the pupils appeared to act in a 
rather unselfconscious way. By using the video I gave myself the opportunity to 
focus in on particular groups and individuals and on the microstructure o f the 
situation. I was able to view the situation over and over again and indulge in 
the reflection from which grounded theory could emerge.
The major behavioural aspect of the study was the influence o f the order in 
which tasks were attempted. It seems quite clear that the children faced 
substantially more difficulty in dealing with concepts of reproduction when 
introduced to them first through plant studies. The issue is the extent to which 
meaning can be assigned to this behaviour and to their behaviour in the study 
generally.
One question frequently put is the extent to which another observer, observing 
the same behaviours and situations, would come to the same conclusions about 
meaning. The answer seems to be that someone with a different ontology 
would see different meaning, but, as I have gone to some trouble to make clear
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the assumptions on which I base my observations, the work can be approached 
in two different ways. The first position is to assess the usefulness o f this 
perspective as one among others without deciding on its veracity. The problem 
with this approach, as outlined by Slife, is that this assumes a metatheory which 
overcomes the apparent contradictions between different approaches (Slife and 
Williams, 1995: 48). The other approach is to examine the areas o f conflict 
between this ontology and others and look at the conflict from the point of view  
of deciding which set of perspectives/observations most closely corresponds 
with reality. If one accepts a foundationist theory then the power to generalise 
and subsume simpler materialist and idealist positions may carry conviction.
I believe that, in addition to the outcomes of the research, some o f the 
instruments were of use and would deserve further investigation and 
refinement. Chief amongst these was the concept board. I found the initial 
interviews illuminating at a whole number of levels because o f the light the 
concept boards and cards cast on pupil thinking. The final interviews were 
much less effective and I believe that I was lucky in the initial interviews in 
having a tight focus on a very narrow area of concept formation and in setting 
the activity at the start of the zone of proximal development. Designing new  
sets of cards and boards to approach other areas o f concept formation would be 
difficult, but they would prove useful both as diagnostic and research tools.
The idea of a structured situation also proved very helpful in making sense of 
situations and allowing the space to develop grounded theory. On reflection I 
would argue that that what structured the situation was the concept and that, 
again, structured situations, where children are forced to assemble meaning 
from cues and object provided, would prove useful in diagnosis and research. It 
is worth noting that some constructions, such as the model flower, appeared to 
point outwards and not to be useful in concept formation.
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The value of research
In my view the educational research cycle is complete when it leads to change 
in the classroom or to change in the body of theory which itself leads to change 
in the classroom. Stenhouse appears to argue that the cycle can be 
encompassed within the individual teacher with his conception o f the ‘extended 
professional’ where he argues both that part of the duty o f the teacher is to carry 
on research to improve their practice and also that true teaching and learning 
are, in a sense, forms of open enquiry (Stenhouse, 1975: 157). However it 
appears clear from the context that he is in fact envisaging a community of  
teacher-researchers, with the education system transformed to acknowledge and 
reward the successful practitioner. Kenunis extends a further definition of the 
teacher-researcher in the conception o f ‘action research’. Here a central 
conception is the démocratisation o f a system apparently governed by elites 
(Kemmis, 1993: 179). The solution is to unite theory and practice as praxis, by 
recognising that theory is always a guide to action and it is the unity o f theory 
and practice in concrete situations and tasks that theory is tested (ibid: 182).
We are able to trust the outcome because the dialectic of movement between 
theory and practice is always emancipatory and allows us to break with habit 
and dogma and see things as they really are (ibid: 183). Again, the assumption 
is o f a community o f teacher-researchers working together, with the task o f 
researchers being to pull together and generalise the work o f the teacher- 
researchers. Martyn Hammersley replies, defending the relevance o f research 
and pointing out that claims that research is undemocratic rest on the 
assumption of particular kinds of participatory democracy (Hammersley, 1993: 
215) and that claims that the teacher is a skilled professional are contradictory 
to claims that she is also a researcher (ibid: 223).
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In my opinion neither argument is convincing. Kemmis seems to assume a 
variety o f Marxism called structuralism where class relationships replicate 
themselves in each institution o f society. This appears very unlikely. In reality 
there appears to be a division of labour which would justify research as a 
separate area. However Hammersley seems to underestimate the democratic 
deficit in education and the crisis of educational research -h e  himself quotes 
Gipps in indicating that the assumptions of educational reforms in the 1980’s 
run counter to the findings o f research (Gipps quoted in Hammersley, 1993: 
220).
In a review of a landmark report -  that of the ‘three wise men’ in 1992 -  
Hammersley and Scarth provide what I would consider to be the grounds for a 
more realistic model (Hammersley and Scarth, 1993: 216). They argue that the 
standard view would be that research informs the formation o f policy but that, 
in the case of the ‘three wise men’ not only is there research which runs counter 
to the conclusions of the report (ibid: 217) but that the report does not contain 
credible research evidence on which to base the conclusions -  and the authors 
admit this in the main body of the report (ibid: 219). My view would be that the 
explicit aspect of educational research is as the authors outline -  as informing 
policy. However there is also an implicit aspect -  that a major role o f education 
is to replicate the class relationships of society. In this case research becomes 
not a body o f information to be interpreted, but a weapon to be deployed in 
whatever way it can be used to meet the implicit needs of the situation.
However the two poles are to some extent independent. Educational theory has 
an internal logic which remains available -  even if  unused -  until a new shift 
comes in the balance of political forces and the direction of educational policy -  
this is perhaps the final lesson of a Vygotskyan perspective that we can draw 
from Vygotsky, whose own work was unknown to many researchers for so 
long.
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Following the research
So what then of my own research? I need to draw up a scheme o f work to 
formalise the teaching approach to reproduction that I have arrived at in the 
course of the study. This will serve as my practice in the future. It should be 
possible to extend the methods used to the practice of my immediate colleagues 
and also to other areas of the curriculum -  with relative ease to other issues in 
biology and with more thought to other aspects of the science curriculum.
There are a number o f broader research questions that could usefully be 
followed up and I will refer to these in a moment.
Is this the outcome? Some changes in my practice and possibly a small number 
of colleagues and acceptance (hopefully) of the thesis? This, after all, is the fate 
of most theses by teacher researchers (Bassey, 1999: 5). There are a number o f 
alternative outcomes:
A diffusion model -  the immediate outcomes of the research is taken up as 
good practice locally and gradually diffuse throughout the profession.
Weak transmission - 1 rewrite and publish the findings relating to teaching 
reproduction in the hope that this element of pedagogy is taken up generally.
Strong transmission - 1 rewrite and publish the findings relating to my general 
model in the hope that this is taken up generally by the research community and 
becomes available when there are future shifts in the political climate and the 
demands that society makes on education.
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I hope I will find the energy for the final element of strong transmission. There 
are a number o f reasons why I might expect interest from other researchers. A  
new perspective generates new areas for investigation and some o f those are 
already apparent.
I have already referred to ‘applied’ research where the general model o f a 
developmental space is brought to bear on specific areas o f the science
curriculum. It would be necessary also to do further work to refine the model.
It has a number of areas, such as automaticity and aboutness, that remain rather 
ill-defined. I also have in mind a number of broader issues that would be worthy 
of exploration.
Following Carey is it possible to define and differentiate a number o f domains 
of thought? What are the characteristics of particular domains? To what extent 
do they constrain thinking? Rogoff suggests that different ways o f thinking 
apply in different areas (Rogoff, 1999: 7). Could it be, for example, that an 
everyday physics would be more ‘Piagetian’ because elements of it would be 
prelinguistic while folkpsychology would be more ‘ Vygotskyian’.
It seems that here might be some value in an attempt to develop a taxonomy of 
concepts. A rough taxonomy of concepts in the classroom would look 
something like the following scheme. Pupils come to school with 
misconceptions/alternative conceptions (Driver et al). These can be long lasting 
and extremely resistant to change (Carey 1989: 107). Misconceptions may 
overlap with spontaneous concepts formed through experience or drawing upon 
metaphor -  for example the idea that the womb is some sort of garden in which 
a seed from the father grows (Driver et al, 1994: 48). In pilot interviews I came 
across teleological explanations of phenomena where an overarching concept is 
used to force meaning on events. In addition to superordinate concepts the
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concept can be structured by language itself, either by narrative structure or by 
logical structuring made possible by language. Vygotsky describes heaps and 
complexes. I have defined these earlier in the study and they appear to be seen 
as temporary structures. However Vygotsky also listed pseudoconcepts, with 
the structure of concepts but arrived at through concrete linkages rather than 
linked by formal logic. There appears to be some overlap between this idea and 
the idea of ‘encapsulated knowledge’ arrived at by Engestrom (Engestrom,
1996: 155). Vygotsky also identified formal concepts based on science as an 
outcome o f school knowledge but contrasts this with the mature concept, 
formed through the fusion of the formal and the spontaneous concept (Vygotsky 
1971:59-67).
The work o f Lave and Wenger seems to me to be of some importance. It 
appears to me, from my reading so far, that the concepts that develop in 
communities of practice are spontaneous ones. They specifically refer to 
concepts that are obtained implicitly, absorbed as a process o f cultural 
assimilation, and frequently only available in particular situations (Lave and 
Wenger 1999: 21-27). In contrast Vygotsky laid great stress on the formal, 
scientific aspect of school. One possibility would be that when the concept is 
available as a tool then metacognition and the formation of the formal concept 
can occur. When the concept is not available as an aspect of metacognition 
then the processes may well resemble those suggested by Lave and Wenger 
(ibid) and the students acculturate into ‘schooling’ -  a form of synthetic 
stupidity.
On a more general note we can speculate about how it might be possible to 
surpass schooling. My model suggests that students and teacher unite around a 
goal of task completion. One approach could be to develop a task o f authentic 
science, allowing a genuine emotional commitment that would unite implicit 
and explicit. Another possibility would be to make it explicit that the task of
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the student is to transform herself. In any case there would have to be major 
changes to the curriculum. The science concept would have to structure the 
science curriculum in ways that it does not appear to do so at the moment.
Finally we approach the boundary that separates sociology and psychology from 
philosophy. Piaget’s genetic epistemology rested on logic being inherent in 
nature and/or in the brain. Vygotsky argues very strongly that logic is a cultural 
construct, existing first in society outside the pupil and then constructed as an 
internal understanding. Post-modernism suggests that the person acting in a 
social setting is incommensurable. If all cultural constructs are equally valid 
then there is no foundationist bedrock on which science can rest. However if  
the concept works backwards to construct itself then there is an arrow to 
history. Not only does science allow greater control of nature and 
generalisation about its laws, it can point backwards to explain the material 
basis of earlier societies. Lacking the scientific concepts, not only can past 
societies not explain their future, they are unable to explain themselves. A  
dialectal materialist approach does not say that historical progress is inevitable. 
What it does say is that is possible, and that it is made possible by the 
contradiction between the ideal and the real. We can never hope to untangle 
one from the other, but we have to assume their existence if  we are to make 
sense of the world.
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Appendix A.l (Administration and ethics) 
Parental permission
Our Ref : JMc~VS~H 
January 2000 
Dear Parent
As part of my professional development in the school I am presently studying for the 
degree of Doctor of Education with the Open University.
As part of this line of study I will be investigating teaching and learning by Year 8 pupils in 
the area of plant reproduction.
I would like your permission to include c<f;orenamw, in this study.
The study will involve recording individual interviews, observation and recording of 
classroom activity, analysis of pupil work and access to pupils academic records. All names 
will be encoded to protect pupil privacy.
The information will eventually be published in the Open University thesis library, but you 
would be consulted before publication if information relating directly to your child is 
included.
Yours sincerely
J McAnulty
Please return to Mr McAnulty as soon as possible.
Forename Surname
I give permission for *Forename~ to be included in the research project being carried out 
by Mr McAnulty.
Signed:
(Parent/guardian)
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Appendix A.1.1 (Administration and ethics)
Doctorate in Education 
Case study on plant reproduction
Administrative permission
Dear Principal/colleagues,
I enclose a report of my Doctoral research to date.
I am about to embark on stage 2. This will involve a number of interviews 
and classroom observation of year 8 pupils, for which I will be seeking 
parental and administrative permission.
I will also be seeking support in a number of areas:
Technician time to help with interviews and observation 
Some sub cover when available
The help of other members of the science dept, in observing in my 
classroom.
Permission and substitute cover to observe some science lessons other than 
my own.
I hope the school community will find the study interesting and will be able 
to help.
Yours,
John McAnulty
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Appendix A.2 (Administration and ethics)
St Fergus’s code of conduct regarding interviews
Code of Conduct
1. Private Meetings with Pupils
• Staff should be aware of the dangers which may arise from private interviews with 
individual pupils. It is recognised that there will be occasions when confidential 
interviews must take place. As far as possible, staff should conduct such 
interviews in a room with visual access, or with the door open.
• Where such conditions cannot apply, staff are advised to ensure that 
another adult knows that the interview is taking place. It may be 
necessary to use a sign indicating that the room is in use, but it is not 
advisable to use signs prohibiting entry to the room.
• Where possible another pupil or (preferably) another adult should be present or 
nearby during the interview, and the school should take active measures to 
facilitate this.
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Appendix A 3 (Administration and ethics) 
Interview setup
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Appendix B.l
Human concept board
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Appendix B.2
Human concept cards for laydown on board
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Appendix B.3
Plant concept board
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Appendix B.4
Plant concept cards for laydown on board
page 190
Appendix B.5 
Sample interview record one
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Appendix B.6 
Sample interview record two
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page 192
Appendix B.7 
Sample interviews
sample interview subject ‘Tanya’
Humanist
T: tell me the story of the human life cycle
C OK., the baby is inside the woman., it comes out.... young baby...turns... 
young girl...turns... Teen boy or girl...adult...married.... go again 
(gesticulates at lot, pointing to cards)
T: can you point to where the new life first appears?
C: pointed silently to embryo
T: can you tell me any more about the new life or where it came from?
C: Hesitation (embarrassed) it starts as an egg., in the mothers stomach... 
and the man ... the father.... (trails off into silence)
T: That’s OK. Where did you get your knowledge?
C: Book
T: Just a Book
CY es
T; What book ? A library book?
C: Yes A library book
Plant board then completed
T: tell me the story of the Plant life cycle
C: (gesticulates at lot, pointing to cards much more so than in human) Peas 
come out of the pod... They are planted... watered by rain... roots come out. 
They grow up to the surface.... making the Petals... Then they come back 
(pointed to pod)
T: Can you point to where the new life first appears?
C: When you first see it?
C: When you first see it above ground?
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T: No. Just first see it.
C: peas to pod
T: Can you tell me any more about the new life or where it came from? 
C: it came from inside the fruit... or even a vegetable.
T: Where did you get your knowledge
C: A Book
T: A library Book?
C: No just a book in the house.
#
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INTITIAL INTERVIEWS 
Sample interview two 
subject: Steve
plant 1st
T: tell me the story of the human life cycle
Pupil ‘Steve’ Slowly turns cards over, reflects - adjusts on desk - more 
reflection - slow lay down pause in air - halt slow descent - final deep 
thought before decision - incorrect
T: Tell story
A: starts with baby - then toddler - then school - gets older - gets job 
Crosses hands and nods vaguely towards board
T: Newlife?
A: gestures to toddler with back of palm. At last moment shifts to 
neighbouring picture.
T: How new life formed?
A: I don't like to say. Nervous shrug with arms folded 
Next sequence Plant
Hesitant selection with rapid laydown, apparently at random. Pace 
accelerates. Task apparently to finish.
T; Story?
A: Peas - then plant. Folds arms defensively 
T: New life?
A: points to mature plant in a loose swing of the arm. At last moment 
diverts to neighbouring picture
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Appendix B.8 
First interviews 
Raw data summary
Human Human cycle
Pupil No. attempted completion correct
in sequence first time (sec) cycle
1 • y
2 y
3 y
4 181
5 254 y
6 101
7 62
8 155 y
9 100
10 54
11 85
12 45 y
13 70 y
14 64 y
15 158
16 23 y
17 88
18 42
19 58 y
20 53 y
21 60 y
22 62 y
23 51 y
24 57 y
25 36 y
26 37 y
27 53 y
28 39 y
29 105
30 35 y
31 48 y
32 80
33 30 y
34 92
35 80
36 67 y
37 25 y
38 53 y
39 * 27 y
40 68 y
41 48
Plant cyde seed
Pupil No. completion correct identified
in sequenc time (sec) cycle correctly 1 cycle?
1 y y y
2 y y
3 y y
4 170 y y
5 89 y
6 106 y
7 62 y y
8 435 y y
9 152 y
10 50 y
11 71 y
12 160 y y
13 55 y y
14 102
15 102 y
16 40 y y
17 78 y
18 37
19 43 y y
20 94 y
21 102 y
22 59 y y
23 176
24 127 y y
25 53 y y
26 85 y y y
27 41 y y
28 122 y
29 40 y y
30 70
31 60 y y
32 101 y
33 37 y y
34 127 y
35 50
36 80 y
37 122 y y
38 75 y
39 26 y y
40 117 y
41 42
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Appendix B.9 
First interviews 
Raw data summary
{ .............  I' ......
Pupil No.
in se q u e n c e c o m m e n t?
1 iinitiai reflection linked to  se t-d o w n  of c a rd s
2 a s k e d  a b o u t dua l c y c le . E x p ec te d  s in g le?
3 H um an se lf-co rrec ted  a t end . P lan t v s lo w  - lo ts of c a rd  rep lacing
4 nervous jum bling. A ttem pt a t  s in g le  c y c le  usin g  m ale  c a rd s
5 confusion . Ju m b le  of random  m ovem en t. "Hunting" m o v em en ts
6 Ju m b le  an d  confusion . F low er an d  s e e d  not recogn ised )
7 confusion  re so lw d  by ac tio n . R apid  m o vem en t a t  random
8 3 a tte m p ts .  Early z ig -zag  hunting m overm ent. S tru c tu re  d e d u c e d ? !
9 laydow n, reflection, rearran g e . P lan t a tte m p te d  1 c y c le  1 s t
10 sin g le  c y c le  d o m inen t
11 sin g le  c y c le  do m in en t
12 sin g le  c y c le  d o m inen t, th en  co rrec tion
13 Initial jum ble  j
14 co n fu sed  a b o u t p lan ts  *
15 co n fu sed  s in g le  c y c le  d o m inen t
16 c o n fu sed  j
17 sin g le  c y c le  do m in en t
18 h e s ita n t re-s tructu rIng  s in g le  c y c le  dom inen t
19 decisive , confiden t, wrong
20 delibera tion  an d  reflection
21 crow ing co n fid en ce  a s  m ove to  plant
22 confiden t
23 d ed u ctio n
24 lay-dow n, th e n  con so lid a tio n
25 relectlon  with p lan t j
26 delibera tion  an d  laydow n, so m e  su rp r ise  a t dual c y c le
27 confident
28 so lved  p lan t p u z z le  - m anipu lation  an d  ded u ctio n .
29 z ing le  c y c le  h u m an  - th en  confusion .
30 delibera tion  m anipu lation
31 so lved  p lan t p u z z le  - m anipulation  an d  d ed u ctio n . - grow ing a s s u r a n c e .
32 s in g le  c y c le  j
33 confiden t. P lan t reflection.
34 ded u ctio n
35 both  narra tives c o rrec t
36 s u c c e s s fu l  ded u ctio n
37 confiden t an d  su re
38 V careful d ed u ctio n  In bptj c a s e s
39 confiden t ded u ctio n
40 confusion , sin g le  c y c le
41 F inish  fa s t to  g e t ou t of situ a tio n .
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Appendix C .l 
Classroom observation setup
CLASS SETUP (A AND B GROUPS ROTATING)
CAMERA 2
TAPE 2
TA PEl
CAMERA 1
DOOR
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Appendix C.2 
Classroom observation instrument 
Model flower kit
V
Yi flÊWL
Build - a - flower
The Carpel ( female bit)
Insert 4 ovules into the ovary. Push in a small piece of cotton wool to keep 
things in place. Push the style into the top of the ovary. Stick the stigma on 
top of the style. Rub the top of the stigma with glue - It should be slightly 
sticky Leave the finished carpel to one side.
The stamen (male bit)
Push the filament into the anther. Put some glue on the anther. Go to the 
dish in the middle of the room and coat the anther with pollen. Leave the 
finished stamen to one side
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The Flower
Push the carpel into the receptacle. Cut out and stick 4 petals inside the 
receptacle. Using bits of plasticene, stick the 4 stamens inside the 
receptacle. Stick 4 sepals to the outside of the receptacle. Using a large 
marker, write your names on a piece of card and set it beside your 
completed flower. Ask your teacher to photograph the completed flower.
If you have time draw a cutaway labelled diagram of your flower. Compare 
it with a diagram in your book. In what ways it is like a real flower? Unlike?
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Appendix C.3 
flower kit 
‘m utation’
/
One group completed the flower early (and incorrectly) and the 
mutation was copied around the room without hesitation or reflection
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Appendix C.4 
Classroom observation 
‘Beetrip’
A Flower
Forms
The bee 
Collects pollen
3 .(3 ;
A bee
v isits  th e  flow er
The flower 
W ith e rs  t r o
The bee
v isits  an o th e r  flow er ^
A f r u i t
is le f t  behind. S eeds a re  inside ^
The pupil was happy with the incorrect sequence until corrected by the teacher. She 
corrected it by copying from group B2, again without reflection.
page 202
Appendix C.5 
Classroom observation
Model flower group B1 
Bart and Andy
Teacher (T) gives out flower kits and issues instructions about reading the 
worksheet and following instructions.
Bart (ADHD) imitates Opera singer -  Andy admiring
B ‘Can I start Sir?’
T ignores -  talks to Girls.
B removes plastic tubes from kit -  makes two antlers Andy admiring. 
Giggles
B Nose attachments 
B blows tubes across desk 
B recovers tubes -  fangs
T Girls did not read instructions -  demand verbal instruction from teacher 
B runs fangs across desk. Andy bored, examining work kit 
Girls demand further instructuuin
Andy starts work takes carpel from Bart. Bart joins in work for a time. 
Class deep concentration for a time during assembly of model flow er.
B Carpel as eyelashes
B imitation Quasimodo imitation - Andy and boys irritated.
Other -  Bart’s deviant behaviour is accompanied by rapid glances to 
establish position of teacher. Other pupils initially amused but then 
annoyed ant not being allowed to go on task.
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Appendix C.6
Classroom observation -  Brian and Martin
A 3 beetrip 
Brian and Martin
T instructions about assembly of Beetrip narrative.
BR bored, plays with audio recorder, accuses M of breaking it, winks at 
Dave.
M patiently assembles components of cartoon by cutting out 
BR ignores him, chats to Roy across desk.
M completes cut-out
BR burst of energy -  quick unthinking shuffle -  ‘You stick it down’ he tells 
M
M, unsure, poles at components -  quite clearly wrong but he is reluctant to 
tell BR
BR plays absently with audio recorder, chats to Roy.
Roy anxious about the cartoon assembly, hand up, but can’t get teacher 
attention
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BR overhears teacher advice to Dave. Longer more purposeful period of 
activity. Discussion with Martin about position of Bees, resolved on basis 
that BR is the dominant figure.
BR. Back to play -  cartoon wrong but settled.
M unsure but lets card slip (without following second ‘stick it down’ 
instruction)
T arrives -  series of rapid questions What is the cartoon supposed to show? 
Role of Bees. Why two Bees? Are they doing different things? If so what?
Reflection by Brian -  sudden comprehension
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Appendix C.7 
Classroom observation 
Fertilisation
Put the following in the correct sequence and write a sentence about each so 
as to tell the story of pollination and fertilisation
Ovule
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Appendix D .l  
Final interview schedule
The interview schedule was as follows:
1. Here are cutouts of a frog life cycle. Can you set them down to tell 
the story of the of the frog life cycle? (The time to set out the cycle 
was recorded.)
2. Can you ^  me the story of the frog life cycle?
3. Here is a diagram of a way of growing carrots indoors). You chop 
up the carrot, put the pieces in a special jelly and you get lots of 
small carrots. Scientists call this asexual reproduction. Why is it 
called reproduction?
4. Why is it called asexual?
5. Here is a cutaway picture of the inside of a flower. Can you point to 
the male bit?
6. Can you point to the female bit?
7. Now, can you tell me why the male bit is called the male bit?
8. Now, can you tell me why the female bit is called the female bit?
This is a picture of a seed. A few seconds before it was there as you see it, 
but it wasn’t a seed. What has happened to turn it into a seed? (If response 
is fertilisation, ask what that means).
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Appendix D.2
Final interview schedule
Here is a diagram of a 
way of growing carrots 
indoors). You chop up 
the carrot, put the pieces 
in a special jelly and you 
get lots of small carrots. 
Scientists call this asex­
ual reproduction. Why 
is it called reproduction?
Why is it called asexual?
Here is a cutaway pic­
ture of the inside 
of a flower. Can 
you point to the 
male bit?
Can you point to the fe­
male bit?
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Final interview schedule
This is a picture of a seed. A few seconds before it was there as you see it, 
but it wasn’t a seed. What has happened to turn it into a seed? (If response 
is fertilisation, ask what that means).
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Final interview schedule
fertnized egg
Here are cutouts of a frog life cycle. Can you set them down to tell 
the story of the of the frog life cycle? (The time to set out the cycle 
was recorded.)
Can you tell me the story of the frog life cycle?
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Appendix E  
Final interviews: raw data summary
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Appendix F .l  School knowledge 
KS3 curriculum content (NI CCEA)
Reproduction
PLANTS
learn about the structure and functions of the component parts of the flower 
(limited to a named dicotyledonous plant), including name the parts - sepals, 
petals, nectaries, stamens, (anthers and filaments), carpels (stigma, style and 
ovary) and receptacle,
. self and cross-pollination, insects and wind as agents of pollination,
• finit and seed dispersal - wind, animals, water and explosive mechanisms,
• seed structure - radide, plumule, cotyledon, testa, endosperm, • seed 
germination (limited to a hypogeal seed),
• investigate the conditions which affect germination - temperature, adequate 
water, oxygen supply;
ANIMALS
be introduced to the stracture and functions of the component parts of the 
reproductive systems in humans, including:
naming the parts of the male system - testes, scrotum, sperm ducts, prostate 
gland, urethra and penis,
naming the parts of the female system - ovaries, oviducts, uterus, cervix, vagina 
and vulva,
fertilisation in the oviduct, role of the placenta, birth (limited to contraction of 
the utems and dilation of the cervix)
find our about the requirements to maintain healthy bodies and healthy babies 
during pregnancy, including diet. Rubella, smoking, alcohol, and drugs;
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Appendix F.2 
School knowledge 
NICCEA KS3 sample questions
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